Sometimes it becomes obvious that people pay for stupidity, assuming that intelligence will then provide the reply for free. Suffice it to say that The Washington Post needs to fire it's idiot reporter who gets trade history wrong. American protectionism, and indeed the trade war, did not start with 1930's Smoot-Hawley. Let me take a section from the Department of State, entitled Protectionism in the interwar period:
In the decade after the end of the First World War, the United States continued to embrace the high tariffs that had characterized its trade policy since the Civil War. These were enacted, in part, to appease domestic constituencies, but ultimately they served to hinder international economic cooperation and trade in the late 1920s and early 1930s.
High tariffs were a means not only of protecting infant industries, but of generating revenue for the federal government. They were also a mainstay of the Republican Party, which dominated the Washington political scene after the Civil War. After the Democrats, who supported freer trade, captured Congress and the White House in the elections of 1910 and 1912, the stage was set for a change in tariff policy. With the 1913 Underwood-Simmons Tariff, the United States broke with its tradition of protectionism, enacting legislation that lowered tariffs (and also instituted an income tax). The reversion of Congress to Republican control during the First World War and the 1920 election of Republican Warren Harding to the presidency signaled an end to the experiment with lower tariffs. To provide protection for American farmers, whose wartime markets in Europe were disappearing with the recovery of European agricultural production, as well as U.S. industries that had been stimulated by the war, Congress passed the temporary Emergency Tariff Act in 1921, followed a year later by the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act of 1922. The Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act raised tariffs above the level set in 1913; it also authorized the president to raise or lower a given tariff rate by 50% in order to even out foreign and domestic production costs. One unintended consequence of the Fordney-McCumber tariff was that it made it more difficult for European nations to export to the United States and so earn dollars to service their war debts.
Despite the Fordney-McCumber tariff, the plight of the American farmer continued. The wartime expansion of non-European agricultural production had led, with the recovery of European producers, to overproduction during the 1920s. This in turn had led to declining farm prices during the second half of the decade. During the 1928 election campaign, Republican presidential candidate Herbert Hoover pledged to help the beleaguered farmer by, among other things, raising tariff levels on agricultural products. But once the tariff schedule revision process got started, it proved impossible to stop. Calls for increased protection flooded in from industrial sector special interest groups and soon a bill meant to provide relief for farmers became a means to raise tariffs in all sectors of the economy. When the dust had settled, Congress had produced a piece of legislation, the Tariff Act of 1930, more commonly known as the Smoot-Hawley tariff, that entrenched the protectionism of the Fordney-McCumber tariff.
Scholars disagree over the extent of protection actually afforded by the Smoot-Hawley tariff; they also differ over the issue of whether the tariff provoked a wave of foreign retaliation that plunged the world deeper into the Great Depression. What is certain, however, is that Smoot-Hawley did nothing to foster cooperation among nations in either the economic or political realm during a perilous era in international relations. It quickly became a symbol of the "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies of the 1930s. Such policies, which were adopted by many countries during this time, contributed to a drastic contraction of international trade. For example, U.S. imports from Europe declined from a 1929 high of $1,334 million to just $390 million in 1932, while U.S. exports to Europe fell from $2,341 million in 1929 to $784 million in 1932. Overall, world trade declined by some 66% between 1929 and 1934.
Key points: Smoot-Hawley made things worse, there is no real consensus on whether it started a trade war, and it was the continuation of a policy of Republican Tariffs that had only briefly been reversed.
The reporter feeds into the myth that the US had some kind of Free Trade before Smoot-Hawley. In fact, America had had high tariffs as part of Republican party policy for most of the post-civil war period, with only periodic easings of protective grip. Paul Bairoch tries to make a case for a "non-protectionist" 1920's arguing against the broader conception of the 1920's as protectionist, and the best he can come up with is a few small reductions in tariff rates, and an expanding volume of trade late in the 1920's. He admits that one cannot call the period "free trade" but towards more "open trade" and that largely it was a continuation of previous policies, which were, he argues, far less liberal. (Preceding from his Economics and World History)
The reality is that 1913 marked the high point of trade liberalization, and that the post-war period had very high tariff rates, in 1927 Germany had 20.4%, France 20.3%, Spain 49%, Poland 53.5% - only the United Kingdom with a 5% rate was committed to liberalization. Bairoch computes the US tariff rate at 37%.
The key point is that tariff rates began rising in 1928 and 1929, in response to agricultural deflation. Smoot-Hawley was return fire, the trade war was already on.
In the context of the Post's article then, the author should have been talking about a 1920's style "unreconstructed trade order." That's what economists label the 1920's because there was a failure to rebuild institutions in the global trade order. It was "a kinder, gentler trade war."
The reality is that elites of our period are quick to declare trade war, as Roston did in this 2001 piece:
But in today's war against terror, the Bush Administration and trade promoters in Congress and business are battling to resist the historic pattern in which commercial shipping becomes target practice and borders become moats. Since Sept. 11, President Bush and his emissaries have emphasized that agreements to lower trade barriers can help attract and hold allies to the antiterror campaign by bringing needed jobs and income to impoverished regions. "The launch of a new global trade round is important for economic recovery in the short term and for economic growth over time," U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick told TIME. "A signal that the world's trading nations are committed to open markets would inject additional confidence into financial markets."
So what is the take away of this? The first is that that Smoot-Hawley was the culmination of a restrictive trade period, one which made matters worse in the context of a broken world financial and trade order. The second is that the chattering classes are all anti-protectionist when it comes to things they buy, such as imported goods, and when it comes to their economic interest in offshoring, but not when it comes to wars and housing booms, which are even more protectionist than tariffs. In short their commitment to free trade isn't really, but a club that they use very narrowly to pursue protectionism for themselves, and competition for everyone else. If we are going to have a mixed trade regime then, there is no reason not to make different decisions about who we protect.