Sean-Paul Kelley | San Antonio | May 13
The Agonist - Yesterday I spent some time going over this post and re-reading the pertinent sections of Henry A. Kissinger's "A World Restored." Here's what I came up with:
Fortuitously, at least for me, Henry the K wrote this piece at the IHT. In it, Kissinger identifies some thought provoking historical parallels:
"Though advanced as a new doctrine, the regime-change prescription follows well-established precedent. It was the impetus behind the religious wars of the 17th century, the wars of the French Revolution in the 18th and early 19th centuries, the Holy Alliance, the Trotskyite version of Communism, and the contemporary Muslim Jihad."
John Judis has called this "inverted Trotskyism." And Andrew Bacevich shows how the adoption of this ideology and the subsequent invasion of Iraq have morphed a hitherto status quo power into revolutionary one:
"[Iraq has transformed] US foreign policy; not preserving the status quo but promoting a revolutionary change [that] would thereafter define the main purpose of American statecraft."
The old system, based on legitimacy, and defined by Kissinger here,
"Legitimacy . . . means no more than an international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy, "
. . . is out. Today the UN, in particular, is under attack, and multi-lateralism receives a broad-based and general assault. The Bush-Bolton Battering Band and the Cheney-Wolfowitz wrecking crew have destroyed the order we created in the aftermath of WWII. At the same time, just like the Concert of Europe, by inviting too many members into the club, was watered down in post-Napoleonic Europe, NATO has duplicated the same process. A new order isn't really in the offing as of yet. Indeed, the current state of affairs can continue, as the collapse of Concert of Europe did, for a great deal of time. But the revolutionary state is not permanent. Something else will replace it at some point. My gander is that it will not be to our liking. And the upheaval that replaces the old order will be like all the others that have come before it: extremely destructive.
So, just how does a revolutionary power affect an international system? For that we turn to Henry the K:
"Whenever the exists a power which considers the international order or the manner of legitimizing it oppressive, relations between it and other powers will be revolutionary. In such cases, it is not the adjustment of differences within a given system which will be at issue, but the system itself. Adjustments are possible, but they will be conceived as tactical maneuvers to consolidate positions for the inevitable showdown, or as tools t undermine the morale of the antagonist. To be sure, the motivation of the revolutionary power may well be defensive; it may well be sincere in its protestations of feeling threatened. But the distinguishing feature of a revolutionary power is not that it feels threatened--such feeling is inherent in the nature of international relations based on sovereign states--but that nothing can reassure it. (Emphasis in oriinal) Only absolute security--the neutralization of the opponent--is considered a sufficient guarantee, and thus the desire of one power for absolute security means absolute insecurity for all others."
Sound familiar? America used to have absolute security, or at least the illusion of it (two big oceans). But, after 9/11, not anymore. And I think the primal fear 9/11 unleashed is the one thing that has led so many Americans into the Neo-Con embrace.
Like Kissinger, I am concerned about the impact this ideology will have on the current international system:
"And because in revolutionary situations the contending systems are less concerned with the adjustment of differences than with the subversion of loyalties, diplomacy is replaced either by war or by an armaments race."
To a great degree this is already happening in East Asia. China's military spending is increasing rapidly. So is India's, not to mention the smaller powers of the region. Of course, Japan flirts, from time to time, with the idea of changing its pacifist constitution too.
In my previous post I cited some concerns for the future:
I fret about the limitlessness of the Bush Doctrine. In the previous post I wrote that that if the doctrine were taken to its logical conclusion, it might possibly be the overthrow of the Chinese-Communist regime, the Uzbek regime and the Pakistani regime. These are hardly plausible options, but we should remember the other many implausible actions other revolutionary powers have taken in the past.
I also asked, "how far is too far?"
I just don't know, but I can say that when we get there, a coalition of powers will be aligned against us. And like I said earlier in this post, it won't be pleasant.
The real problem, however, is that most people don't recognize the danger and if they do, well, this quote is instructive:
"Those who warn against the danger in time are considered alarmists; those who counsel adaptation to circumstance are considered balanced and sane, for they have all the good "reasons" on their side: the arguments accepted as valid in the existing framework."
As a final note, let me just add, I may well indeed be wrong. (It's certainly happened before.) Bush may end up being as popular and succesful as Reagan, in that Reagan "transformed" the Soviet Union and Bush will transform the Middle East.
For my children's sake, I certainly hope Bush succeeds.