Logistics Are For Pros


William Arkin appears to believe that the main culprit of our failure in Iraq stems from our long tail, fat-tail or or that our tooth-to-tail ratio is too large:

I don't know what the actual "tooth to tail" ratio is today, but I suspect it is huge. Someone has to operate the gyms, the internet cafes, provide the hot meals and hot water, the amenities that far too many in uniform expect and "require" at their bases. It is just a reality of U.S. military culture that the build-up (and the care and feeding of) the desk warriors and sustainers in the Green Zone, at Camp Victory at the old Saddam International Airport and at mega-bases like Balad is mightily responsible for the military failure on the ground . . . They say that the Pentagon doesn't go anywhere with light luggage. We are seeing the product of this reality in spades in Iraq. . . Here is the biggest failure of the Rumsfeld era: for all the claims of a more agile Army and a more expeditionary force, the U.S. armed forces remain a lumbering colossus, paralyzed by their own laws of supply and demands.

I'm reminded of the old US military saw that strategy is for amateurs, but logistics is for pros. If so, what does that say about our army and armed forces then?


Sean Paul Kelley November 20, 2006 - 5:18pm

when you imagine a nation which has permitted the industries supplying the military to influence the process by which those needs are determined.

The goals of corporations and government are largely antithetical.

Escher Sketch November 20, 2006 - 7:11pm

we wish we could fight the World Wars over again.

If you look at this one way, we are "pros" at logistics in that we can send more material at a faster rate to any point on the globe than any empire (err... nation) before us. Our capacity is breathtaking.

But we abuse this capacity by quite literally exporting pieces of America to military bases around the world--shopping malls, internet cafes, giant recreational facilities, etc. We think that extravagant spending and having the power to ship small cities across the globe means we are strong and will "win." And we would, if we were fighting WWI and WWII all over again--the nations that brought new troops and supplies to the front(s) the fastest generally won those wars.

But wars like them will not happen again. The metrics for measuring success have changed. We're pros at the old ways, but utter amateurs at whatever the new war dynamics are.

Bolo November 20, 2006 - 9:02pm

...pros do cultural anthropology, not logistics.

"We declared war on terror, it's not even a noun, so, good luck. After we defeat it, I'm sure we'll take on that bastard ennui." - Jon Stewart.

JustPlainDave November 20, 2006 - 11:30pm

LOL. Who knew that when I was taking all that anthro I was studying military science.

Ian Welsh November 21, 2006 - 12:07am

in cultural anthropology involve ideas that can only be solved at the political level (ie outside the military's mandate), perhaps you too could have successfully reduced it to a militarily useful art by excising those parts that would inevitably throw you into conflict about the validity of the mission itself.

Escher Sketch November 21, 2006 - 6:29pm

in the ETO in 1944 less than 20% of US soldiers were in combat units compared with some 56% in the UK forces and I believe in the region of 70% in the German army.

Asylum November 21, 2006 - 1:32am

Arkin has a very interesting take on this war. For the first time, the U.S. military is bringing the comforts of home to the troops overseas, at tremendous expense to the taxpayer. The combat troops in the field, from what I've read, are openly disdainful of the support personnel on the various bases studded around Iraq. The combat troops go weeks without a shower, lug 40 pounds of gear in 120 deg. heat, and eat rations while they scrounge for any bottled water they can trust to drink. The support guys have air conditioned quarters, Burger King, bowling alleys, and other American treats. This situation is duplicated for the contract security services, whose high salaries also cause resentment among combat soldiers and marines.

No wonder morale is low and the cost of this war so high. How is a military which brings along Little Americas wherever it fights going to win the Long War, WW III, or whatever this is called?

Numerian November 21, 2006 - 1:34am

...based on what I read morale is highest among the combat arms - where it's lowest (and it still seems high to me compared to many other conflicts) is amongst the support troops. Higher comfort would appear to equal lower morale.

I've said it before, I'll say it again - odd damned way to run a war.

For a broader historical context, this isn't actually entirely new in its essential nature - everything that I've seen (admittedly mainly written by Army guys ;) ) suggests that lots of USAF facilities in SE Asia were pretty plush - what is new is the extent and level of it.

"We declared war on terror, it's not even a noun, so, good luck. After we defeat it, I'm sure we'll take on that bastard ennui." - Jon Stewart.

JustPlainDave November 21, 2006 - 8:42am

"Sorrows of Empire" by Chalmers Johnson? Provided his depiction is accurate, there's a lot of luxury in a lot of our military bases.

Bolo November 21, 2006 - 12:22pm

There's a lot in there that isn't accurate, but I don't recall that his qualitative descriptions of the basing facilities was bad (his interpretation of their numbers, however, is highly suspect). What's being done in Iraq seems essentially, for the handful of large bases at any rate, to be an attempt to bring a Stateside, peacetime standard of living to an expeditionary force.

Peculiar.

"We declared war on terror, it's not even a noun, so, good luck. After we defeat it, I'm sure we'll take on that bastard ennui." - Jon Stewart.

JustPlainDave November 21, 2006 - 12:31pm

Chalmers Johnson does impart the style of U.S. military forts. Not much has changed in bringing the comforts of hometown U.S.A. into the sequestered lifestyle of the military community. I feel that the real job of the BRAC effort was to simply close bases in the Continental U.S.A. and shift the resources to project power for the Oil protection racket.

"Takes a bucket of blood for a barrel of oil"

Steven Bruton

Peter C November 21, 2006 - 3:09pm

Standard American practice and problem. I remember my father speaking contemptuously of the habit of American consulates to create compounds, fly in all their food and gear, and hardly ever interact with the natives. And mind you, this was back in the eighties. The other consulate's staff tended to live amongst the regular citizens of the country.

Rule 1: Buy everything locally that you can. Work those relationships and make sure people, including ordinary people (ie. the butcher shop down the road) have reason to care what happens to you, to like you, to help you and pass information along.

This ain't rocket science.

Ian Welsh November 21, 2006 - 10:30pm

one of the things you learn is that subject to practicalities of command you share your troops' experience, You sleep on the ground if they sleep on the ground, you eat MREs if they're eating MREs and you work hard if you want them to work hard.

Unfortunately this doesn't seem to have made the translation into American military practice when viewed through the lens of "leadership in other nations".

In broad terms they expect local forces to absorb losses, work with less protective equipment, endure greater local resentment and commensurate risk, tolerate vastly higher levels of collateral damage through doctrine and risk-aversion than they would operating amongst their own citizenry, and generally accept far inferior conditions than they do.

It doesn't matter that they have good and compelling reasons to do so from their own perspective; what always matters is how it's perceived, and the direct effect that has on respect for their leadership.

Escher Sketch November 21, 2006 - 11:00pm

in World War II the concept of mechanized warfare was new, and those supply folks were needed to get gasoline to the front, because it wasn't readily available the way it is now. Volumes have been written on the logistics situation from D-Day through the end of 1944, and how much could they get to whom and how fast. But you're right, supply was always considered as living easy, with more people in Paris than there should have been (the guy in charge was a Gen. J.C.H. Lee, whose initials were said to stand for "Jesus Christ Himself"). On the other hand, the army had repair battalions that scrounged and cataloged spare parts and repaired equipment right in the field (Ernie Pyle wrote an interesting column about it). Is anyone trying to be so efficient and economical in the new privatized army?

Flyer Anne November 21, 2006 - 6:29pm

Robert Bryce

One of the U.S. military's greatest vulnerabilities in Iraq is its enormous appetite for fuel. The insurgents have figured this out

by Robert Bryce

.....

T he Department of Defense now has about 27,000 vehicles in Iraq—and every one of them gets lousy gas mileage. To power that fleet the Defense Logistics Agency must move huge quantities of fuel into the country in truck convoys from Kuwait, Turkey, and Jordan. All that fuel gives American soldiers a tremendous battlefield advantage (in communications, mobility, and firepower, among other things). But overseeing and carrying out this process requires the work of some 20,000 American soldiers and private contractors. Every day some 2,000 trucks leave Kuwait alone for various locales in Iraq.

In addition to the challenges posed by the volume of fuel needed, the Army's logisticians must deal with the sheer variety of fuels. Although the Pentagon has tried to reduce the number of fuels it consumes, and now relies primarily on a jet-fuel-like substance called JP-8, the Defense Energy Support Center is currently supplying fourteen kinds of fuel to U.S. troops in Iraq.

Peter C November 22, 2006 - 12:15am

Comment viewing options

Select your preferred way to display the comments and click "Save settings" to activate your changes.