Sean-Paul Kelley | San Antonio | May 11
The Agonist - On Monday I highlighted a short passage from Henry Kissinger's doctoral dissertation that typifies what eventually happens to a revolutionary/revisionist power. This quote was meant to be an adjunct to this post where I blasted Bush for his historical revisionism.
It's very important to divine where this revisionism is taking us, but first I want to delve into its pedigree. And for that, we turn to Andrew Bacevich's book, "The New American Militarism."
At the end of the Cold War it seemed most, if not all, of Europe's questions were settled. Germany reunified. Poland, Germany and Russia settled their lingering border disputes. The Baltics gained independence and acceptance. The Czech and Slovak Republics divorced without a nasty custody battle. Of course, South Eastern Europe has its problems yet, but they appear, thus far, to be manageable.
More after the jump.
With little happening in their European playground the neocons turned inward. For a time they were adrift amidst the flotsam and jetsam of Clinton's presidency. At one point, writes Bacevich, "[Podhoretz] even pronounced the neoconservative project dead." Soon, however, the second generation neoconservatives eclipsed their elders and sought the transformation of a region far more difficult and contentious than Europe during the Cold War. With the Greater Middle East firmly in their sights,
the Aim of this second generation was to prod the United States into seizing the strategic offensive. In 1979, Podhoretz had written disparagingly that the "fondest wish" of the New Left had "been to turn the United States around altogether--from a counterrevolutionary power into an active sponsor" of revolution. Within a decade, that became the fondest wish of Neoconservatives--soon enough including Podhoretz himself. Neocons aimed to convert the United States into an instrument for fulfilling their own revolutionary dreams.
This project was well underway, writes Bacevich, before 9/11. Indeed, by 9/11 the first step in this global endevaor, regime change in the Middle East, was already official American policy. So, what are the guiding principles of this new project?
Five key convictions "form the foundation" of this revolutionary-revisionism:
- America's status as hegemon is benign. Other states see it thus.
- Any failure to police this new "imperium" would result in "global disorder.
- Nothing is more efficacious to the policing of this order than American force.
- American must "sustain and enhance" its military supremacy.
- Classical foreign policy realism, in the Scowcroft-Kissinger vein, is devoid of ideas and in the Powell vein, relies on an excess of caution.
The first four convictions might possibly be used in the formation of a staus-quo hegemony. But number five is a sure giveaway that the neocons want more, a lot more. Unlike the status-quoism of the British Empire, they seek to overturn the existing global order. They're not interested in a stable empire, but in revision, an idea that is best conveyed by this question from Robert Kagan:
If the United States is founded on universal principles, how can Americans practice amoral indifference when those principles are under siege around the world?
I myself confess that this is a tempting state of affairs. It panders to my innate sense of American exceptionalism. Taking the question to its logical conclusion, however, reveals significant shortcomings, not too mention quite a bit of risk, risk that turns off my cautious inner realist. After all, wouldn't this policy require us to overthrow regimes like that of Karimov's in Uzbekistan, and possibly even the Communist regime in Beijing?
What's most important about the five principles outlined above is how they affirm American prejudices, in ways similar to the whole neocon project. It's easy for Americans to digest and accept these ideas. Their inherent appeal to all things American, typified best by this reader's thoughtful and incisive response show how such idealism is hard to refute. And it's difficult, damn near impossible, for realists to counter such ideas. After all, when you are winning, and sure of yourself, who's interested in appeals to caution? How can you possibly be going to far, in the face of victory after victory? To ask is to be a bore; they're good leaders and know what they are doing. They'll know when to stop.
If the neo-con project were limited to the Greater Middle-East I might be able to swallow it. After all, it has been reasonably successful in some countries thus far, liberal carping about who gets credit notwithstanding.
But, as we've seen recently with Bush in Russia, it's not limited to the Greater Middle-East. The neo-cons want it all, history included. It includes the Caucasus region, the Caspain Basin, Central and North East Asia and more. This limitlessness is what worries me most. How far is too far? And what happens when you get there?
That there are significant dangers attendant to such a policy is obvious, but in today's climate, you're a pessimist, or worse, to bring them up. But the dangers are real, and to those I will return in a subsequent post.
edited slightly for clarity.