Hersh: In an unstable Pakistan, can nuclear warheads be kept safe?


Seymour Hersh | Nov 16 Issue | New Yorker

Obama did not say so, but current and former officials said in interviews in Washington and Pakistan that his Administration has been negotiating highly sensitive understandings with the Pakistani military. These would allow specially trained American units to provide added security for the Pakistani arsenal in case of a crisis. At the same time, the Pakistani military would be given money to equip and train Pakistani soldiers and to improve their housing and facilities—goals that General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the chief of the Pakistan Army, has long desired. In June, Congress approved a four-hundred-million-dollar request for what the Administration called the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, providing immediate assistance to the Pakistan Army for equipment, training, and “renovation and construction.”

The secrecy surrounding the understandings was important because there is growing antipathy toward America in Pakistan, as well as a history of distrust. Many Pakistanis believe that America’s true goal is not to keep their weapons safe but to diminish or destroy the Pakistani nuclear complex. The arsenal is a source of great pride among Pakistanis, who view the weapons as symbols of their nation’s status and as an essential deterrent against an attack by India. (India’s first nuclear test took place in 1974, Pakistan’s in 1998.)

Seymour Hersh | Nov 16 Issue | New Yorker

In the tumultuous days leading up to the Pakistan Army’s ground offensive in the tribal area of South Waziristan, which began on October 17th, the Pakistani Taliban attacked what should have been some of the country’s best-guarded targets. In the most brazen strike, ten gunmen penetrated the Army’s main headquarters, in Rawalpindi, instigating a twenty-two-hour standoff that left twenty-three dead and the military thoroughly embarrassed. The terrorists had been dressed in Army uniforms. There were also attacks on police installations in Peshawar and Lahore, and, once the offensive began, an Army general was shot dead by gunmen on motorcycles on the streets of Islamabad, the capital. The assassins clearly had advance knowledge of the general’s route, indicating that they had contacts and allies inside the security forces.

Pakistan has been a nuclear power for two decades, and has an estimated eighty to a hundred warheads, scattered in facilities around the country. The success of the latest attacks raised an obvious question: Are the bombs safe? Asked this question the day after the Rawalpindi raid, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, “We have confidence in the Pakistani government and the military’s control over nuclear weapons.” Clinton—whose own visit to Pakistan, two weeks later, would be disrupted by more terrorist bombs—added that, despite the attacks by the Taliban, “we see no evidence that they are going to take over the state.”

Clinton’s words sounded reassuring, and several current and former officials also said in interviews that the Pakistan Army was in full control of the nuclear arsenal. But the Taliban overrunning Islamabad is not the only, or even the greatest, concern. The principal fear is mutiny—that extremists inside the Pakistani military might stage a coup, take control of some nuclear assets, or even divert a warhead.

On April 29th, President Obama was asked at a news conference whether he could reassure the American people that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal could be kept away from terrorists. Obama’s answer remains the clearest delineation of the Administration’s public posture. He was, he said, “gravely concerned” about the fragility of the civilian government of President Asif Ali Zardari. “Their biggest threat right now comes internally,” Obama said. “We have huge . . . national-security interests in making sure that Pakistan is stable and that you don’t end up having a nuclear-armed militant state.” The United States, he said, could “make sure that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is secure—primarily, initially, because the Pakistan Army, I think, recognizes the hazards of those weapons’ falling into the wrong hands.”

The questioner, Chuck Todd, of NBC, began asking whether the American military could, if necessary, move in and secure Pakistan’s bombs. Obama did not let Todd finish. “I’m not going to engage in hypotheticals of that sort,” he said. “I feel confident that the nuclear arsenal will remain out of militant hands. O.K.?”

Obama did not say so, but current and former officials said in interviews in Washington and Pakistan that his Administration has been negotiating highly sensitive understandings with the Pakistani military. These would allow specially trained American units to provide added security for the Pakistani arsenal in case of a crisis. At the same time, the Pakistani military would be given money to equip and train Pakistani soldiers and to improve their housing and facilities—goals that General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the chief of the Pakistan Army, has long desired. In June, Congress approved a four-hundred-million-dollar request for what the Administration called the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, providing immediate assistance to the Pakistan Army for equipment, training, and “renovation and construction.”

The secrecy surrounding the understandings was important because there is growing antipathy toward America in Pakistan, as well as a history of distrust. Many Pakistanis believe that America’s true goal is not to keep their weapons safe but to diminish or destroy the Pakistani nuclear complex. The arsenal is a source of great pride among Pakistanis, who view the weapons as symbols of their nation’s status and as an essential deterrent against an attack by India. (India’s first nuclear test took place in 1974, Pakistan’s in 1998.)

A senior Pakistani official who has close ties to Zardari exploded with anger during an interview when the subject turned to the American demands for more information about the arsenal. After the September 11th attacks, he said, there had been an understanding between the Bush Administration and then President Pervez Musharraf “over what Pakistan had and did not have.” Today, he said, “you’d like control of our day-to-day deployment. But why should we give it to you? Even if there was a military coup d’état in Pakistan, no one is going to give up total control of our nuclear weapons. Never. Why are you not afraid of India’s nuclear weapons?” the official asked. “Because India is your friend, and the longtime policies of America and India converge. Between you and the Indians, you will fuck us in every way. The truth is that our weapons are less of a problem for the Obama Administration than finding a respectable way out of Afghanistan.”

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Tina November 8, 2009 - 11:18am

The author of this post publishes at "Five Rupees," one of the best Pakistani blogs. The critique ends by saying of the Hersh story: "It's all bull shit." The Hersh piece is very good and so is this sharp ane elegant response. The Taliban terror attacks he references are troubling, particularly if you have to endure them. The attacks, however, are producing strong demands for much better security and they've had the effect of cratering the limited support that the Taliban and other radicals prior to the events that started in Swat.
----------------------

Five Rupees Blog, Pakistan, Nov. 8 on Hersh Story:

This Will Go Over Well With The Zaid Hamid/Shireen Mazari/Ahmad Qurashi Crowd: The US Has Plans To Guard Pakistani Nukes In The Event Of A Mutiny
Posted by Ahsan at 6:48 AM

Apologies for the long title. This is from Sy Hersh's latest piece in the New Yorker:

Obama did not say so, but current and former officials said in interviews in Washington and Pakistan that his Administration has been negotiating highly sensitive understandings with the Pakistani military. These would allow specially trained American units to provide added security for the Pakistani [nuclear] arsenal in case of a crisis.

That's not even the best part of the the story. This is:

A senior Pakistani official who has close ties to Zardari exploded with anger during an interview when the subject turned to the American demands for more information about the arsenal. After the September 11th attacks, he said, there had been an understanding between the Bush Administration and then President Pervez Musharraf “over what Pakistan had and did not have.” Today, he said, “you’d like control of our day-to-day deployment. But why should we give it to you? Even if there was a military coup d’état in Pakistan, no one is going to give up total control of our nuclear weapons. Never. Why are you not afraid of India's nuclear weapons?” the official asked. “Because India is your friend, and the longtime policies of America and India converge. Between you and the Indians, you will fuck us in every way."

Alright, loyal readers. Set everything aside and try and figure this one out with me: who's this "senior Pakistani official"? You guys are very smart, so I know we can do this. We know that:

1. It's a man (ruling out Farahnaz Ispahani and Sherry Rehman).
2. It's someone unguarded enough to speak to Sy Hersh, even if it's off the record (ruling out anyone in an actual position of national power, such as Gillani, because they're all scared shitless of the Western press).
3. It's someone who is claimed to be to close to Zardari (ruling out 99.999999999% of Pakistan's population).
4. It's someone who feels comfortable using the word "fuck" in an interview (ruling out people who don't feel comfortable speaking in English in a natural way, such as Rehman Malik).
5. It's someone who has traces of anti-Indian sentiment (ruling out Husain Haqqani).

My guess is Salman Taseer. I know it's out there, but I always like darkhorses/underdogs in my betting schemes. Thoughts?

UPDATE: I just realized that in writing this post, I neglected to exhort you to go read the whole piece. It's really, really entertaining, and contains all sorts of juicy quotes. Say this for the New Yorker: their investigative reporting and feature writing is never, ever, EVER boring. Take twenty minutes out of your day to read the whole thing -- trust me.

UPDATE II: People may conclude based on the title of this post that the U.S. actually has contingency plans for safeguarding Pakistani nukes (uh, my bad for leading you on). If you read the actual piece, you'll realize very quickly that that is highly, highly unlikely. They (the Americans) don't actually have any real information because the military (quite rightly, in my view) refuses to be truthful on matters of nuclear security when discussing it with them. In a word, it's all bullshit.

From Five Rupees Nov. 8 (Pakistani Blog)

Michael Collins November 8, 2009 - 4:56pm
Tina November 10, 2009 - 1:13pm

Published: Nov. 10, 2009 at 12:45 PM

WASHINGTON, Nov. 10 (UPI) -- The United States has no intention of taking control of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal as Islamabad deals with a growing insurgent threat, Washington said.

Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Seymour Hersch writing in The New Yorker implies Washington and Islamabad have made arrangements that "would allow specially trained American units to provide added security for the Pakistani arsenal in case of a crisis."

Gen. Tariq Majid, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff for the Pakistani military, bluntly rejected the allegations, noting Pakistan had the resources to protect its nuclear material, Pakistan's Dawn newspaper reports.

"Our security apparatus has the capacity and is fully geared to meet all conceivable challenges, therefore we do not need to negotiate with any other country to physically augment our security forces, which in any case, we believe, are more capable than their forces," he stressed.

His comments were echoed by Ian Kelly, a spokesman for the U.S. State Department, who told reporters that while Washington does offer assistance in terms of security and other initiatives, there are no plans to seize Pakistani nuclear materials.

"We have confidence in the ability of the Pakistani government to provide adequate security for their nuclear programs and materials," he said. "And we have a number of security assistance initiatives that are focused on strengthening counterinsurgency capacities to foster stability."

Tina November 10, 2009 - 2:09pm

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