There's been a lot of talk about a resurgent Russia in the media lately--an Economist front page, Time, Newsweek and the lot of them. I'm not sure why that is. As a pure, absolute measurement of power Russia is far, far behind its Soviet apogee. But as a relative measure, what with our failings in Iraq, our outsourcing of foreign policy to China in North Korea, the slow drip of blood in Afghanistan, our tenuous position in Central Asia, and the Western setback in the Ukraine Russia, especially since they knocked off Basayev (or he blew himself up--we'll never know), does seem to be stationary. Or perhaps our screw-ups give the illusion of Russian gains. Who knows, maybe they are gaining. I live with a Russian, and they still confuse me!

My marital situation notwithstanding (and not such a good measure of geopolitics, I hasten to add), this report from Jamestown hints that Chechnya may be a done deal. Baev writes that Russia faces only "limited residual tasks in Chechnya." And with that, a more assertive Russia (in a passive-aggressive type way) may be in the works.

More after the jump.

If Russia is indeed consolidating its position in the Caucasus, after two tense years that would leave a KGB analyst without fingernails to chew, years that included multiple Chechen attempts to expand the war in every conceivable direction, our shadow boxing in the Caucasus with the Russkis might take on a more serious demeanor.

Our foreign policy elite--brain dead rubes that they are--don't realize Georgia may be much less symbolic and much more concrete to Russian vital interests than previously imagined. I've long believed that Georgia was the place where the Russian Federation and the United States would have their 'Come to Jesus' talk, fight, spat, proxy war or whatever you want to call it. It's perfect geographically speaking. Just the kind of place two great powers can wreck the crockery, without their contents spilling over the giant mountain walls to the North and South. It'll all just drain into the Black Sea or the Caspain, right? It's not like there is much in Georgia anyway, except rocks, mineral water and wine.

Joking aside, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and (previously) Adjaria we're purposefully peeled off Georgia to keep the country divided and preoccupied (it's largely worked too), while Russia traded space for time with the West in Europe. Our counter-strategy has been to co-opt Georgia, via BTC (which has added to Georgia's tax take handsomely), GTEP and the Rose Revolution to weaken Russia or at least keep it pre-occupied while we extract as much oil and gas from Trans-Caspia and Central Asia, as we can, which the Russians do not like. I don't think our leaders have given much thought beyond getting that nasty little three letter word everyone pretends doesn't exist, either.

You know, oil.

I've got no idea what's going to happen in Georgia or with Georgia. But our interests there are first and foremost about the BTC, which also helps us keep Russia weak (our secondary reason). It doesn't hurt that the Georgians won't ever miss an opportunity to piss the Russians off.

Still, I'll ask a question I've asked before, to which I have never received a suitable answer: Is an unstable Russia really worth [the] marginal gains [we'll get] from Trans-Caucasian and Trans-Caspian oil?

Action, for the sake of action isn't going to solve the region's problems. Like oil, many of the regions problems are insoluble. (Pun, get it?) Then again, there are three kinds of problems in the world: those that have solutions, those that do not, and those that are the unintended consequences of well meaning people who try to solve problems they do not understand. When I think about a forward policy in the Caucasus all I see are unintended consequences. And, as we've learned in Iraq, those kinda suck.

The Russians can have it. We already have our hands full elsewhere.