An Excellent Basic Look At What Subprime Is


Over at Calculated Risk there's an excellent primer not just on what subprime is, but on what good basic mortgage underwriting (or, indeed, financial underwriting of any type is about.)

That said, what it’s about is just working through the complexity of the variations on three things that have been the core of mortgage underwriting since roughly the dawn of time: the three Cs, or Credit, Capacity, and Collateral. Does the borrower’s history establish creditworthiness, or the willingness to repay debt? Does the borrower’s current income and expense situation (and likely future prospects) establish the capacity or ability to repay the debt? Does the house itself, the collateral for the loan, have sufficient value and marketability to protect the lender in the event that the debt is not repaid?

There is no New Paradigm, there was no New Paradigm, there is not going to be a New Paradigm. The Cs are the Cs. What we “innovated” was our willingness to believe that we had established the Cs with indirect or superficial measures (that are, not coincidentally, cheap and fast compared to direct measures). We looked at FICOs—scores produced by computers—instead of full credit reports and other documents to supplement them. We looked at the borrower’s statement of income or assets, not the documents; when we got docs, we looked at the last paystub or the current balance of an account, not the documentation of a long enough period to establish stability of income or source of account balances. We looked at AVMs instead of full field appraisals. We read the Cliff’s Notes.

I can't hammer this in enough. Things don't change fundamentally all that often, and on the very rare occasions when they do change, usually because of changes in things like how fast one can communicate, the cost of transportation, the way military force works, or the very basic stuff like the means of production, it tends to change rather slowly. Even fast changes tend to take a couple decades.

Underwriting, however, has not changed from the basics. And I doubt it ever will.

Go read the rest. It will reward your time.


Ian Welsh November 27, 2007 - 4:08pm
( categories: Miscellany )

The crucial aspect to keep in mind is that neglecting the C of “capacity” allowed the U.S. to ignore the real underlying problem: the stagnation of earnings for the middle two fifths of the population, and real declines in earnings for the bottom two fifths.

I recall very clearly that when I bought a house in 1999, I was urged to get an low initial rate with a series of resets down the road, rather than a fixed rate, with the argument that when time came for the interest rates to increase, I would be earning more money and thus have higher capacity to pay. Well, it didn’t work out that way for me, and it hasn’t worked out that way for around 240 million of my fellow citizens. (btw, I stuck with the old-fashioned fixed 30 year at 6.0 percent).

If, since Reagan took office, average weekly earnings had continued to grow at the same rate they had grown from 1964 to 1980, the typical household in the U.S. would have had around $30,000 more in income than it does now. That's right, nearly twice the income. There would not have been a “market” for sub-prime mortgages in those circumstances.

Photo Sharing and Video Hosting at Photobucket

Where did the missing wages go?

To the financial sector:
Photo Sharing and Video Hosting at Photobucket

And to corporate profits:
Photo Sharing and Video Hosting at Photobucket

Tony Wikrent November 27, 2007 - 9:40pm

the numbers are worse than that chart shows since it's average, not median, and I suspect it's houshold as well.

Ian Welsh November 28, 2007 - 5:49am

Comment viewing options

Select your preferred way to display the comments and click "Save settings" to activate your changes.