Not One Or Two


Tom Ricks, the author of Fiasco and a Washington Post stenographer in Iraq, had a chat at washingtonpost.com today. One of the participants asked him this:

Where does the crux of the blame for the FIASCO lie? There were a lot of efforts to incorporate lessons learned and new "ways of thinking" into military concepts, doctrine, education and training prior to OIF. Why did these efforts fail to take?

And Ricks, like a good stenographer, replied:

I'd say the book argues that you don't get a mess as big as Iraq from the failings of one or two men, such as President Bush and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld.

Rather, I think there was a systemic failure.

Okay, maybe not two, but three people can be held responsible and should be: Bush, Rumsfeld and Franks. Had a real general stood up to Rumsfeld and his febrile fantasies about RMA and transformation, we would never have endured such a 'catastrophic success' as Gen. Franks called it.

Three sounds just right to me.


Sean Paul Kelley July 24, 2006 - 11:42pm

I'd say it's always easier to lay the responsibility for a fiasco on a few people, but half of those that voted, voted for the administration that led this, and a big majority of the Congress authorized the invasion, voted in by a big majority of the country.

This fiasco is the responsibility, at least, of most of us, still scared from 9/11 and not thinking systemically about the very complicated systems of the Middle East. Of course Rumsfeld and Bush have very poor and unsystemic views of the Middle East, but then why elect Bush and why confirm such a narrow-minded Defense Secretary as Donald Rumsfeld?

trob July 25, 2006 - 3:11am

There do seem to be an awful lot of things we can't do very well that have be discussed in these pages during the past few years. Whether it is schools, war, automobiles, health care, the environment or the economy, we seem to persist making in quick, dead end decisions that leave us in a hole. There are individuals who make the decisions, but the system seems to be organized so as to put the less thoughtful in position of power.

pihwht July 25, 2006 - 9:43am

Shinseki tried to tell them before the war. They wouldn't listen. You had three choices.

1) Tell them and be forced into retirement. If unlucky, with a sexual scandal they cooked up.
2) Play along.
3) Go along hoping you could make it less of a mess.

Ian Welsh July 25, 2006 - 9:44am

...that the United States Army lacked and continues to lack any sort of coherent counter-insurgency doctrine. With the US Army, if you don't have a doctrine, the chance that you'll have a viable strategy trends to zero (this is not true of all militaries, BTW - both the British Army and the CF cheerfully ignore doctrine in favour of winning strategy; this is something that you can do in craft rather than industrial armies). Without that viable strategy, it really doesn't matter what else you do. In that sense, yes, this is a bigger thing than just Rumsfeld and the usual suspects. You take Shinseki's force levels and you combine them with a strategy , then you've got something - but it takes both elements.

"We declared war on terror, it's not even a noun, so, good luck. After we defeat it, I'm sure we'll take on that bastard ennui." - Jon Stewart.

JustPlainDave July 25, 2006 - 12:34pm

it's not the car's fault if I take it out in a blinding snowstorm.

The car doesn't become more culpable if the driver didn't have a compelling existential reason for being out in the storm in the first place. Nor does his claiming "I didn't know there was a storm coming" in the face of so very many weather reports - a great deal of which predicted the insurgency.

Driver failure all around, whether it's 1) failure to sift conflicting weather data and come to the right prediction, 2) failure to assign proper values when weighing the necessity of venturing out vs the risks, or 3) failure - as the person directly responsible for the maintenance of the vehicle - to understand the necessity for windshield wipers and make sure they work first.

Escher Sketch July 25, 2006 - 1:12pm

It's a little more serious than the car not having windshield wipers and encountering inclement weather. The lack of a counter-insurgency doctrine is more akin to the car lacking any gears other than reverse - even if the pavement's completely dry, things don't really work. It was reasonably forseeable to anyone that could fog the mirror since before the fall of the Sovs that counter-insurgency was the dominant mode of warfare for the forseeable future and that a coherent doctrine was needed.

Yes the driver bears blame, and that blame is likely primary, but there's a bunch of others that contributed and those contributions were very, very significant.

"We declared war on terror, it's not even a noun, so, good luck. After we defeat it, I'm sure we'll take on that bastard ennui." - Jon Stewart.

JustPlainDave July 25, 2006 - 1:28pm

The US army isn't designed for anti-insurgency or occupation. However, led competently (see: Kosovo, reconstruction) it can do it. There was a window in the first six months or so where there was very little insurgency activity - what was mainly required was to rebuild, using locals and to flood the country with money, so everyone (or close enough) was happy.

But paying pork to domestic concerns was more important and so was stupid ideology and payback like dismissing the army, purging Ba'ath members (the secular technocrats who actully, um, ran the country) and imposing free market fundamentalism on Iraq to turn it into the sort of country the idiots want the US to be. (For example, I know they wanted to dismantle the dole system which made sure very single Iraqi got fed - which was very efficient, effective and non-corrupt. Lost track of whether they actually did.)

Really good anti-insurgency troops weren't needed - the ability to hand out contracts to Iraqis was. But Iraqis aren't Bush pioneers, so so much for that.

Ian Welsh July 26, 2006 - 3:34am

...above. However, what is it that tells an army to do or not do those things? A doctrine. Why did they do the wrong things? Because they were led by people who did not understand what was going to happen because they lacked an effective doctrine.

In the absence of doctrine all the folks at the lower levels who saw what was happening could do was say "in my professional military opinion, this doesn't look like a good idea". Saying something contravenes doctrine carries a lot more weight and it's something that higher is much less likely to ignore.

"We declared war on terror, it's not even a noun, so, good luck. After we defeat it, I'm sure we'll take on that bastard ennui." - Jon Stewart.

JustPlainDave July 26, 2006 - 11:16am

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