another angle

Andrew McGregor
Asia Times

Great to see his name here. He was the first online pundit I ever knew.
14+ years ago I used to receive his emailed newsletter and kept up with him ever since. He's definitely in my ubershort blogroll. I can't recall anyone referencing him before, or at least lately for sure. No, I've nothing substantive on-topic to add here, just enjoyment. Made my morning.

Now that official U.S. policy endorses preemption, which in practice requires a flimsy or no actual military threat to the preemptor, Turkey has every right to cross the border and attack the peshmerga (who are a real threat). This is what happens in a world where the UN charter and in fact entire purpose of being - to prevent wars of aggression - is routinely violated.

It seemed risible twenty years ago when Strom Thurmond and Jesse Helms stormed on and on about the UN, undermining public support for international cooperation on security matters. Now we realize this was setting the stage in the Republican Party for unilateralism. The Republicans thought in such a world the U.S. would dominate, but it is becoming increasingly evident that the U.S. cannot control the global scene even in matters of vital interest to America.

As much as we like to blame the neocons for America's foreign policy fiascos, the real problem is the Republican Party. It is a force for danger in the world. Since it cannot reform itself, it needs to go away.

Terrain would be pretty difficult. A ten year war with a half decent opposition would gut the Turkish economy, and if Turkey fails, it loses more than the shot at iraqi lands, but bunches of its own. This is a bad, bad idea, but unlike the odds of Bush going into Iran, Turkey is acting more like it is truly considering going into Iraq.

Hey, if the US can make a naked oil grab in Iraq, why expect the rest of the world to just sit around and watch. Peak oil must here or at least close. This is just what was predicted to happen when oil started getting scarce and whole economies depend on it.

There is so much that is wrong with this post. To begin with, the treatement of Turkey as a country which has to be taken seriously in military terms. The aura of the undefeatable Turkish army, and of course the idea that conquest of Kurdistan is a) feasible militarily, b) politically, c) economically.

Let us begin.

As a Greek I grew up in a country where at every moment we exagerate on everything that has to do with Turkey. Turkey is powerful, Turkey has an amazing diplomacy, which it uses to screw us up and so on. All this made sense to an extent given our history of bungling Cyprus and the chest thumping of the Turkish army generals over issues of the Aegean, but it was never seriously examined. You see, ultimately, while Greece went into an EU-inspired consumer binge which is still going on and progressively became part of a nice club of snobby Euronations, Turkey was still there having nothing more than the large US supported army and the IMF to bail it out of crisis everytime there was a snag in its economy.

But was Turkey diplomatically powerful and militarily strong? Well, the Iraq war, which happened against its wishes and despite its inconvenient position on use of its land trasport system by the US army, proved that the US could more or less ignore Turkey in its politics. And then the gradual strengthening of the Kurdish region in Iraq and the prospect of autonomy within Iraq proved once more that Turkish diplomacy and political weight counts for nothing. And then the Armenian resolution (where unlike many on this site I believe that the US was wright and so do most of my Turkish non-Kemalist, non-Islamist friends) just rubbed mud on Turkey's face.

So will Turkey invade for conquest? NO! For a series of reasons. First because the Euro-door will close for ever. And that door IS important. You cannot develop a country with oil alone and Turkey needs EU-cred (not really EU-accession) if only to get the millions of Euro-Tourists to come to its western shores. You seem to believe that somehow oil will replace the benefits that Turkey derives from its admitedly problematic relationship with the Europeans. When bombs start exploding in Antalya and Kusadasi and when the streets of every Turkish city become even more inundated with ruthless police than they are now, then you will see what will happen to the tourism cash-cow.

But that is not the only reason why the invasion will never take place in the form of conquest. Somehow you mention the ruthless efficiency of the Turkish army. Well, first you have to show that it is efficient. Last time it fought (in Cyprus) it sank one of its own ships and almost bugled the easiest amphibious operation on earth fighting against almost no one. But time has passed and admitedly the Turkish armed forces have improved. As a recruit of the Greek army and having experienced the mess that this venerable institution is all about, I can be sure that the conscripts of the Turkish army will not necessarily be too much better. For now we have already seen them poached by light guerilla groups on their own soil and killed by the dozen. Remember, this kind of ambush has not been seen in Iraq, where the highest single-event US casualities are from helicopter crashes. Moreover, if the professional US army is having trouble, how will the conscript Turkish army do any better without the satellite comunications and weapons-guidance, ineffective air-support, and faulty radios and on top of that, with a US arms embargo may follow such a conquest plan (remember Turkey has suffered an arms embargo before, after the Cyrpus invasion). Unless of course the army starts being ruthless as you say it will. In which case, just remember the recent Armenian resolution and add to it so many Kurdish ones. Kurds burning themselves all around Europe in protest and all the usual responses. Halabja would look like a vacation soon enough and the west will be quite unhappy to rediscover Turkish barbarity. Europeans have been looking for an excuse to forever close the door to a country which in their xenophobic fears they have never liked as anything other than a vacation site. In practical terms, where will the refuges from this pacification go (Iran and Syria will surely not want them) and central Iraq hates them. More PR problems for the invasion project.

Meanwhile you assume that in this mess the oil will flow. How? If the US with billions of dollars failed to secure supply lines, how will Turkey do it? By killing everyone? But then they would be back to the previous problem of disastrous PR. Moreover, the oil industry in Kurdistan as in the rest of Iraq requires billions of dollars in investment to be rentable and those you cannot procure having pissed the Americans and the Europeans off. Unless you align yourself with Iran and look to China, but lets be real. The Turkish elites have till recently been western-minded. They looked to the west for inspiration. They will not look east that easily. In fact, Kemalism was an attempt to forget all about the east. Yes this has partly changed in the past few years but are you sure it is enough for such a reorientation of a 80 year old policy. Even Erdogan has been looking to Europe wishing to distinguish his moslem politics, which he compares to the Christian Democracy in Germany, from the of the fanatics in his neighborhood.

Finally. Where will the US retreat once it leaves Iraq? Kurdistan is the US playground. It is already reserved as the parking lot for the US army. It is where American troops will go once they "leave" Iraq. In permanent bases allowing them control of at least some of the oil. You think Turkey will play with that? That they will risk getting the US to impose an embargo on their F-16s and all their US military equipment?

An incursion for the eyes of the Turkish public which wants to see dead Kurdish guerillas maybe. An invasion for conquest? Think again...

He has not posted on his blog in many weeks... Anyone?

By EDWARD P. JOSEPH and MICHAEL E. O'HANLON
November 2, 2007; Page A12

WSJ

As President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice prepare for next week's crucial meetings with Turkey's leaders about the attacks by Kurdish PKK rebels, they should look beyond crisis management to deal with the wider Turkish-Kurdish agenda. If they do, it is possible that the political stalemate within Iraq can begin to be broken as well. Broadening the agenda could make diplomacy easier.

Iraq's responsible Kurdish establishment is appealing to Washington for support. Kurdish leaders like Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih see the U.S. as the indispensable player in resolving the crisis. Turkey has put aside anger over a recent Congressional resolution on the Armenian genocide; it also looks to Washington to advance its legitimate demand that the PKK threat in northern Iraq be dealt with once and for all.

The problem is that, while Washington is relevant politically, it will be tough to broker a deal that will meet Turkish expectations. The momentum in Turkey towards a decisive military confrontation is strong. So is the resistance in the Kurdish region of Iraq towards a crackdown on the PKK, which is popular among Kurds along both sides of the border.

Mr. Bush and Ms. Rice may be tempted to simply soothe tempers and focus on the PKK problem. But all indications are that won't solve much. And a Turkish invasion, even if limited to the Qandil Mountain stronghold of the PKK, could have disastrous consequences. It would destabilize the most successful part of Iraq and further solidify Kurdish nationalism -- rendering compromise over the flashpoint, oil-rich town of Kirkuk even more difficult.

Averting crisis in Kurdistan requires dealing with the three most neuralgic issues: the PKK, oil and Kirkuk. Turkey sees Kurdish control of Kirkuk and its oil as the precursor to a Kurdistan independent from Iraq, which could in turn lead to the violent breakaway of Turkey's Kurdish region. Iraqi Kurds see Kirkuk as an inalienable piece of Kurdish patrimony and a source of revenue-producing oil and gas. A comprehensive deal will take some time to negotiate. But a signal from Washington to finally deal with all these issues, and make tradeoffs across all three, could be the key to defusing the current crisis.

Instead of simply delaying resolution of Kirkuk, as Washington has asked the Kurds to do so far, the U.S. should table creative options like giving the town a "special status" under the Iraqi constitution. The constitution's wide federalism provisions permit making Kirkuk its own region, while at the same time guaranteeing full power-sharing and property rights for its Turkomen, Arab and other minorities.

While not achieving maximal Kurdish aspirations to reclaim all of Kirkuk under their control, a special status would advance much of the Kurdish agenda without crossing Turkish red lines. It would also stimulate much-needed dialogue with Kirkuk's sizeable non-Kurdish minority, roughly 40% of the population.

As for oil, the Kurds have been a major obstacle to a comprehensive package on production and revenue-sharing necessary for a political settlement in Iraq as a whole. In July, a breakthrough seemed close, but fell apart largely over Kurdish concerns about their autonomy to enter into contracts unfettered by Baghdad. Likewise, the question of whether Kirkuk's oil and gas is from "current fields" (subject to sharing with others in Iraq) or "new fields" (possibly exempt from the same kind of sharing) is another nettlesome question that has so far defied resolution.

Up to now, Kurdish leaders have adroitly played their role as "kingmaker" in Baghdad -- helping determine which Shiite leader governs Iraq in exchange for freedom to assert their demands on oil and Kirkuk. Now, these same Kurdish leaders, facing their most serious crisis since the U.S. invasion in 2003, might be more willing to listen to creative, carefully crafted proposals from Washington.

An oil deal addressing Kurdish concerns about interference from Baghdad, while providing firm guarantees about production and revenue sharing, is certainly possible. And a breakthrough on oil could advance discussions on the other political questions. Progress on Kirkuk might make possible a badly needed conversation in Baghdad on political arrangements to accommodate the concerns of the capital's mixed populations (such as helping people to relocate safely if they feel the need), while acknowledging the reality, as seen in Kirkuk, that the country's demographics have been altered by war.

Mr. Joseph is visiting scholar at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Mr. O'Hanlon directs the "Opportunity 08 Project" at the Brookings Institution.

Asia Times, By Kaveh L Afrasiabi, November 3

Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad has stated his determination to turn "the present threats into opportunities" for Iran and, by all indications, the brewing crisis between Turkey and Iraq represents precisely such a scenario, in light of Iran's excellent relations with all the parties involved and its ability to play an effective crisis-prevention role.

On the eve of the much-anticipated high-level summit on Iraq and its neighbors in Istanbul, Iran's Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, who was due in Ankara on Friday, coinciding with the visit of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, traveled to Syria and Iraq. And while on a stopover in Baghdad, he was urged by the Iraqi leadership to mediate the "border crisis" with Turkey.

The Istanbul summit, which includes the foreign ministers of Iraq and its neighbors, plus the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and the Group of Eight, is due to start on Friday night and continue into Saturday.

A litmus test of Iranian diplomacy, Mottaki's ability to deliver the goods on this front will undoubtedly help Iran's own crisis with the US and Israel on the nuclear issue. The big question is, of course, whether or not the US, which has reportedly sent signals to Tehran regarding a fourth round of bilateral Iran-US dialogue on Iraq's security [1], will tolerate Iran's mediation in the Kurdish crisis. More importantly, can anyone prevent the outbreak of the present Kurdish crisis from developing into a full-blown crisis, given the admission by various top Turkish government officials and experts that Turkey's invasion of northern Iraq, to deal with the menace of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), is irreversible.

Indeed, so much rides on the flurry of diplomatic transactions, ie, the Istanbul meeting bound to be dominated by the growing tensions between Turkey and Iraq and the November 5 White House visit by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Erdogan has stated, "I will only tell him [President George W Bush] that we expect concrete, immediate steps against the terrorists," and the PKK itself, one of whose leaders, Abdulrahman Alchaderchi, has asked Ankara to come up with a "peace proposal".