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Setting the Boundaries for Negotiation

David Sirota has an excellent piece up on the direct mail guru Richard Viguerle’s book “America’s Right Turn” on how the conservative movement (not the Republican party) turned the country right over the last thirty years. It’s an excellent review and teases apart a couple different strands, but it’s this part I want to bounce off of:

Put another way, Democratic politicians couldn’t muster the intelligence (guts?) to appreciate the value of having an outside progressive movement setting the boundaries of the debate at $8 so that, when it comes time to compromise, the final number can be set at $7.25. Instead, the cry like little infants over potentially hurt feelings, and idiotically suggest that it is more advantageous to start negotiating at $7.25 ”“ thus creating the very real possibility that the ”œcompromise” will be much lower.

It’s not just politicians who don’t understand the value of a vigorous movement, it’s a lot of movement types who seem to think that they should pre-compromise. When NARAL compromises on abortion rights it undercuts the politicians. When bloggers play politician, and pre-compromise on policy, it helps make the outer boundaries of the position weaker, and thus requires a deeper compromise from the politicians. This is just basic bargaining – when you’re bargaining in a hostile environment (this doesn’t necessarily apply in all bargaining situations, but definitely does in the current House and Senate) you start with the very far end of possible positions so you have room to bargain. The job of movement types is to set those boundaries as far to the left as possible.

I learned that as a kid in third world bazaars.

Example:

When I bargain for a belt in Bangladesh, I offer 80 taka, hoping to get 150. The vendor starts at 500. I am, however, willing to walk away and he knows that and since I’m a westerner and he’s going to wind up at least double charging me what he’d charge a Bengali he’s desperate for me not to walk away.

I don’t expect to cut health insurance companies completely out of insurance – in fact, what I want is to allow them to do top up insurance or some variation depending on plan specifics. But to get there we start by talking about cutting them out utterly, so that when they are allowed in – we’re at the place we wanted to end up. I am, however, if push comes to shove, willing to, if we can, cut them out entirely if they won’t deal – or damage them in other ways (passive agressiveness is not a flaw in multi-issue bargaining relationships. Punishing people for screwing with you is necessary.) If insurance companies think you’ll do the equivalent of walking away (take away all the money) they’ll be desperate to make some sort of bargain.

But unlike with my Bengali merchant, if they think (or know) you won’t or can’t, then they’ll never cut a deal – the status quo already favors them so much that they have no incentive to do so.

4 comments to Setting the Boundaries for Negotiation

  • Escher Sketch

    You define your ideal endstate first and foremost, they define theirs, and you work towards a compromise.

    You do not under any circumstances begin with a compromise and work towards a worse compromise.

    You shift the Overton Window -

    … describes a window of majority acceptable ideas in public discourse, from a spectrum of all possible options on an issue. It provides a plan of action to make the options one would prefer acceptable to the public by priming them not with the leaders of the political movement, but with media spokespeople.

    The steps an idea takes to full legitimacy are roughly as follows:

    Unthinkable
    Radical
    Acceptable
    Sensible
    Popular
    Policy

    - in your own favor, while resisting its shifting in the opposite direction.

    Another clearly expressed article details it nicely:

    An Introduction to the Overton Window of Political Possibilities

    … What does a think tank do? Does it educate? Advocate policy? Should a think tank focus on short-term or long-term goals?

    Among Joe Overton’s many contributions, he was instrumental in defining the role of the Mackinac Center in particular and think tanks in general. He understood that, regardless of how persuasive the think tank, lawmakers are constrained by the political climate. Therefore, Overton concluded, to be truly successful, the Mackinac Center should not focus on direct policy advocacy, but instead should focus on educating lawmakers and the public in an attempt to change the political climate.

    To answer the inevitable questions about the role of a think tank, Overton developed an explanation that others have since dubbed the “Overton Window of Political Possibilities.” Though his theory has roots in complex public choice economics, it boils down quite easily.[1]

    Imagine, if you will, a yardstick standing on end. On either end are the extreme policy actions for any political issue. Between the ends lie all gradations of policy from one extreme to the other. The yardstick represents the full political spectrum for a particular issue. The essence of the Overton window is that only a portion of this policy spectrum is within the realm of the politically possible at any time. Regardless of how vigorously a think tank or other group may campaign, only policy initiatives within this window of the politically possible will meet with success. Why is this?

    Politicians are constrained by ideas, even if they have no interest in them personally. What they can accomplish, the legislation they can sponsor and support while still achieving political success (i.e. winning reelection or leaving the party strong for their successor), is framed by the set of ideas held by their constituents — the way people think. Politicians have the flexibility to make up their own minds, but negative consequences await the elected officeholder who strays too far. A politician’s success or failure stems from how well they understand and amplify the ideas and ideals held by those who elected them.

    In addition to being dependent on the ideas that form the boundaries of the political climate, politicians are also known to be self-interested and desirous of obtaining the best political result for themselves.[2] Therefore, they will almost always constrain themselves to taking actions within the “window” of ideas approved of by the electorate. Actions outside of this window, while theoretically possible, and maybe more optimal in terms of sound policy, are politically unsuccessful. Even if a few legislators were willing to stick out their necks for an action outside the window, most would not risk the disfavor of their constituents. They may seek the good of those who elected them, and even the good of the state or nation as a whole, but in pursuing the course they think is best, most will certainly take into account their political future. This is the heart of the Overton window theory.

    So, if a think tank’s research and the principles of sound policy suggest a particular idea that lies outside the Overton window, what is to be done? Shift the window. Since commonly held ideas, attitudes and presumptions frame what is politically possible and create the “window,” a change in the opinions held by politicians and the people in general will shift it. Move the window of what is politically possible and those policies previously impractical can become the next great popular and legislative rage.

    Likewise, policies that were once acceptable become politically infeasible as the window shifts away from them. Think tanks can shape public opinion and shift the Overton window by educating legislators and the public about sound policy, by creating a vision for how things could be done, by conducting research and presenting facts, and by involving people in the exchange of ideas…

  • Ian Welsh

    I hadn’t heard that phrase before, thank you Escher.

  • Escher Sketch

    Thinking of the politics of the last two generations – no wonder the political left got its ass kicked. It didn’t even know the name of the game it was playing – let alone what the rules were – so it never even understood why it kept losing.

    “Conservatism” and “progressivism” (I can’t even say “liberalism” any more – as soon as it became associated with neocons, and “economic liberalism” in the form of compelled global corporatism, the word became meaningless) have different and complementary strengths and are both necessary to political discourse. If one wing flips its wig and declares war on the other, then the other wing must push back with equivalent force in order to maintain balance. As I’ve written elsewhere, a radically heeling boat capsizes if everyone reacts to the heeling by sitting in the center; this man isn’t leaning out to flip the boat in the other direction, he’s leaning out because the boat will capsize if he doesn’t.

    Sidenote – psychologically, the shifting of the Overton Window describes discourse and not core belief – more like “everyone seems to be saying” rather than “this is what I believe to be true”. While it may be possible to superimpose a radically shifted Overton Window on a public through discourse manipulation (coughthelastfortyyearscough), I believe the resulting cognitive dissonance inevitably eventually leads to aberrant and pathological cultural psychology – much like a person whose actions are seriously in conflict with their beliefs.

    I wonder how many aberrant social phenomena we’re seeing nowadays are symptoms of this; every so often I muse about the recent spike in violent crime.

    Anyone concerned with the psychological well-being of a society should be concerned with making those Overton Windows more closely overlap societal baselines. The idea is the two gates should line up, just as any healthy person’s actions should reflect their beliefs.

  • VizierVic

    In addition to setting higher/better/larger goals, successful negotiators also don’t bend from their publically-stated objectives until very late in the negotiationg process. They were teaching that to us twenty years ago in marketing seminars I attended for a Fortune 10 company. Clearly the Democratic leadership has been snoozing for the last twenty years if they weren’t aware of the most elemental tools available for negotiating skills development. I suspect that the Republicans will be experiencing a nasty shock when increasingly more Democrats begin applying modern techniques toward dealing with Republican tactics.

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