Straight Talk on the Mortgage Mess from an Insider


from Herb Greenberg's MarketBlog

This is a very long email to Herb Greenberg from a Mark Hanson who has been in the mortgage business in the SF Bay Area for 20 years. The whole email AND the comments are worth the read. Here are a few grafs:

The Government and the market are trying to boil this down to a ’sub-prime’ thing, especially with all constant talk of ‘resets’. But sub-prime loans were only a small piece of the mortgage mess. And sub-prime loans are not the only ones with resets. What we are experiencing should be called ‘The Mortgage Meltdown’ because many different exotic loan types are imploding currently belonging to what lenders considered ‘qualified’ or ‘prime’ borrowers. This will continue to worsen over the next few of years. When ‘prime’ loans begin to explode to a degree large enough to catch national attention, the ratings agencies will jump on board and we will have ‘Round 2′. It is not that far away.

Since 2003, when lending first started becoming extremely lax, a small percentage of the loans were true sub-prime fixed or arms. But sub-prime is what is being focused upon to draw attention away from the fact the lenders and Wall Street banks made all loans too easy to attain for everyone. They can explain away the reason sub-prime loans are imploding due to the weakness of the borrower.

How will they explain foreclosures in wealthy cities across the nation involving borrowers with 750 scores when their loan adjusts higher or terms change overnight because they reached their maximum negative potential on a neg-am Pay Option ARM for instance? ...

The ’second mortgage implosion’, ‘Pay-Option implosion’ and ‘Hybrid Intermediate-term ARM implosion’ are all happening simultaneously and about to heat up drastically. Second mortgage liens were done by nearly every large bank in the nation and really heated up in 2005, as first mortgage rates started rising and nobody could benefit from refinancing. This was a way to keep the mortgage money flowing. Second mortgages to 100% of the homes value with no income or asset documentation were among the best sellers at CITI, Wells, WAMU, Chase, National City and Countrywide. We now know these are worthless especially since values have indeed dropped and those who maxed out their liens with a 100% purchase or refi of a second now owe much more than their property is worth.

How are the banks going to get this junk second mortgage paper off their books? Moody’s is expecting a 15% default rate among ‘prime’ second mortgages. Just think the default rate in lower quality such as sub-prime. These assets will need to be sold for pennies on the dollar to free up capacity for new vintage paper or borrowers allowed to pay 50 cents on the dollar, for instance, to buy back their note. ...

The ‘Pay-Option ARM implosion’ will carry on for a couple of years. In my opinion, this implosion will dwarf the ’sub-prime implosion’ because it cuts across all borrower types and all home values. Some of the most affluent areas in California contain the most Option ARMs due to the ability to buy a $1 million home with payments of a few thousand dollars per month. Wamu, Countrywide, Wachovia, IndyMac, Downey and Bear Stearns were/are among the largest Option ARM lenders. Option ARMs are literally worthless with no bids found for many months for these assets. These assets are almost guaranteed to blow up. 75% of Option ARM borrowers make the minimum monthly payment. Eighty percent-plus are stated income/asset. Average combined loan-to-value are at or above 90%. The majority done in the past few years have second mortgages behind them. ...


LJ December 8, 2007 - 1:56pm
( categories: Miscellany | Opinion )

Right on target. Are these Heloc's packed & sold in the secondary market? Or are they made out of the Bank's own funds?

If the Bank's own funds, how many have to go bad before the Bank's capital rations are badly affected, and the Banks can neither make loans nor take deposits?

What we are facing, at its worst, is a complete failure of the Banking system. I'm wiling to bet that the Comptroller of the Currency (who, I believe governs Banks), is will to let the Capital Ratios slide to keep the Banking system going.

I hope so. The consequences of the Banking system collapsing is clear to see -- Go read up on Zimbabwe.

Synoia December 8, 2007 - 3:53pm

China just increased its capital ratios. This is the 10th hike this year.

http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific_business/view/316297/1/.html

They're nervous and doing a controlled banking correction instead of waiting for an uncontrolled one.

Forget it, Jake - it's AmnesiaTown

Tonsure Wimple December 8, 2007 - 11:35pm

Can Numerian or someone comment on why and how so many crazy programs got started to begin with? Was it a way to put the credit the economy was swimming in to work?

Lesly December 8, 2007 - 9:49pm

Especially in public companies where management watches the stock price daily, it is essential to meet quarterly earnings growth targets, which these days are set at absurd levels from 15% - 25% p.a. So the mortgage business had to keep the fee income growing at high levels.

It is a lot easier in a bank to achieve your loan growth targets if you can cut out those nasty credit officers who police the credit risk you take on. The way to do this is to securitize your loans - sell them to investors as fast as you book them. Or, you can sell them to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, except these two agencies were banned by Congress from booking much new business the past few years. Either way, you can argue to the credit department that there is no credit risk - the loans leave the bank the minute they are done. You can then operate with minimal credit standards.

But suppose you run out of potential clients who meet even these standards? Abandon the standards altogether. Eliminate the need for proof of a job and income. Make it as easy as possible for people to get a mortgage, because it is the investors in the securities who are taking on any default risk, and you're paying them a handsome yield, aren't you?

Suppose further while all this is developing that the Fed starts raising interest rates, making it harder for even your new credit-impaired clients to qualify? Easy - lower the interest rate on the mortgage for the first year or two with teaser rates. Change the structure of the mortgage so that after two years the rates set at a much higher level to compensate for the first two years giveaway. That makes the investors whole, and if the customer has trouble paying the new rates they can always refinance into a new mortgage with a lower rate, using the equity they've built up in the two years of homeownership. Of course they will build up equity - real estate values only ever go up, as everyone knows.

Hence the trap was set. When the teaser rates hit, millions of new homeowners had no way of meeting the payments. Home values started to go down given all the homes going into foreclosure, so there was no out for the banks or the customers.

Before the market turned south, banks also were marketing second mortgages as home equity lines of credit - the piggy banks used by customers to "cash in" some of their profit in their home. For this, banks deserve whatever losses they carry here, because first they were willing to lend up to 100% or more of the home value, and stand second behind the first mortgagor. This is just stupid - it meant the banks were counting as well on continuing asset appreciation to get them out if the customer couldn't meet the mortgage payments.

The second stupid and misleading thing they did was sell customers on the idea that their house appreciation was profit they actually earned, and taking cash out of the home was just like cashing in your profit. Banks never emphasized that homeowners were cashing in equity and replacing it with debt. For that matter, debt was never mentioned - only the monthly interest payments, which with teaser rates looked very low.

Think back to all the mortgage advertisements you've seen in the past 10 years. They were always about the monthly payment and how you could reduce it. The total new amount of debt you were taking on was hidden until you signed the papers. This type of advertising is misleading if it isn't fraudulent, and was an example of the collapse of credit standards in the mortgage business.

That's worth repeating: the collapse of credit standards is what this crisis is all about. Somebody else was going to be on the hook, or the market appreciation was going to get the bank and customer out of any trouble. The problem was, at the slightest hint of default risk in the investment securities, investors panicked and stopped buying. The music stopped - no new securities could be issued and banks could only do loans that they kept, not securitized. Without this crutch, with no one able to buy new mortgages, the house appreciation stopped. Homes for sale exploded and house values started to go backwards, not up. A vicious cycle has set in to replace the virtuous cycle that allow credit to explode.

What the article suggests is that we are only in the early stages of this crisis. The second mortgages are now starting to collapse too, and these will be problematic because there is no equity left for even the bank with the first mortgage, forget about the bank holding a second mortgage. This is why Wells Fargo announced they were writing down so much in second mortgages.

Following this, the loans with teaser rates will implode.

Adding all these losses up suggest that some big banks will have to be rescued by the government and merged with other banks. The only question here is whether the public will panic and start a run on these banks, making the problem much worse. I wouldn't be surprise to see that happen. We just saw Florida municipalities panic when they discovered their pension investments were frozen. Bank runs are easy to predict here.

One last thing about your question. The economy was swimming in credit because the banks were creating so much of it. This was an effort not to put credit to work, but to make more of it so that the fee income could grow for the banks. Greed, stupidity, deception, fraud, and blindness to the reality of all is what motivated this disaster.

Numerian December 8, 2007 - 11:51pm

Thanks. Lots of stuff to think about.

Lesly December 9, 2007 - 12:28am

there are al least 3 parties in a lonn

The borrower
the servicing company
the investor (who paid money for the loan)

How is it the servicing companies foreclose? They don't appear to own the loans.

Synoia December 9, 2007 - 12:33am

Two Ohio courts just looked at this issue and decided that servicing companies could not foreclose if they didn't show up in court with a clear title. The title could be anywhere, given all the parties in securitization who have an ownership interest.

Countrywide has been very aggressive in foreclosing. Less than 2% of their defaulted loans have been given any amelioration. So their tactic of grabbing the property and forcing a quick sale might be stopped by the courts.

There are similar problems if not fraud going on in the foreclosure process. Banks and servicing companies are adding all sorts of fees, and miscalculating out of error, laziness, or greed, the real amount owed by the customer. This is all part of the pollution that occurred in the process when so many fees were introduced. When house values were going up, nobody cared about the fees, but now we see how egregious they truly were.

If the debtor can't even trust the lender to accurately and faithfully calculate what is owed, the entire banking relationship breaks down and debtors feel no compulsion to pay back anything.

Numerian December 9, 2007 - 6:13am

How can the servicing companies ever have clear title? Surely the title belongs to the investors? Then there has to be some agreement, including power of attorney for the servicing companies to foreclose.

It's got to be a lot of paper, that must be produced on demand (the borrower's demand)...right?

Synoia December 9, 2007 - 12:34pm

The title does belong to the investors, several hundreds of them for the typical mortgage security. But not one of them is holding on to the actual piece of paper, and neither apparently is the servicing company or the mortgage broker or the real estate agent or the lawyers or any of the dozens of people who fed off the fees channeled through the process.

Why should anyone care who has the title or who has legal rights to it once the fees were paid, most of which were paid technically by the banks who issued the checks at closing and rolled it all up into what the customer owed.

Securitization spread the risk all right, just as it spread the responsibility and made it much harder to fix any problems.

Numerian December 9, 2007 - 1:49pm

in America,

but you do.

Forty minutes long, but well worth the time.

I did inhale.

Don December 8, 2007 - 10:00pm


1."George Washington did not cross the Delaware for Capitalism," -Shmuley Boteach.
2.The Dems haven't punished the GOP enough, so you're going to reward the Republicans?

nymole December 8, 2007 - 11:27pm

So if Countrywide goes wheels-up can I skip on my payments? ;-)



Turn back to the Constitution - and
READ it.

Rick December 9, 2007 - 12:34am

An interesting percentage of mortgages have screwed-up title transfers: the holder can have trouble proving title.

I don't know how to demand proof of title without damaging your credit, but I'm sure such a challenge is possible.

And now for the money shot: http://www.foreclosureradar.com/
Find out how much of your neighborhood is in trouble.

Forget it, Jake - it's AmnesiaTown

Tonsure Wimple December 9, 2007 - 3:15am

To borrow a phrase about rugged individuals out west living without electricity (or stealing it where they can), it is quite likely that millions of Americans will refuse to participate in the credit scheme that defines this country. They just won't care anymore about their credit rating, they'll walk away from their debts without negotiating any repayment, they'll stop using banks and participating in the electronic economy. "What have I got to lose," they'll reason. "I have no assets, no investments, not much of a job, and no prospects."

Certain hurdles will have to be overcome, like finding a way to access cash and checking accounts, stopping the harassment of bill collectors, and preventing garnishment of their wages. In a bad enough recession, though, people will band together to find answers to these problems.

Inner city people have been living off the banking grid for decades. They already have the model in place for people who have lost everything playing by the rules.

Numerian December 9, 2007 - 6:21am

Wheee! 400 comments in that post.

Search down for "Mary Glass". She claims to have originated some of the mortgage securitization models in the early nineties.

Recently I wrote a brief history of Alt ‘A’ and the reasons for the mortgage meltdown in which might help clear up a few things in the market. In 1993, I wrote and developed the core philsophy developing credit risk and risk base pricing for the first securitization transaction in the market for Alt ‘A’ and have transacted over $50b of securitizations that have excellent performance.

...

(It's mainly fraud.)

.....

I just returned from NY after spending time working on redeveloping liquidity for 2008 and meeting with agencies as well. Hopefully, we can work together to restore the market with a better understanding on how to prevent fraud in our marketplace.

As my ex says, "my Snoopy ears are flapping". (The signal for consternation in the comic strip "Peanuts".)

Forget it, Jake - it's AmnesiaTown

Tonsure Wimple December 9, 2007 - 3:50am

If this is what industry experts and insiders think, the problems aren't going to be fixed soon. There was a ton of fraud in the process, but the core of the problem was greed and the lack of any credit standards that resulted from greed taking hold. The fraudsters took advantage of it, but the industry created the environment in the first place.

Numerian December 9, 2007 - 6:24am

The government "deregulated", relaxing all of the regulations on the banking industry. The bankers then responded by giving loans to anybody, basing their profit margins on volume and pocketing their bonuses. Watch government fail to regulate anything.

Lasthorseman December 9, 2007 - 10:07am

Who set the underwriting standards? Who established NINA (No Income No Asset disclosures to obtain a loan?), and SISA (Stated Income Stated Assets disclosures by the borrower)?

Why did underwrites allow W2 employees to get SISA & SIVA (Stated Income, Verified assets, assets = typically a few months of payments) loans?

Where's the investigation of this, at best negligence, and at worst systematic fraud?

Synoia December 9, 2007 - 12:31pm

Comment viewing options

Select your preferred way to display the comments and click "Save settings" to activate your changes.