As Josh at TPM will probably note tonight, in relation to his earlier post, that the installation and the Iranian announcement of 3,000 new centrifuges late this month or early March will be the ‘Red Line.’ At least that’s been my working assumption for the last several weeks.
I was going to blog about my recent research into Iran’s nuclear program at a later date when I had conducted more interviews and I will write up the post at some point, but here is my conclusion: I believe there is good evidence, albeit circumstantial, that the Iranians have failed to let the IAEA inspect in accordance with the Additional Protocol (and reduced the IAEA team) because of serious program failures (as noted here in the Guardian) as opposed to a successful program. The Iranians may be hiding failure for domestic reasons, as well–especially as tomatoes cost three euros a pound. Think of the outrage at home if the program was seen as a failure, the country is pouring all that money into it, Ahmedinehad is speechifying everywhere and the program is a bust?
One could rebut by saying, “Bush is pressuring Iran to create negotiating space, a la Friedman’s column this week. But it’s not about strategy at this point, but trust, as Chris Nelson wrote today:
a case can be made that IF you could bring yourself to trust the judgment and capacity of Bush and Cheney, then you MIGHT be able to feel that the combined escalation of rhetoric, threats, Navy deployments, and calculated sanctions efforts, is creating a potentially useful negotiating space with Iran.
You might, that is, if you accept the evidence, clearly demonstrated over the years, that the council of mullahs is capable of rational, pragmatic, self-interested foreign policy decisions, including helping the US defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan. If you buy this, then you might be willing to believe that Bush efforts will stimulate the council to properly assessing the risks and benefits of continuing to pursue the threat of nuclear weapons…vs reaching accommodation with Europe and the US.
Alas…if you break down the components of the ”œif/then” propositions above, it’s way too many to be sustained on faith. The Bush Administration simply has not earned any extension of faith, on anything.
Will we attack Iran? I put the odds at 65/35, creeping up more with news of additional White House pressure and lack of Democratic pushback. Where are the Democrats, by the way?
The good news is that cable ratings and revenues will be up.



It’s starting to dawn on people that they were always 100%.
What’s creeping up is the slow horror of dawning realization that a lot of people were wrong.
They told us from 1992 what they intended to do. Now they’re doing it.
[edited to add - that is, 100% if unchecked - ES]
…wouldn’t welcome an excuse to step back from the abyss a bit and think things through. My understanding is that they aren’t all that supportive of the notion of a weapons program – seems to me that the only reason that a delay (as opposed to outright cessation of enrichment) would cause serious unrest is if there was a popular belief that there was a real time pressure (i.e., if it was actually a weapons program). Busheyr doesn’t go live until, what, this fall? Given that the intial fuel load is coming from Russia, provided that Ahmadinejad can plausibly show that he’ll have a LEU cascade running for reactor fuel within about, what, approx. 18 months or so, where’s the problem with the popular reaction?
“Political Islam is a dream or a nightmare, but not a sociological reality.” – Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah
where do you get your understanding that “they aren’t all that supportive of a nuclear wearpons program”?
Furthermore, as someone with significant emotional capital invested in certain members of the armed forces, you’ll forgive me if I don’t particularly care to spend that capital simply to give the Iranians the excuse to do something I really don’t give a good goddamn about anyway.
…and listened to from guys that are Iran experts. Further, when Iranians were polled on the issue in November [pdf], two-thirds of them said that they thought it was good idea that Iran is a signatory to the Nonproliferation Treaty, having had it explained to them that the NPT forbids them from developing nuclear weapons. Only 10% thought that it was a bad idea and 24% didn’t know or refused to answer the question.
I’m afraid that I don’t understand your latter comment. Seems to me that my interpretation, which sees the Iranian public as not putting pressure on the government to cover-up any non-functional enrichment cascade, is a view that, if taken on board by decision makers in both governments, makes conflict less likely, not more likely.
“Political Islam is a dream or a nightmare, but not a sociological reality.” – Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah
Probably nothing Iran’s leaders can do in the real world to stop this. Not that it’s inconceivable, just that time is short and falling prostate on the ground and begging for mercy is not something Iran’s politicians can get away with and stay in power. In retrospect, Saddam Hussein did try, behind the scenes, to soften his stance, to no avail.
If bush is stopped it’ll be at home.
Jesus wasn’t a Christian.
…could quite readily get away with a temporary cessation of enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water related activities. The question is what effect that would have on the intra-mural power sharing below him. Ahmadinejad would take a beating, but frankly there’s a whole pile of folks in Iran who are gunning for him precisely because he’s been riding the tiger on this one. Recent reporting out of the UK would tend to suggest that Khamenei is one of the folks willing to take Ahmadinejad down a peg on this one, by appointing a new negotiating team. Dunno whether that’d be enough for this administration of the dim, but the rest of us adults would think it a development with potential.
“Political Islam is a dream or a nightmare, but not a sociological reality.” – Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah
Tremors within
The presidents of the United States and Iran are under fire for their respective foreign policies towards each other, reports Rasha Saad
AL Ahram Weekly – Washington and Tehran have alarmingly intensified the psychological war ongoing between them during the last month.
In a move that was interpreted as an attempt to counter Iran’s missile capacity and naval power, the United States has moved two aircraft carriers — the Eisenhower and the Stennis — to within quick sailing distance of Iran, and has ordered Patriot missile defence systems to the Gulf Cooperation Council states.
The move was significant because it followed a series of escalating measures Washington undertook that included attempts to cripple Iran’s banking system, as well as the financing of its external trade, by pressuring international banks not to deal with Iran. Washington has reportedly urged several major companies to stop trading with Iran.
The US has also taken steps to prevent Iran from blocking oil shipments in the Gulf. Also, US troops have arrested Iranian officials in three different incidents in Iraq, accusing them of financing and arming Iraqi insurgents. On 10 January, President Bush declared, “we will seek out and destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq.” The US is also planning to stiffen sanctions against Iran if it fails to suspend its uranium enrichment activities by early February, as stipulated by UN Security Council Resolution 1737 issued 23 December.
While these moves have aroused fears in the West and in the Arab world — fears that President Bush is heading towards war — Washington’s escalation was particularly stark as it comes shortly after the Iraq Study Group, or Baker-Hamilton commission, recommended that the Bush Administration engage Iran in some form of dialogue. Instead, the Bush administration is choosing to threaten it.
According to Egyptian political analyst Abdel-Azim Hammad, tightening its grip on Iran might be aimed at improving Washington’s chances to initiate a dialogue in which it has the upper hand during talks. “Bush would not rush to implement the Baker-Hamilton recommendations, to escape appearing vulnerable before initiating a dialogue with Iran.”
According to Hammad, Bush would publicly refuse to initiate a dialogue with Iran unless the Islamic republic cooperates in face-saving manoeuvres for Bush. “Until this happens, the US will insist that Iran comprehend that the US quagmire in Iraq does not mean that Washington is politically or militarily impotent.”
Another theory is that the US new policy is based on the assumption that Tehran will back down from its nuclear ambitions if the US hits it hard in Iraq and elsewhere, creating a sense of vulnerability among Iranian leaders.
In this context, President Bush last week denied widespread speculations that his administration was preparing for military action against Iran. Bush confirmed his authorisation to US troops to shoot and kill Iranian operatives in Iraq, but denied this was prelude to stronger action. Any suggestion, Bush said, that he wished to widen the confrontation with Iran was “not accurate”. “We’re going to continue to protect ourselves in Iraq and at the same time work to solve their problems with Iran diplomatically, and I believe we can succeed. The choice is the Iranian government’s,” he said.
The policy has riled some influential sceptics inside the Bush administration and the intelligence community who advise that any pressure on Iran needs to be carefully measured, since Iran, too, has the capacity to escalate the confrontation, both in Iraq and elsewhere. CIA Director-General Michael V Hayden counselled the president to consider that Iran could undertake to kill or capture US personnel in Iraq or neighbouring Afghanistan.
In an editorial of The Washington Post this week, the paper wrote: “what’s needed is a mix of pressure with avenues for moderation by Tehran.” The editorial also explained that hardline policy “ignores the very differences between extremists and moderates that can now be glimpsed in Tehran, and it invites Ahmadinejad to rally the country on a nationalist platform.”
The sharpest criticism however came from the new chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator John D Rockefeller IV, who on Friday chided the Bush administration for its increasingly combative stance towards Iran, saying that White House efforts to portray Iran as a growing threat are uncomfortably reminiscent of rhetoric about Iraq before the American invasion of 2003. He added that the administration was building a case against Tehran even as American intelligence agencies know little about either Iran’s internal dynamics or its intentions in the Middle East.
“To be quite honest, I’m a little concerned that it’s Iraq again,” Senator Rockefeller said. “This whole concept of moving against Iran is bizarre. I don’t think that policy-makers in this administration particularly understand Iran,” he added.
Rockefeller’s views reportedly carry weight; he is one of a handful of lawmakers with access to the most classified intelligence about the threat from Iran.
Meanwhile, the Islamic republic has not stood hand-tied in the face of US escalations. On Monday, Tehran began military manoeuvres in its central desert, testing short-range missiles. State radio reported that Revolutionary Guards were test-firing both the 350 kilometre-range Zelzal-1 missile and the 70 kilometre-range Fajr-5 missile near the town of Garmsar, 80 kilometres southeast of Tehran.
In defiance of US policy against Iran in Iraq, Iran’s Ambassador to Iraq Hassan Kazemi Qumi told The New York Times in an interview this week that his country was prepared to offer training, equipment and advisers to Iraqi government forces. Qumi also said in a recent news conference that Iranian policy in Iraq is “clear and going forward”.
He added: “we are happy with the Iraqi government. The kidnapping of our diplomats will have no effect at all on our help and cooperation with the Iraqi side… We are only at the first stages of this support.”
Iran last week barred 38 inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency because they came from countries that voted for sanctions on Iran. As Russia’s national security adviser, Igor Ivanov, paid a important visit to Tehran Sunday, Iranian state radio reported that Iran was looking to Russia for “new proposals” and expects Russia to “take a close stance with the international community” to help Iran resolve its nuclear standoff.
However, while Iran remains publicly defiant, insisting it will move ahead with its nuclear ambitions, President Ahmadinejad is under increasing strain as political and economic pressures grow. Editorials in normally uncritical hardline newspapers have been criticising Ahmadinejad for being too aggressive towards the West.
When President Ahmadinejad dismissed UN Security Council Resolution 1737 as “a piece of torn paper”, the daily newspaper Jomhouri-Eslami, which belongs to Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, wrote that, “the resolution is certainly harmful for the country,” adding that it is “too much to call it a piece of torn paper”.
And in comments released Monday, Iran’s most senior dissident cleric, Grand Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri, joined the chorus of criticism of Ahmadinejad for his “radical and provocative slogans”, and argued that Iran’s rights could be defended without giving “pretexts” to the US.
Ahmadinejad’s internal policies have also been criticised. The stock market is dropping, and capital flight is accelerating.
A group of Iranian reformist and moderate members of parliament have now started collecting signatures to summon him to answer questions about his policies. It has so far gathered 63 signatures and needs only a further nine to be effective. Meanwhile, proceedings are underway to impeach four of Ahmadinejad’s ministers who are accused of incompetence.
Iran’s beleaguered president is also facing a powerful challenge from his fiercest political rival, Hashemi Rafsanjani. Rafsanjani, a pragmatic conservative who was defeated by Ahmadinejad in the 2005 presidential elections, believes Iran may have to yield to Western demands to suspend uranium enrichment in order to save the country’s Islamic system from collapse.
Rafsanjani is reportedly trying to persuade the country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali, that negotiations are essential to avoid a potentially disastrous conflict with the US or Israel.
Rafsanjani reportedly demonstrated his growing influence over the nuclear issue in a meeting this week with Britain’s ambassador to Tehran, Geoffrey Adams. He told Adams that Iran was willing to submit to “any verifying measures of the responsible authorities” to prove the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, which many in the West suspect is aimed at developing an atomic bomb.
Meanwhile, alarmed by such warnings and mounting US pressure and UN sanctions, officials close to Khamenei reportedly said that Iran’s supreme leader is considering the appointment of a more moderate team for international nuclear negotiations.
According to sources in Tehran, one of the possible members of a new Iranian negotiating team would be Mohamed Moussavian, a former senior nuclear negotiator and an ally of Rafsanjani.
Last week Moussavian accused Ahmadinejad of “misleading the country about the dangers it faced as a result of UN penalties”.
“at some point I’m hopeful I’ll figure out something to put here”
TEHRAN | Feb.2
ISNA - Iranian foreign ministry spokesman recognized the recent statements by the French President indicating that even if Iran acquired a nuclear weapon it would not be particularly threatening, as an insult.
In his remarks to journalists on Monday, Jacques Chirac had stated that Iran’s possession of a nuclear bomb would not be “very dangerous”.
In an interview with the Associated Press, Mohammad Ali Husseini renounced the idea of Iran access to nuclear warheads and branded it as an initiative in contrast with Iran’s religious beliefs.
“This is not the first time that Chirac is making such remarks. He had previously said that France would probably deploy nuclear missiles for its security and these statements were not welcomed by Europe and reactions followed,” he said.
He added that Chirac’s recent remarks were nothing new and that they would not be of any help to the sensitive circumstances in the region.
“This does not mean that Iran has a right to possess nuclear missiles or to enhance its nuclear programs in this line. Even if Chirac meant to say this, it is still an insult against Iran, because based on our religious beliefs we cannot own nuclear warheads,” he reiterated.
In the final parts of his interview, Husseini expressed hope that in future such remarks and statements would be expressed on a more rational and logical foundation, considering the regional circumstances.
“at some point I’m hopeful I’ll figure out something to put here”