Pretzel Politics


Lex has a great post on the pretzel politics of Afghanistan:

Mikhail Sergeyevich applies the idiomatic phrase “…… vydelyvnet Krendelya” to Karmal. We could use it do describe Karzai, Obama, Clinton, McChrystal, et. al.. It translates literally as “….. is walking like a pretzel.” The figurative meaning is that someone is staggering and weaving like a drunk; that is, not being straight-forward.

The Soviets had the exact same problem with Afghan government legitimacy that the US is having now. They had the same problem with the Pakistan-Afghan border land that we have now. They had a better Afghan Army to work with and still had the problems we’re having. History may not repeat itself, but it rhymes and in this case we’re merely looking at history translated from Russian to English.

As I have said, over and over again: Afghanistan is easy to conquer but impossible to hold.

And Chuck Spinney chimes in with some observations about this news story at the Times of London:

More after the break.

The Afghan debacle is becoming a case study of how political debate in Versailles drips in a naturally self-organizing way to protect the dysfunctional status quo.

As I indicated yesterday and in September, the fundamental flaw that set the stage for the current policy making fiasco was the unexamined analytical hole in General McChrystal's escalation strategy -- namely, its dependence of the rapid expansion of the corrupt and ineffective Afghan national security forces. McChrystal did not analyze this corruption/ineffectiveness issue, but that crucial omission was ignored the hoorah accompanying the immediate leaking of report by his allies buried somewhere in the Versailles apparat. The only alternative that surfaced during cacophony of the ensuing months, the so-called Biden plan, was equally reckless, because it also glossed over this analytical hole by advocating that we substitute a greater reliance on robotic drones for boots on the ground (drones create their own problems) and further accelerate training of the Afghan forces. With Versailles leaking like a sieve, the debate became a ridiculous fact-free exercise in macho venting. Now, it is beginning to look like Ambassador Eikenberry (a former Army general and possibly an adult to boot) has moved to pull everyone's fat out of the fire by blaming the chaos in the escalation debate on corruption by the Karzai government (true enough), but not surprisingly, this blame is being treated implicitly in Versailles as if were a new development that has arisen suddenly since McChrystal's supporters leaked his fatally flawed report. In this "new" rush of developments, the attached report in the Times [UK] can be forgiven if it inadvertently helps to reinforce the collective amnesia, because it does not connect the dots to link the obvious flaws in the original McChrystal strategy and the cynical leaking of that report which together put the whole dripping circus into motion.

Mr. Obama is in a no win situation, and the time to cut his losses is past due. Hopefully, he has learned a lesson and heads will roll. But I fear the more likely outcome will be double down with some form of mushy middle course, possibly adorned with Mr. Karzai's carcass twisting slowly in the wind, that protects everyone in Versailles, if only in the short term.


Sean Paul Kelley November 15, 2009 - 1:54pm
( categories: Afghanistan )

I was just heading over here to post the piece in full as a diary.

Really, the Politburo minutes from the archives at GWU (links with story at S&R) are seriously disturbing. This isn't something new and novel that we're dealing with, it's the same situation...and i fear the same outcome.

Lex November 15, 2009 - 2:35pm

...as well like, say, the explicit Soviet policy of seeking to depopulate the countryside via the expedients of sowing air scatterable mines all over hell's half acre and reducing a significant percentage of the semi-built up areas via artillery and air bombardment. ISAF is one hell of a lot hated than the Sovs were. We're far from love, to be sure, but the difference is significant.

As to Russ' notion expressed in the comments that he'd almost rather have the Taliban - we might all want to remember that to dip toes into the "forbidden fruit" is a very easy intellectual conceit to indulge in from half a world away. Rather more consequence for the folks that have to live it.

“The absence of any US-Iran bilateral channel...may have the perverse effect of reinforcing Iranian interest in progressing in the nuclear realm so that the US will be forced to take it seriously and engage it directly." ~ Richard Haass

JustPlainDave November 15, 2009 - 9:26pm

But they make no difference in the outcome; in fact, with all that behavior the Soviet Union still couldn't defeat an Afghan insurgency. (I'd also argue that cluster munitions and the evidence, denied as it is, of uranium munitions are just as bad as Soviet behavior.)

And if our idea of civilized is being slightly more civilized than a nation we spent 50 years calling barbaric, then we've got much bigger problems than extricating ourselves from Afghanistan, no?

Russ's feelings and arguments are his own, but we didn't care too much about the Taliban before 9/11. Why, we wouldn't even funnel aid to the NA before 9/11. I've heard no calls for an invasion of Zimbabwe or North Korea. And our behavior during the Soviet Afghan War is a direct cause of the Taliban taking over Afghanistan in the first place. We don't have a high road to take here, not to mention that we've done nothing to establish a stable government in Afghanistan since we arrived.

Minuscule aid that mostly gets funneled back to Western nations through contracts and consultancies doesn't count. Funding warlords who destabilize the country doesn't count either.

Lex November 15, 2009 - 10:10pm

We have always been at war with Afpakistani

zot23 November 15, 2009 - 8:21pm

Really, when did it start? And what happens if we "lose"? Do they take over our government and occupy Topeka, Long Beach, and Boston?

Zman1527 November 15, 2009 - 10:09pm

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