and helping the Saudi's stability at the expense of the Iranians, however, if you believe the article, played a pretty strong role.

It's ironic that later the Saudi's went nuts making sure their internal politics were not contaminated by Iran's Islamic revolution.

_{"The mythical John McCain is an affable, straight-talking, moderately conservative war hero who is an expert on foreign policy" - Bob Herbert}

...(subscribers only, sorry) and I've read all but the last two pages. The piece really focuses on the Iran-USA dynamics with little attention to the comparing the various causes of the Shah's decline (i.e., it doesn't appear to make much of an argument that it was the decline in oil prices that knocked the Shah off - it's certainly presumed not to have helped, but no specific argument).

My understanding is that the Saudis were motivated not so much by a desire for increased stability, but rather by a fear of Iran becoming a hegemonic (for lack of a more precise term) power. Thinking was that if they could cramp Iran's style, they would have to curtail their aspirations for regional dominance. As I understand it, they did not at all intend for the Shah to fall - and I rather suspect that they understood the seeds that the Iran's sudden affluence and the Shah's reckless policies were sowing.

“The absence of any US-Iran bilateral channel...may have the perverse effect of reinforcing Iranian interest in progressing in the nuclear realm so that the US will be forced to take it seriously and engage it directly." ~ Richard Haass