I'm just trying to decode this statement.

Direct hit against missile command center in Tyre
The IAF scored a successful direct hit Thursday against Hezbollah's missile command center deployed in Tyre, which has been primarily responsible for targeting Haifa and its surroundings. The regional command center was located on the 12th floor of a Tyre building that the IAF destroyed.

I thought Hezbollah was firing "rockets" (unguided and fired like artillery) rather than "missiles" (guided).

Additionally I thought Hezbollah was firing at "towns". With very rare exceptions, they tend to sit still, and it's tough to disguise their precise unchanging coordinates.

So - about this "missile command center" or "rocket command center" - while it would undoubtedly be a useful thing to take out, how badly would this affect individual batteries being able to fire by themselves on the grid coordinates they presumably already have? Especially with Hezbollah's apparent "since we're just chucking rabid dogs over Israel's fence, close is close enough" policy?

Aren't they supposed to operate as independent units with individual but not coordinated orders?

...conceptualizing this, the longer range weapons that are capable of hitting Haifa are viewed as strategic weapons, under tighter Hizbullah command and control.

"We declared war on terror, it's not even a noun, so, good luck. After we defeat it, I'm sure we'll take on that bastard ennui." - Jon Stewart.

but in fact the reality is that they're actually unguided coordinate-fired weps like artillery, and their targets have had the exact same coordinates for a generation, neh?

So "central control" doesn't mean "stand by to receive your target package", it only means "shoot/don't shoot", which brief message could be sent by the upper leadership via telephone or radio or carrier pigeon, with no need for a "missile control center". Short form being that taking out a "missile control center" is in this case not even close to a "decapitation strike" against that capability.

For one thing, these guys have a well-founded reluctance to use electronic communications means. Based on what I've seen, they're heavily dependent on couriers.

Additionally, they are somewhat capable of targeting particular zones within cities. Note in particular WRT Haifa that this would include things like targeting the refinery area or not. It's clear, to me anyway, that this isn't quite as simple as shoot/don't shoot. I also suspect that part of the information that may be passed is what rockets they are to use from what caches (this is extremely important, due to the fact that if you're being watched by a recce platform while servicing a cache, you're likely to lose it) and what firing points they are to use - also important because of the potential range of consequences to the immediate region.

As to what effect this strike would have, it would very much depend on how centralized control of the information as to where the caches are and what they contain is and what control the political echelon asserts over these weapons. If information is closely held and there's a high degree of control, then this strike could hurt them. If it's the reverse, then it's no big deal. I would suggest that the subsequent strikes from some of the more advanced systems would lean more towards the latter as the correct interpretation, but determining this with any certainty is probably impossible, particularly from this remove.

"We declared war on terror, it's not even a noun, so, good luck. After we defeat it, I'm sure we'll take on that bastard ennui." - Jon Stewart.

was feasible. Re-read the post. I really think you are missing the main point in that I was looking at this from the Israeli point of view, but clearly not taking sides. This is a big failure for the Israelis and for the neocons in the United States. And it is important to examine it from that angle. That's what I like to call realism.

A touch of realism would say it was an entirely predictable one.

There are a lot of Muslims in the world.

One day, Israel will be vulnerable to their missiles.

America accepts that Russia and China can destroy American cities.

Getting rid of of any missiles that can hit anywhere in Israel will eventually mean Israel will have to attack not just Lebanon, not just Iraq, not just Iran, but Pakistan and Indonesia. Eventually.

That's what an infantile need for security implies. You have to kill ALL your enemies.

Of course that is the road to World War.

That is the illogical 'logic' of Israel and its neocon allies.

Realists should urge pragmatism. Pragmatism in this case means giving Hizb'allah a little kudos, negotiating, swapping prisoners, being humanitarian, leaving south Lebanon, and stopping the war.

The tough guy approach won't work. It's been tried since Israel's founding, and it's why 58 years on, Israeli citizens are cowering in bomb shelters and Israeli soldiers are coming home in body bags.

The quest for absolute security is futile because it's self-defeating.

I was simply pointing out that 'this looks bad from an Israeli point of view' is only true if that viewpoint is already skewed by an infantile and infeasible criterion of 'security'. I wasn't accusing you of endorsing such a viewpoint.

From a realistic, pragmatic viewpoint, Israel's interests are best served by ending the war and negotiating a just settlement with Lebanon, including de facto its Hizballah component.

Of course, the Israeli and US neocon right are too stupid and too cruel to see that, and I was pointing out that the logic of their position implies World War. Since he operates out of that logic, Newt Gingrich more or less welcomed the prospect of World War on American national TV the other week. (It says a lot about the state of political discourse in America that this is viewed as a tolerable position, instead of one that screams 'dangerous madman'. But then look at who your president and vice-president are!)

The neocon logic is 'kill all enemies'. So, not killing enemies is bad policy from that standpoint. Hence not killing all Hizballah personnel in Lebanon, and not overthrowing the Iranian regime etc is, in their view, bad policy.

Of course, as you and I both know and agree, it's the 'kill all enemies' logic itself which is the Bad Thing, not policies which deviate from that logic.

Maybe invading Lebanon is a way to start a new war with a bonus war on Syria too!

Failing to occupy Lebanon, or if doing so, not being able to sustain it = predictable failure, and I predicted it day one of the crisis. However, failure to take some town by the IDF - no, that's not predictable and it makes them look weak. I'm sorry, but while Hezbollah are good soldiers, they shouldn't be able to hold a town if Israel decides to take it.

It is an avoidable failure, if Israel's willing to take casualties - they could thrown thousands more men at it and take it if they wanted to. But Olmert doesn't have the stomach for more Israeli casualties. And that shows weakness - bombing from the air takes not guts at all. So what it looks, hell what it is, is that Israel tried to take a town just miles from their border and couldn't even do that. That's just pathetic.

That's a loss, and it's an embarassing loss, and it was NOT obviously predictable. Historically the Israelis have been entirely capable of doing such operations when they chose.

I agree that it's gone badly, or at least unsatisfactorily, both military operation-wise and PR-wise. Tactical intelligence and tactical decision-making do appear to have been less than stellar, and have attracted much criticism within Israel.

I've sensed some arrogance on the part of IDF, with Mossad being much more circumspect, and Mossad basically saying, you IDF people are making a mess of things, and IDF saying, no, we're doing great (while knowing otherwise).

Olmert and Peretz (and other cabinet members) may have sided with the Mossad assessment and chosen not to trust Halutz and the IDF ground team much further.

Arabic sources have been reporting the fight as having gone even worse for the IDF than the IDF has so far admitted.

I suspect a combination of defective leadership and inexperience within the junior officer ranks of the IDF ground forces has played a role.

But even apart from that, the operational problem is still formidable. A full capture and occupation of Jbeil with lots of troops and armor would leave them exposed to relentless Hizballah rocketing from deeper within Lebanon. Reluctance to take ongoing casualties without being sure of recovering the two prisoners is an understandable military judgment.

But fanning out from the Jbeil sector in full-scale invasion mode isn't a good option either. 1982-2000 wasn't a 'win' for Israel, and Hizballah is even better armed this time to deal with a more expansive ground operation.

I don't think Israel had good options, in fact, which is why Hizballah decided to act as it did earlier this month. Hizballah knew that it was well prepared to resist on the ground, and it knew it could rocket Israel for weeks and weeks.

Nasrallah's statements make that clear.

IDF readies for new ground offensive in s. Lebanon

Yaakov Katz | July 30

The Jerusalem Post - The IDF wrapped up its operations in the southern Lebanese village of Bint Jbail on Saturday and withdrew most of its troops from the area. At the same time, the army was gearing up for a new ground incursion into Lebanon.

Also Saturday night, the IAF struck a road along the Lebanese border with Syria that the IDF said was being used by Damascus to smuggle weapons to Hizbullah.

At the same time, the IDF said it was investigating reports that a UNIFIL outpost had been hit by missiles. Two UN peacekeepers were wounded Saturday when an Israeli airstrike hit near their border post in southern Lebanon, The Associated Press reported.

"We declared war on terror, it's not even a noun, so, good luck. After we defeat it, I'm sure we'll take on that bastard ennui." - Jon Stewart.

Occupation is a long term thing. In the short term they tried to take a village and failed. That looks bad and there is no way for them to spin out of that save coming back and actually taking it.

They attacked the same position multiple times and lost. That's really bad for the IDF's mystique.

The international force materializing was, in large part, contingent on the IDF clearing out an area in the south. They've failed to do that, so unless Hezbollah agrees to an international force (and actually, they may, if they get some other things they want, like their prisoners back) there probably won't be a larger force because who wants to get into a donnybrook with Hezbollah?

...they didn't fail to "take" the village, they took the terrain but were unable to stop Hizbullah from countering, which is pretty understandable, given the nature of the position. It looks more to me like they didn't park themselves in a known location in large numbers indefinitely so as to allow Hizbullah to continue to counter and inflict casualties indefinitely, to no military purpose. There's no such thing as "taking" a given chunk of terrain in this scenario and holding it; Hizbullah has extensively prepared the battlefield over the course of many years - the notion that a chunk of terrain could be taken and held against all subsequent infiltration is fanciful, to put it mildly. In this scenario, the pertinent question is whether the attacker can hold an objective long enough to carry out a useful mission beyond attrition and withdraw in an organized and timely fashion (to be clear, I don't think that any of us can be sure whether the IDF has managed to do all this with the available evidence, but there simply isn't enough currently known to classify this as the clear "failure" it's being painted as).

Many folks that I see commenting on this, and particularly those that are emphasizing the political aspects of this, would in other contexts (correctly) note how approaches that focus on taking and holding terrain in conflict with a guerilla force are flawed - this is what an approach that doesn't focus on that looks like. I look at the commentary on this one, and I see a lot of political discourse based on a pretty distant picture of the engagement, not strict interpretation of reality. In my opinion, what we've learned of relevance from this scenario is that Hizbullah is significantly better than many observers (particularly those in the west) believed them to be at the tactical level, when they've had a lot of time to prepare the battlefield - the next pertinent question is how extensively they've managed to prepare other objectives and whether they'll be able to replicate this performance elsewhere.

Me personally, I think the notion of an international force extending beyond France is fanciful regardless of whether the ground is cleared or not. I think there's a real good chance that Hizbullah will agree to an international force because they'll believe themselves to gain from it over the short term, and long term they can turf it at will. If there's no international force and Hizbullah continues to attack at a moderate level, eventually the IDF will have to go in - dunno what form that intervention will take on the ground exactly; comparatively small scale cross-border operations rather than a multi-division sweep seem to me to be a pretty good possibility, but who knows.

"We declared war on terror, it's not even a noun, so, good luck. After we defeat it, I'm sure we'll take on that bastard ennui." - Jon Stewart.

Paratroopers regroup on Kinneret beach for battle

Yuval Azoulay

Ha'aretz - On Friday afternoon, paratroopers returning from battles in Lebanon wade in Lake Kinneret, gathering strength to continue fighting. Their commanders sit in the lobby of a nearby hotel, refusing to be photographed with the lake, pool or anything that smacks of recreation. They're here for a short break; their comrades are still beyond the lines.

"We found an enemy that had prepared a long time for battle. Very resolute, well equipped, skilled and coordinated, unlike what we encountered in Gaza and the West Bank," says Amit, commander of the paratroops special forces unit.

"Hezbollah prepared the ground with outposts, defense lines, small organic units. But despite everything, it's still a guerrilla organization," he says.

"We declared war on terror, it's not even a noun, so, good luck. After we defeat it, I'm sure we'll take on that bastard ennui." - Jon Stewart.

Israel response to Hizbollah tactics reminds me of the redcoats saying Americans cheated, they didn't fight the way we thought they would.

Dave, all that is all very nice. It doesn't matter - the perception is they can't even take a village a few miles from their border (and yeah, it can be taken, cleary Hezbollah out, establish a cordon, make sure they don't get back in. Yes, that means some troops are further in than the village, but that should go without saying. You don't hold any position just by sitting in that position.)

Failing to take a village a few miles from their border is pathetic, and even if you are right that the IDF reasonably can't hold turf even a few miles into Lebanon (which, again, I don't agree with or believe) it's irrelevant.

It was Israel's own metric - their own metric - that they could clear Hezbollah out from a region around their border.

They chose the victory conditions they needed to meet, and they failed. If they were "impossible" conditions (something, frankly, I don't believe) it doesn't matter - they chose them, they publicized them, they failed to meet them.

They failed and they were seen to fail, and there will be consequences from that (one of which is that they are massing tanks, because they know they can't be seen to be beaten this way.)

Hezbollah is seen to be beating them. That's the bottom line.

...cordoned and held, you are not fully in command of the realities on the ground, to put it mildly. And that is quite apart from the fact that the effort required to even approximate control for any significant length of time would never, ever begin to justify the casualties that would come of it.

As to holding turf: a) there is a significant difference between holding a salient and holding some logically defined unit of frontage, and b) you're asserting that failure to hold turf, which is part and parcel of any "clear Hizbullah out" objective and which would be a huge error in the context of this conflict, is somehow a relevant metric for evaluating winners and losers. In fact, I don't think that Israel's metric for success was ever whether they could "clear Hizbullah out" from the border region. Consistently they've messaged that they had no intention of occupying ground over any significant period - by extension, that means no "clear out". The only mention that I've seen of any area to be "cleared out" over any period of time was a strip of about 1000 metres right on the border, which I have a real feeling that they've substantially achieved just by virtue of volume of fires.

I think people are consitently misreading the Israeli victory conditions due to their biases and their focus on what they did previously. Did they talk of doing severe damage to Hizbullah as an objective? Yes. Did they even say "smash" Hizbullah? Yes. Did they probably not do as much damage as they hoped? Yes, and they've likely done even less than they currently think they have. However, note also that after the "smash Hizbullah" messaging they immediately started specifically messaging about how that wasn't possible - they said multiple times that destroying Hizbullah was not something that could be achieved and that Hizbullah would always be left with the capability of launching rockets. This seems consistent with what they had previously said they wanted to do WRT Hizbullah: destroy Hizbullah's strategic weapons (the few hundred longer range rockets), disrupt their command and control networks, and push them back from the immediate region of the border by destroying all identifiable infrastructure. I read that as pushing them back a few klicks, and I think they're largely going to achieve that. In fact, they've apparently managed to push the launchers for any of the longer range weapons back past the Litani (which they're viewing as an achievement), and prevent massed fires, which is what I'd really be concerned about were I in their shoes.

They also aimed to demonstrate, by virtue of the strategic bombing campaign, that there was a cost to Lebanon in tolerating/supporting Hizbullah - this they've certainly demonstrated, but it seems clear to me that there's been nowhere near the fracturing, as yet anyway, that they probably hoped for. That said, the indications that I'm seeing are that there are a bunch of factors in play that are likely to result in Hizbullah integrating more closely with the Lebanese state (e.g., the notion that Hizbullah forces could be incorporated into the Lebanese army in certain circumstances), which is going to ultimately be a strategic weakness for them.

Were I to sum it all up, I'd say that the direct campaign against Hizbullah has worked better than most commentators think it has because they're looking at this through an overly political lens (stating that perceptions of IDF superiority are critical and that lives should be spent to maintain a myth that hasn't been founded in reality for 25 years? do they think that Hizbullah ever believed that the IDF had superiority? that myth died outside the west a long time ago), and the portion of the strategic bombing campaign aimed at isolating Hizbullah has not worked very well at all, though it's going to have some interesting knock-on effects.

Frankly, Hizbullah is being seen clearly to be beating them by a bunch of folks that are wearing pretty funky glasses. If anyone's "beaten" them, it's the rest of the Lebanese people. Just surviving as a guerilla group matters a lot as a definition of victory if you're trying to overthow occupation of the territory that you're operating in - it's of less central importance when the situation's as it is here.

"We declared war on terror, it's not even a noun, so, good luck. After we defeat it, I'm sure we'll take on that bastard ennui." - Jon Stewart.

It's sort of like what my friend says when our Phillies get swept by the Mets - "Yeah, but we scored 6 runs off of Pedro! I thought he was supposed to be the best pitcher in the league. Mets suck."

Right.