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Theocratic Governance Strikes a Blow for Despotism“I feel like I went to sleep in one country and woke up in another." So said a Western reporter about the riots that have swept Iran following the disputed election for President between Mahmud Ahmadinejad and Mir-Hussein Mousavi. Following weeks of increasingly animated, large demonstrations in favor of Mousavi as a reform candidate, and despite polls just before the voting that showed Mousavi with a lead, Ahmadinejad emerged with a “landslide victory” from the Ministry of Interior’s election commission, which counts the votes and which conveniently reports to Ahmadinejad. The crudity with which the voting has been conducted defies common sense. Ministry of Interior officials who were suspected of favoring Mousavi have been purged in the weeks leading up to the election. The election results are reporting districts with curiously even numbers of votes in favor of Ahmadinejad, such as 1,000 here, or 5,000 there. Districts where reform candidates reside went suspiciously in favor of Ahmadinejad. Mousavi himself has disappeared – some fear he is under house arrest – and internet social sites like Twitter and Facebook have been shut down, as has Mousavi’s website. Ahmadinejad will come out of this electoral “victory” a damaged piece of goods domestically and internationally. He is already despised in many Western foreign ministries, and that same odium apparently is shared by millions of urban Iranians who formed the support base for Mousavi. What looked like a flowering of democracy in probably the most important country in the Middle East has turned into a withering display of theocratic despotism in action. Things like this don’t come about overnight. The clash between the rule of the theocrats in Iran and the forces for reform has been building over many years, and dates back directly to the 1979 revolution and the religious dictatorship of Ayatollah Khomeini. Iran has continued ever since to struggle with the conflicting forces of religious rule and popular voting. Khomeini left the seeds for this conflict buried in the Iranian constitution. There is a president and there is a parliament, the Majlis, both subject to popular vote. The president is the supposed head of government. But there is also an Assembly of Experts composed of dozens of the leading Shi’ite ayatollahs and clerics in Iran, and this group appoints themselves from among Iran’s major Islamic schools. This body elects the Supreme Jurisprudent, the most revered of all religious figures in Iran, a successor to Ayatollah Khomeini and in that sense the embodiment of the continuing revolution of 1979. The Supreme Jurisprudent has direct constitutional control of the military, of the domestic paramilitary (the Revolutionary Guards), the police, and the judiciary. Once selected by the Assembly of Experts, he manages this organization, plus two other constitutional bodies. One is the Guardians Council, which must approve all legislation that emerges from the Majlis, and which vets and approves all candidates running for public office. The second is the Expediency Council, which arbitrates any legislative disputes that emerge in the Majlis. In short, power resides with religious clerics and their bureaucrats, none of whom is popularly voted into office. This is the fundamental crisis, or flaw, in the Iranian constitution, which desperately seeks legitimacy through public voting, but which time and again has shown itself willing to overthrow the popular vote if any real threat emerges to theocratic rule. The theocrats are not without some public support. They control most of the major levers of business through nationalized companies, and they dispense the largess of Iran’s oil revenues to their supporters throughout the country. This includes the thugs who man the Revolutionary Guards now intimidating the public by truncheoning or even shooting any demonstrators who protest the regime. Many small businessmen receive subsidies from the regime, and various charities direct welfare to the rural poor. These are the sort of people who probably voted for Ahmadinejad with enthusiasm, but it is hard for observers to believe that they are so numerous as to give him a landslide electoral victory. Even within the theocracy, there have been on-going disputes over whether the regime can continue to operate with behind-the-scenes and deeply unpopular rule. For those of you familiar with the 1979 revolution, one of the firebrands at the time was Ali Hashemi Rafsanjani, who later served as president. He is now chairman of the Expediency Council, and he has been engaging in a theological battle with people even more conservative than he is over the role of the Supreme Jurisprudent. Rafsanjani argues that the Supreme Jurisprudent should be more like a constitutional monarch, wielding limited constitutional power and leaving control of the government to the president. His opponents, considered the most radical and hardline of the clergy, see the Supreme Jurisprudent as a direct representative on earth of the 12th imam, the sacred figure in Shi’ite Islam who will one day return to rule the earth in a restoration of the heavenly kingdom. Under this interpretation, the current Supreme Jurisprudent, Ali Khameni, is Allah’s agent in the terrestrial realm, who has all earthly power because he can only act for the good. The hardliners look at Ali Khameni as an Islamic pope of the type in the Renaissance who held real political power. This Islamic pope has in their view an unlimited power, capable of overriding any governmental decision, any legislative act, and any electoral result. This is the sort of thinking that has led hardliners in the Ministry of Interior to act brazenly and crudely in the matter of the Ahmadinejad – Mousavi election. Ali Rafsanjani is rumored to have resigned his chairmanship of the Expediency Council in protest of these election results. Other theocrats have raised their voices in protest as well. Few who are familiar with the way power is exercised behind the scenes expect any of this to make a difference. The Supreme Jurisprudent has been content in the past to exercise his power behind the scenes and with restraint, but he has consistently spoken out against one thing – any demonstrations protesting the government or the clergy. The one thing this regime recognizes is the danger of public protest and how it can get out of hand – this is after all how they came to power in 1979. There are so many important global issues swirling around this election result that it is difficult to focus on what the consequences will be of this transparent electoral fraud. Israel will want the world to continue to concentrate on the nuclear weapons ambitions of the Iranians. Obama’s outreach to the Iranian government may continue to be rebuffed, or may be abandoned altogether rather than risk trying to do a deal with a buffoon like Ahmadinejad. Iran’s oil reserves make it an unofficial fifth member of the BRIC community of up-coming economic powers, so there are always implications in Iranian politics for the price of oil and the global economy. But underlying all of this is the internal struggle within Iran between the hardline theocrats who control real power, and the forces struggling for modernity, a less obstreperous approach to the West, a functioning economy, and a more open government. This is a life and death struggle and it is still early innings. How much longer this regime can hold on without any real public support, and how much more intimidation and autocracy will be necessary to keep control over the population, are the two most critical questions facing Iran. Numerian June 13, 2009 - 5:32pm
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