Nuclear-Power Fuel Too Close to Nuclear-Weapon Fuel for Comfort


THE DEPROLIFERATOR -- Recent statements by its chief representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency suggest that Iran may be backing away from an agreement to ship its low-enriched nuclear fuel to Russia for further enriching. Even, though, after agreeing to the deal, President Ahmadinejad, ever the master of the sweeping gesture, said the West had "moved from confrontation to cooperation."

Among reasons to hope that Iran relents is a fact of which many who proclaim Iran has a right to a nuclear program seem ignorant. Turns out that transubstantiating the fuel used for nuclear energy into nuclear-weapon fuel, far from a miracle, is all too commonplace.

The Hudson Institute's Christopher Ford explains (sorry, misplaced the link).

Reactor fuel production is worrisome enough all by itself, because in enriching uranium to LEU [low-enriched uranium] reactor fuel levels the Iranians would have already done most of the work necessary to enrich to weapons-usable HEU [highly-enriched uranium].
At Huffington Post, Bruno Pellaud, former deputy director general of the International Atomic Agency, adds some seasoning to Ford's remarks:
. . . [LEU] (some 4% enriched) is already a long way towards the weapon-relevant [HEU] (some 90%), much more than these two figures seem to indicate. In the physics of enrichment, it's like a pre-cooked cake, so well pre-cooked that a few minutes in the micro-oven suffices to bring it to the table.
Ford again (emphasis added):
. . . it takes a certain number of [Sleep-Inducing Technical Term, or SITT -- RW] to enrich uranium all the way to weapons-usable levels, but by the time one gets to [LEU] most of that work has already been accomplished. It takes fewer [SITT] to finish the job than to get to [LEU] in the first place, so possessing a supply of uranium that is already LEU makes it much easier to enrich to HEU levels [but] at a secret additional facility.
This is nothing new, Ford explains in a previous paper. Describing the early U.S. nuclear years, he writes: "Thinkers of the period were painfully aware of what we might today call the problem of the 'latent' or 'virtual' nuclear weapons programs [which can be ramped up in case of a threat -- RW] afforded by possession of nuclear fuel-making capabilities. As U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson put it, the true 'measure of atomic armament'. . . was to be found less in what [a country] actually had 'put into a bomb'" than in the sum-total of its fissionable material.

Therefore, writes Pellaud:

For the time being, this shipment to Russia. . . eliminates the [risk of a nuclear weapons breakout]. Some would argue that Iran would only send to Russia part of its LEU stockpile and keep hidden any past clandestine production of LEU. Not so easy. The IAEA would indeed detect such dissimulation, [like it] kept track [of the] 350 tonnes of raw uranium that Iran had purchased from Namibia in the seventies.
Besides, wrote Andreas Persbo in March at Verification, Implementation, and Compliance, winner of the award for Highest-Traffic-Generating Blog Title three years running (not):
A break-out at this stage would be very risky for the Iranian government. The amassed low-enriched material is about right for one uranium-based weapon, but in order to get that processed into weapons-grade, Iran would need to reconfigure the cascade and run the material through the facility again. Then, the weapons grade material would need to [go through a Tedious Technical Process, or TTP -- RW].
How long will that process take?
… a minimum of two months. Add another four to five months to [endure yet another TTP] and we're up to half a year. Even if the Iranians have done their weaponization homework, they'll have to move from theory to practice for the first time. [What's more] they only have enough material for one weapon. It is literally a one-shot deal. …

If Iran really wants to acquire a nuclear weapon, the best strategy would be to bypass safeguards altogether and to build a clandestine enrichment facility.

Which, of course, it since did -- the Fordo facility near Iranian holy city Qom, from which an International Atomic Energy Agency inspection team just returned. "We had a good trip," said the mission head.

First posted at the Faster Times.


Russ Wellen November 8, 2009 - 11:27am

the nukes of Iran as much as living under a bridge abutment right here in the former US of A.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=185HKE2c5Gg

Lasthorseman November 8, 2009 - 12:01pm

Iran's putative nukes as much as the those in the hands of the USA's own fundamentalist madmen, either.

chalo November 8, 2009 - 7:43pm

Like most doctrines about transubstantiation, these types of reports need to be accepted with pure faith. The question is, does one believe in both species?

The typical concentration for U235 naturally is 0.7% and low-enriched U235 (LEU) is typically considered to be about 4% for power generation purposes. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is considered to be at least 80% U235 if one is talking about weapons grade material. A casual web search reveals that the typical pass in the centrifuges is expected to increase concentration by a factor of 1.3. That means it is expected to take 7 passes through the centrifuge cascade to reach LEU levels. Reaching HEU grades would require at least another 12 passes through the cascade according to the procedures available. Achieving the higher purity isn't easier than reaching the LEU status. In fact it will be more difficult, because the higher purity must be reached with a much higher degree of certainty. Possessing the technology to reach LEU levels gets one only about half way to the goal, from a processing point of view. The argument that reaching LEU status makes it easy to reach HEU levels applies only to achieving concentrations intended for research reactors.

VizierVic November 8, 2009 - 11:37pm

...falls in line with my information. Scott Ritter seems to think most of the hysteria is just that and far from the truth.


"We're all of us children in a vast kindergarten trying to spell God's name with the wrong alphabet blocks." ~ Edwin Arlington Robinson

Celsius 233 November 9, 2009 - 5:59am

...(Separative Work Unit). An online calculator can be found here:
link.

The important thing to remember is that with each "pass through the cascade" as you express it above, the number of SWUs required for the desired level of enrichment decreases [decrease in the amount of material that runs through the cascade each cycle as the tails for the previous round are taken off].

Number of SWUs required to enrich 1 tonne of natural hex (0.71% U235) to 3.3787663% [6 "passes through the cascade" assuming enrichment factor of 1.3 and starting enrichment of 0.71%]: 371.02, producing 0.133 tonnes of enriched hex [assumes tails of 0.3, which is the calculator's default] - I manually entered the figures for the repeat stages in the calculator and the total for the 6 runs and the one step reported total match

Number of SWUs required to enrich 1 t natural hex to 90% [18+ "passes through the cascade"]: 596.74, producing 0.05 tonnes of enriched hex assuming same tails of 0.3 - did not manually enter the figures for the repeat runs; too much to do today - if the reader wishes to do it, I leave it to them

“The absence of any US-Iran bilateral channel...may have the perverse effect of reinforcing Iranian interest in progressing in the nuclear realm so that the US will be forced to take it seriously and engage it directly." ~ Richard Haass

JustPlainDave November 9, 2009 - 9:49am

;)

Tina November 9, 2009 - 10:23am

...is that the folks that Russ has cited have it right. SWU [or Sleep Inducing Technical Term in Russ' piece above ;)] is the unit used to measure centrifuge output.

“The absence of any US-Iran bilateral channel...may have the perverse effect of reinforcing Iranian interest in progressing in the nuclear realm so that the US will be forced to take it seriously and engage it directly." ~ Richard Haass

JustPlainDave November 9, 2009 - 12:11pm

No, Separative Work Unit is not - repeat not - the measure of centrifuge output. It's the COST of actually conducting the concentration. That's a big difference. Here's the definition from the EIA:

"Separative work unit (SWU): The standard measure of enrichment services. The effort expended in separating a mass F of feed of assay xf into a mass P of product assay xp and waste of mass W and assay xw is expressed in terms of the number of separative work units needed, given by the expression SWU = WV(xw) + PV(xp) - FV(xf), where V(x) is the "value function," defined as V(x) = (1 - 2x) 1n((1 - x)/x)."

Note that expression "... effort expended..." That's the cost of doing the work, not the level of difficulty. I would concede that it does imply that the time required to perform the concentration to HEU levels will be shorter than that required to achieve LEU levels.

VizierVic November 9, 2009 - 4:23pm

...I meant the "work" of spinning the thing not anything to do with the characteristics of the enrichment product. I don't think that "cost" is a great term for describing it either, unfortunately, given that one can trade off various forms of cost in the process (raw material inputs vs. SWUs).

I guess that's why they used such a sleep inducing technical term as SWU, to steal a phrase.

“The absence of any US-Iran bilateral channel...may have the perverse effect of reinforcing Iranian interest in progressing in the nuclear realm so that the US will be forced to take it seriously and engage it directly." ~ Richard Haass

JustPlainDave November 9, 2009 - 5:10pm

"Work" and "cost" mean the same thing in this context. The concept of a Separative Work Unit was clearly created to offer a normalized unit which can be used to assess the "work" of processing unenriched uranium to a certain level of concentration. It appears to be used by the nuclear power industry to assess what the costs will be to process uranium for fuel. If you know how much "work" needs to be done, by evaluating the price for work ($ per Kw-hr for power, $ per labor-hour, $ per rental-hour for the equipment), one can develop an understanding of the cost to reach certain purities.

What the concept does show is that the time required to achieve a certain level declines, so long as one is looking at processing only a fixed quantity of material. This is done because the quantity of material to be processed to a final state declines, as you've pointed out earlier. That enables the processor to reassign the equipment to expedite the process rate. Just looking at the examples we've been discussing, it would mean that after the producing the LEU with, lets say 6000 centrifuges, the cascade needs fewer centrifuges to process the remaining material. That offers the possibility of splitting the total 6000 centrifuges into different process lines, thereby accelerating the final production process to achieve HEU.

VizierVic November 10, 2009 - 9:27am

...great generic term here because the decision making surrounding the whole process is about balancing different forms of cost (hex consumption vs. SWU consumption). Seems to me to be the same sort of imprecision as when using the term "output" to describe the number of SWUs that a given cascade or centrifuge can produce over a given period. Though "output" is used in this context (particularly in the grey literature), as you've properly noted it isn't a great idea.

“The absence of any US-Iran bilateral channel...may have the perverse effect of reinforcing Iranian interest in progressing in the nuclear realm so that the US will be forced to take it seriously and engage it directly." ~ Richard Haass

JustPlainDave November 10, 2009 - 10:15am

The entire course of nuclear technology trafficking and proliferation has been one huge pile of BS and garbage. Iran has natural uranium. The United States seeded the Shah's regime with the first round of nuclear tech anyway. Pakistan, India, Israel and Russia all have as much nuclear tech as they want.

And how did they get it? An international network of criminals working for pay from governments and their cohorts. Valerie Plame and Brewster Jennings got too close to these people, who seem quite friendly with the likes of Marc Grossman and Richard Armitage. If the FBI hadn't been busy covering up for the operations of the American Turkish Council and associated actors maybe all this nuke tech wouldn't have gotten around so much. Sibel Edmonds, John Cole and others have tried to spell out how nuclear trafficking really works, but no one wants to hear about it (because it's way more fun to make a business of freeking out about Evil States).

I believe SPK recently pointed out how someone, I think Richard Cohen in WaPo, admitted that the real risk of Iran getting the bomb means they would finally be able to knock Israel off its strategic hegemony and therefore Jewish people would not feel like living in that messed up garrison state.

Until everyone finally takes stock of the complicity of the FBI and everyone else in trafficking in nuclear goodies, as well as the fundamental flaw in the political demand that Iran can't use its own uranium, then this whole thing is going to continue to be a high-profile charade of BSing hawks and wonks.
--
Hongpong.com

HongPong November 9, 2009 - 4:10pm

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