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The Fed to the Rescue Yet Again, But at What Cost?This morning’s announcement by the Federal Reserve that it is taking steps to alleviate the bank liquidity crisis was greeted enthusiastically by the stock market. Almost all of yesterday’s losses following the Fed’s “disappointing” 25 basis point interest rate cut (many were expecting a cut twice that size) have been recouped based on this news that the central banks are coming to rescue the credit markets. How appropriate is this reaction? Don't be surprised if the stock market upon reflection decides this is not such a good thing. To accomplish this rescue, the Fed is once again debasing its own credit worthiness, and sooner or later the stock market is going to have to look seriously at where all this is leading. A central bank with its own credit problems is the last thing the U.S. needs in this crisis. The Fed’s announcement states that they are now prepared to lend money to member banks for as long as one month on a fully-collateralized basis. The collateral, in this case, has been extended to include the whole panoply of instruments that the Fed decided to accept back in the summer when the credit crisis first erupted. Traditionally the Fed has accepted only U.S. Treasuries, certain agency securities of the highest quality, and high quality banker’s acceptances used for trade or agricultural financing. In the summer it was willing to accept market instruments with mortgage backing, for loans that had just a few days maturity. While the short term nature of this lending was encouraging, the expansion of acceptable collateral to include the types of securities the market was having trouble financing was less encouraging. Clearly the Fed was expanding its risk profile with these changes. Now the Fed is expanding its risk profile even more by pushing these loans out to a month. The first such financing will be for $20 billion, a fairly significant amount, and will allow commercial banks to obtain credit over the New Year when money is traditionally tight. This is in obvious recognition of the fact that lending by banks to each other remains constrained. Banks know as much about their competitors’ exposure to mortgage defaults as they know about their own, which is not much if you go by how frequently major banks are announcing additional reserves for losses and disappointing earnings (see Bank of America this morning). The second part of the Fed announcement was just as telling: it is entering into foreign exchange swaps with major European central banks in order to provide these banks with dollars. What this says is that the interbank overnight and short term lending markets in dollars remain tight in all global markets, and that European central banks simply can’t access enough dollars to provide liquidity. Hence their need to have new, special swap facilities with the Fed to get dollars. The good news here, looking at this situation somewhat trenchantly, is that the Fed is giving up a weak currency (the dollar) in exchange for all those strong European currencies, though eventually under these swap lines the central banks will do reverse trades and the Europeans will get their strong currencies back. Let’s add up all the good news. The interbank lending markets remain very constrained, to the point where the Fed is having difficulty keeping even overnight money at the rate it desires. Banks are now having trouble borrowing medium term, especially over year end, and so the Fed has had to institute what it calls term lending to provide liquidity for this period. These problems are global, so the Fed is entering into swap lines with major central banks in Europe to help them provide dollar liquidity. To accomplish all this, the Fed is taking on more risk, not just in maturity, but by accepting weaker quality financial instruments from the banks as collateral. And the stock market finds this welcome? Of course, the stock market has been weaned for decades on the Greenspan put and now the Bernanke put, which tells it that the Fed will always come to the rescue in times of financial turmoil or economic distress. Investors will be bailed out of bad decisions and poor risk taking, banks will never go under, and any recessions that occur will be mild and short. But let me take you back to June of this year and any time earlier. Do you remember the mantra of stock market pundits back then? It was “the world is awash in liquidity.” The stock market was confused or willfully blind, because the world wasn’t awash in liquidity, it was awash in debt. The cash proceeds one could obtain from taking out a loan were being confused with liquidity. This confusion or blindness is why the world suddenly went from excessive liquidity to very little liquidity at all – the debt creation machine came to a halt when people’s eyes were opened to the real risks of default. There are a lot of very smart people at the Federal Reserve, especially the examiners and regulators who spend their time monitoring commercial bank credit standards and liquidity. They know that what the Fed is doing is weakening its own credit worthiness by these rescue operations. It’s not likely that the Board of Governors took these actions without someone in seniority pointing out the risks being assumed. You have to wonder if the Fed didn’t feel compelled to do this, considering the cost, because the financial market situation is so bad. This is the very type of “slippery slope” that the Fed warns its banks about. A little risk here, and another little risk there, leads to increasingly inability to refuse taking on ever-greater risks. The United States government has been on this slippery slope for decades, allowing its federal budget deficit to explode, overextending itself abroad, and permitting the current account deficit to fester at untenable levels, all the time ignoring a serious health care crisis and looming retirement burdens. U.S. government credibility has been substantially weakened at home and abroad because of these problems. Somehow, for nearly a century of operation, the Federal Reserve functioned well by accepting only a limited type of very high quality collateral for very short term periods from its member banks. Now it is on its own slippery slope. Its only real asset is its credibility, which in the markets is currently very high. But central bank credibility can be lost as quickly as liquidity can one day exist in abundance and the next day disappear. Maybe these risks are worth it if the Fed can forestall a recession and rescue the banking system, but the magnitude of the problems now facing the U.S. are certainly large enough that this bet is 50/50 at best. What needs to be avoided here is the perception that through these new lending programs the mortgage securities problems are now traveling from commercial bank balance sheets to the Federal Reserve balance sheet. After all, if a bank gets into trouble the Fed may have no choice but to roll over its loans to this bank again and again, making a 30 - day loan a 3 year loan, and exposing the Fed to losses from deterioration in the collateral. This is a nightmare situation for any central bank, but that’s what slippery slopes do – they give you nightmares when you contemplate where you can end up. Numerian December 12, 2007 - 10:54am
( categories: Analysis | The Markets )
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