Pope: Other denominations not true churches
Benedict issues statement asserting that Jesus established ‘only one church’

MSNBC News Services
Updated: 9:52 a.m. ET July 10, 2007

LORENZAGO DI CADORE, Italy - Pope Benedict XVI has reasserted the universal primacy of the Roman Catholic Church, approving a document released Tuesday that says Orthodox churches were defective and that other Christian denominations were not true churches.

Benedict approved a document from his old offices at the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith that restates church teaching on relations with other Christians. It was the second time in a week the pope has corrected what he says are erroneous interpretations of the Second Vatican Council, the 1962-65 meetings that modernized the church.

On Saturday, Benedict revisited another key aspect of Vatican II by reviving the old Latin Mass. Traditional Catholics cheered the move, but more liberal ones called it a step back from Vatican II.

Benedict, who attended Vatican II as a young theologian, has long complained about what he considers the erroneous interpretation of the council by liberals, saying it was not a break from the past but rather a renewal of church tradition.

In the latest document — formulated as five questions and answers — the Vatican seeks to set the record straight on Vatican II’s ecumenical intent, saying some contemporary theological interpretation had been “erroneous or ambiguous” and had prompted confusion and doubt.

It restates key sections of a 2000 document the pope wrote when he was prefect of the congregation, “Dominus Iesus,” which set off a firestorm of criticism among Protestant and other Christian denominations because it said they were not true churches but merely ecclesial communities and therefore did not have the “means of salvation.”

In the new document and an accompanying commentary, which were released as the pope vacations here in Italy’s Dolomite mountains, the Vatican repeated that position.

“Christ ‘established here on earth’ only one church,” the document said. The other communities “cannot be called ‘churches’ in the proper sense” because they do not have apostolic succession — the ability to trace their bishops back to Christ’s original apostles.

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_{"Vanity, Vanity, all is Vanity."}

and his Opus Dei chums never cared for Vatican II and now they're working to undo it with Bush-esque statements like "Vatican II never intended to change anything, so therefore it didn't."

The Mass is back in Latin; the pope says that the Church "purified" indigenous peoples (who were "silently yearning" to be purified by the Conquistadors anyway). And now, the Eastern Church is a sham.

How sad. Bring back the Inquisition--all of those heretics need to be rooted out. Sure hope that the Vatican's got enough firewood. Best turn the altar around...

the Dominicans are into the practical applications of scientific research, if not all that theory shit with it's demoralizing effects on belief systems. No firewood required when microwaves create the same effect.

The other communities “cannot be called ‘churches’ in the proper sense” because they do not have apostolic succession — the ability to trace their bishops back to Christ’s original apostles.

The Bishops of the Church of England and their US counterparts, whatever you may think of them, have a true claim to apostolic succession albeit that their predecessors broke away fom the Catholic church.

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“I despise idealogues masquerading as objective journalists.” - Bill O'Reilly, March 30, 2007

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...that the Roman Church can only document succession back to Scipione Cardinal Rebiba (1504-1577)? And that Benedict XIII, long after the fact, around 1720, declared that Rebbia was "the ordainer"? (Let's not forget that Benedict himself had an axe to grind as a member of the Orsini family looking to assert the legitimacy of its claim to the papcy).

So, any real sense of "apostolic succession" is mostly conjecture, no? If not, let's see the paper record...

I liked a comment I heard from Richard Dawkins, to the effect that he is also, technically, agnostic about a supreme being, in about the same way that he is agnostic about Santa Claus and agnostic about the faeries who live at the back of the garden.

I can't figure out who those guys think they are usefully addressing with the New Atheism chant.

On the one hand, it seems plausible enough that a lot of people with relatively little sophistication in theology or science do have some kind of confused literalist understanding of religious texts. The New Atheists aren't going to much help that situation because no amount of trying to illustrate a case using pop-science narratives can substitute for the decades long experiencing of real scientific practice, hands-on, and coming to appreciate what science is (and is not) that way. So, their arguments against literalism, for that audience, are just one would-be voice of authority disagreeing with the other. They ask this group to "change" by repeating the mistake they are already accused of: this time taking scientists rather than clerics at their word.

On a second hand, there are serious theologens. This group isn't hearing anything they haven't already heard before and long since learned to "build around" in their hermeneutics.

On the third hand, there are those with a more philosophical outlook who see a mistake in the use the scientists are making of their own theories -- the conflation of a closed-form calculus of empirical procedures with a singular metaphysics even when, as with quantum electrodynamics, the math itself prohibits metaphysical certainty.

The New Atheists don't seem to understand what is logically at stake in these loud public debates so, whatever is going on in the trend is something other than what's written on the surface of the rhetoric. I find it vicariously embarassing for them and quite unscientific.

I think Hitchens has the better idea. Polemically and somewhat flippantly he ridicules literalism, certainly. But his main target isn't an abstract metaphysical belief but the role of religion in civil order. Religion has thoroughly discredited itself of having any authority or respectability whatsoever on any political stage. It's religion's appearence in the halls of government, on the world stage, in the agora, and in the bondage of unemancipated children that is the problem -- not whether or not a person likes to hold in their heart that Noah cuddled with T-rex on his arky arky during the floody floody.

Meanwhile, theology's modern agility and the moral question of religion shouldn't be contemplated without looking at examples like the famous Glide Memorial Church in San Francisco.

Known for its inclusiveness, good works, and very widely appreciated civic presence, Glide reminds us that religious beliefs and even organized religion are not, per se, the problem.

Peace,
-t

p.s.:

(I note that Sean-Paul, mentioning his own practice, does not himself seem to really believe that region or religous beliefs are, per se, the problem. The spin and traction that the New Atheism is getting in the echo chamber seems problematic to me, is all.)

p.p.s.: on the question of what it actually means to hear that such and such a percentage of a population believes X I would highlight all the presumptions already present once we've assumed that we can meaningfully make such a measurement for any objective purpose. The Paniker essay seems to me to touch on that kind of mistake.

Without getting into the extremes of the 1960's French left, religion is as political as any other organization in that it is a structure by which we organize our society. I sympathise with what I think is your point: that religion as an organizational tool in society has undergone a long (one might say) evolutionary process that has tuned its usefulness. Discarding that tool may toss the proverbial baby out with the bathwater.

However, in a North American context, where religions have largely become unbound from the historical, cultural, even geographic context in which they evolved, I think there is more of a tendency towards literalism out of desperation to force a relevance into otherwise out-of-context myths and traditions. Some, such as the Mormons, even invented a new literatist tradition to bring the Americas into a "biblical" context. There has been some evolution in what I see as a more useful direction, which shows up in organizations like the United Church of Canada (one of our larger churches). That organization grew organically in the praries, where you either laid aside your religious differences with your very few neighbors or had a church with one family attending it. Interestingly, it has become almost Buddhist in its philosophical flexibility, proposing even that the literal divinity of Christ is open for discussion. The former type of group has made themselves unwelcome in political power, the latter are usually constructive.

What I have heard of and read of Dawkins position is that it is one which strongly expresses the uncertainty and evolution of scientific belief (a nod to Karl Popper). I'll admit that I would like to see a proposal from Dawkins to integrates the useful components of religious practice, which (for me) come down to the promotion of an active and broad social community and a civil society, but discards the less relevant and more destructive myths. I do think that Dawkins does address some urgent issues, such as the labelling of children as belonging to a religious group which in engaged in active conflict with another group. He certainly acknowledges the instincts which humans have that lead, naturally, to religious beliefs. I agree that his approach often appears harsh in sound-bite form; one needs to take the time to get to the core of his arguments, many of which, I agree, are not new.

Frankly, I'm personally happiest with our Canadian solution, as much as it annoys Europeans with its lack of a core "reference" culture and occasionally bugs our Southern Cousins with its apparent ambiguity. I enjoyed a discussion on our local Ontario public broadcaster, TVO, (see July 2) where leaders from a number of communities (Muslim, Siekh, Buddhist, Catholic, Anglican, Orthodox Jewish, ...) discussed these issues quite constructively. As much as I tend towards Dawkin's style of atheism, my personal wish is primarily for the debate to continue in a way that allows an economically prosperous, civil, co-existence to be our core level of social agreement.

Thanks for a nice reply.

I think relevant but slightly missing from your reply is metaphysics. I think that science itself is formally (and accurately regarded as) agnostic about metaphysics and, from what I can tell, the New Atheists are making thoroughly metaphysical claims (claiming scientific formulae as justification). That's a mistake that's subtle in the sense that most people don't notice it but sophmoric in the sense that among intellectuals of the New Atheists' caliber, it's the kind of mistake that should be gotten over by the end of freshman year, at latest.

The New Atheists seem to me to advocate mostly for a kind of linguistic hygiene in which we are not permitted to refer to meanings of things other than what the computer scientists call "least fixpoint" meanings of things as described scientifically. At least abstractly, they seem to seek to enforce a kind of nihilism.

That such advocacy takes the form of a theory that is not just sophmoric but too subtle for most people to catch the error, and that they get such good press for this effort, frankly alarms me. These guys are basically claiming to know (to the limits of what can be known, which they also claim to map) "the meaning of life" and, for them, it's little more than "what happens to happen, according to these equations". Why the hell should anyone believe them?

-t

Perhaps the mistake of the New Atheists is that they conflate the use of Occam's razor in the professional practice of science -- as a tool for finding the most useful formulation of a theory of empirical results -- with a map of metaphysical reality.

Q.E.D. (quantum electro-dynamics) does not say that there are no knowable but unmeasurable facts about the world. It also does not say that there knowable but unmeasurable facts. It says, basically, that that question can not be determined through empirical experiment. The New Atheists make the logical mistake of going from there to the unsupported claim that Q.E.D. says that there are no knowable but unmeasurable facts.

-t

(Seriously - not snark).

To wit: There are true statements which cannot be proved; there are false statements which cannot be disproved.

To wit: There are true statements which cannot be proved; there are false statements which cannot be disproved.

And, in Q.E.D., there are true things about the world which can not be known other than stochastically. Einstein said something like "God does not play dice!" but what Q.E.D. says is "Perhaps not, but if there is a God of any sort, 'He' does cover his tracks so well that we can't prove anything about 'him'."

It's nothing special about Q.E.D., really. The same conclusion about God follows from Newton and from every other theory that is recognizably scientific. They are all metaphysically ambiguous and, helpfully, mathematicians who study the empirical structure of meaning can show us (via hacks like Goedel's) that *all* expressible axiomatic theories are necessarily metaphysically ambiguous when they are regarded as models of a physical empiricism.

You should read some of Mauberly's recent fiction on his blog (6mo ro a year, going back) -- I'll bet you'd like it. I also think that, though it needs some minor edits (arguably, and through a narrow trade-based perspective only) it works as, actually, um... good literature. I hope I haven't jinxed his effort by mentioning that here.

-t

Escher's "Print Gallery" is relevant, imo.

With respect for the copyright holder's I'll post directions rather than a link:

www.mcescher.com >> "Recognition and Success 1955-1972" >> "Print Gallery [...]"

"It"'s that hole in the middle, using "It" in the sense of pop-Buddhist A. Watts.

-t

at least of the “New Atheist” variety, would deny metaphysics outright. Apropos of Karl Popper, no falsifiable theory can be formulated to test metaphysical claims quod erat demonstrandum they convey no useful information. I believe Dennets latest work is a challenge to the metaphysical community to come up with a falsifiable theory. I am doubt Dennet actually believes it can be done. So, until such a theory is proffered, the disciplines of metaphysics and theology should be considered at best the equivalent of literary criticism and at worst intellectual onanism.

Your characterization of the thinking sounds about right.

Logically, it requires the axiom that truth can only be demonstrated via scientific (i.e., communicable and repeatable) experiment.

That axiom is not itself a scientific question.

So, what science+logic prove is "we in these fields have next to nothing useful or meaningful to say about metaphysics" but where the New Atheists are going to is "there is nothing to say about metaphysics" -- which is a kind of fascism based on a linguistic fetish.

-t

there is nothing to say about Metaphysics, nothing useful at least. The rest you have exactly backwards, the Metaphysicians are the fascists, not the term I would necessarily choose, demanding to be taken seriously playing word games about something that doesn’t exist. In the case of the Pope these idle musings can have serious real world implications.

In the case of the Pope these idle musings can have serious real world implications.

No kidding. If you'll pardon the expression, he's damned if he does and damned if he doesn't.

I kinda like where the ratman seems to be going. Attrition from the Roman church isn't his to worry about (and, anyway, probably won't rise to fatal levels anytime soon). He weighed in on I.D. in a way that I think deserves at least a passing grade in philosophy 101 -- thus trumping many of the other voices. And of the church: he's saying "no, it is *not* our job to continuously modernize our brand, even if that means higher attrition and lower conversion/birth-into rates. We am what we am." He's a philosopher-currator as much as anything, working in a minefield. He seems to be a conservative progressive.

-t

... as a pastime, and this is more than coarsely speaking as a complete amateur, granted, is that I don't particularly see the practical use of constructing an imaginary world beyond my own then basing my daily life on the resulting assumptions. This, especially, when the real world is so rich in detail to be discovered. It strikes me in my coldest, most rational moments as, at best, escapism.

Not that escapism has no place, I enjoy Harry Potter as much as the next person.

That said, I see theological metaphysics more as a study of our own desires and wishes as humans, much as I see art as a study of the subconcious.

I think what Dawkins is saying is that such intellectual exercises have the tendency to delude the less sophisticated and, as such in an age where the AK-47 and RPG-7 are ubiquitous, are often far more destructive than constructive. I personally feel that the question of whether we should actively promote the removal of religion is a fair one, albeit it is elitist of me to think so, wherein lies a philisophical contradiction. In practical terms it is used far too often as a political tool. I believe the subtlety in Dawkin's argument comes from the realization of the actual breadth of (induction permitting) scientific understanding and the astonishing degree to which we actually have unravelled many of the questions often considered the purvue of religion.

What happens to happen would be what Christians call humility in the face of the will of God, what the Greeks might call the fates, what Buddhists might call karma or, indeed, loss of self in the mystical whole. Why must the elegant, falsifiable, complexity of explaining what happens to be happening in equations, perhaps also the realization of the futulity of our existence in cosmological terms, be a barrier to enjoying what it is humans enjoy, to contributing to our collective survival in the mean time, and making a vibrant, civil society in the process?

That said, I see theological metaphysics more as a study of our own desires and wishes as humans, much as I see art as a study of the subconcious.

That's one possible meaning that can be assigned to that discourse. It might very well be right. Is there something wrong with that?

Well, you forward the thought:

I think what Dawkins is saying is that such intellectual exercises have the tendency to delude the less sophisticated

That's an unfalsifiable claim.

-t

Is there something wrong with that?

I find it an odd approach. I think it may have been justified when the resulting mythology more directly supported organization and cooperation in a society with low economic productivity. Today, when our society codifies the minimum rules of conduct in laws that are independent of religious structures and when our economic productivity is such that "individualistic" conduct is acceptable, I think that the myth-based structures as social organization is fraught with problems, as we have discussed. As an intellectual exercise, it seems to be a mode of dialogue that is rapidly losing its relevance. If it perpetuates myths that pretend to universal application, then that raises some serious political concerns.

That's an unfalsifiable claim.

"Intellectual exercise", "tendency", "delude" and "less sophisticated" are, I'll grant, individually subjects on which people, no doubt, write their theses. I'm sure there's a workable hypothesis in there somewhere.