The Yen Carry Trade Unwinds


Psylo asks why the Yen carry trade is unwinding.

It's unwinding now because large numbers of people are having to close out positions and thus repay their Yen denominated loans. The standard play was to borrow in Japan (which has had zero or near zero prime rates all decade) and then buy foreign denominated assets. When you unwind you have to convert your foreign currency back into Yen. That increased demand is driving up the price of the Yen.

As the Yen goes up, you get into a classic vicious spiral - the higher the Yen is compared to when you borrowed, the worst the (non Yen) assets you bought with that loan are looking. A large enough rise in the value of the Yen can wipe out your gains entirely, or even convert them into losses. So rises in the Yen cause even more people to need to unwind their positions, driving up the Yen even more, causing even more people to have to unwind their positions, causing... well, you get the picture.

Can't say I have any sympathy. It was a free money arbitrage situation which was used to create ridiculous amounts of leverage. When you gamble that way, you take your chances and if you aren't smart enough to get out before the scam ends, you deserve to lose your shirt.


Ian Welsh August 18, 2007 - 8:24am
( categories: The Markets )

The question is whether we have reached an "Ohmstead Break", that shock point when the losses generated by people force selling to liquidate assets has become a vicious circle. This is why Bernanke acted as he did: because there was a serious chance that people would have to dump oil and stock futures in large quantities to avoid losses infecting major financial institutions.

If oil futures go down substantially, the arabs that have a great deal of money in mutual funds and hedge funds will have to dump. It was a strategic threat that said, in essence "if you dump our oil, we will dump your stocks. We are not paying for this bail out." At which point central banks flooded banks with liquidity.

Bernanke knows about this from his writing on the Great Depression, it is what every good monetarist - liberal or conservative - knows: the central bank should have eased after the crash of 1929. However, the correct lesson is that bailing out people who made large mistakes, while leaving them in charge, means that they will make the same mistake over again. We are seeing the same mistake that was made in 1997-98 made over again. It is at this point that sensible policy makers should realize that it is time for upper income tax increases of a substantial size. However, instead, the instinct of our neo-conservative era will be to "make the poor pay" and cut spending or allow inflation.

The poor don't have the money....

Stirling Newberry August 18, 2007 - 9:28am

As you say they're bailing out the rich, and letting the poor and middle class sink... again. Even Clinton's 1 billion mortgage plan is far too little (and will be far too late if it ever occurs). We've got to get off the Arab blackmail train - and we've got to stop coddling the rich.

And I confess that it's getting to the point where even though I know easing is part of the answer, I'd almost rather do a Hoover than bail the rich out yet again. Cutting off my nose to spite my face? Perhaps. But it seems to be a choice between getting slow roasted or dumped into the fire, and I think I'd like to get it over with.

Ian Welsh August 18, 2007 - 9:38am

Somehow I just don't think it is in the cards yet. The populace just doesn't "get it" yet, they still think all income taxes are bad regardless of wealth status. It'll take a few more briges falling down IMHO before they start to wake up.

Welcome to the Great Depression of 2010 ;)

zot23 August 20, 2007 - 11:46am

Thanks Ian. I can see that if people start buying back Yen to pay off the vast amounts of Yen denominated debt that has been created by the carry trade, the Yen will rise making it imperative to pay off those loans asap and creating a vicious circle. Clearly this situation will arise whenever there is a significant carry trade and therefore carry trade positions become more dangerous the longer the process continues as the debt mounts up and the affect on FX prices of unwinding it becomes more significant.
It is not obvious to me why the current crisis kick started this unwinding process. People are being forced out of positions that have become toxic waste (eg mortgage backed CDOs) in vast quantities freeing up a lot of captial, but as interest rates in Japan have not risen, why does it make sense to pay off the very cheap debt now rather than put the money somewhere where you will get better returns on it? Is it because returns on all asset classes have taken a battering and hence there is nowhere good to put it? Or is this unwinding driven by a sudden risk aversion? While this Yen debt was cheap, it was clearly fundementally risky because the unwinding process when it happened was going to hurt anyone short on Yen. Did suddenly risk averse traders want to reduce their exposure to this FX risk and hence decide it was time to unwind the positions?

Psylo August 18, 2007 - 9:57am

" Or is this unwinding driven by a sudden risk aversion?"

http://mauberly.blogspot.com/

mauberly August 18, 2007 - 11:02am

What we are seeing is the result of uncertainty, which increases risk aversion, especially at tipping points. We are at a tipping point in the global markets because of lack of transparency that is causing the uncertainty. Easy money leads to imprudent assumption risk on the premise that one can always borrow to cover oneself. This is sustainable as long as asset prices rise and core inflation is contained, so that asset increases are not attributable to inflation. However, when inflation starts to rise, as it has when housing, energy and food are figured in, although they are excluded from core inflation, then the game is running out. In addition, when even the little guy is getting into the action (subprime mortgages, RE speculation), the game is beginning to run its course. Through in the securitization of debt through derivatives, and the entrance of private equity and hedge funds as major players, and the game gets very opaque, since these players are not required to be transparent. The icing on the cake is the huge leverage involved, which puts even the big money and the deepest pockets at risk.

At a tipping point such as this, the uncertainty becomes too great for the game to be sustainable, and almost unlimited appetite for risk turns into risk aversion. Then, liquidity becomes an issue as players seek to cover their positions and there are more sellers than buyers. At this point the house of cards will collapse unless the central bank step in and provide liquidity. However, if they do, they not only reward moral hazard, but they create it. What this means is that there is little or no check on markets owing to risk, because everyone knows that there will be a bailout.

As a result, instead of the necessary correction to shake out weak hands and restore market equilibrium, the game continues until until another level of unsustainability is reached, and so on -- until this cycle itself becomes unsustainable. For example, at some point, the central bank's unrelenting printing of mony results in a currency crisis, hyperinflation, etc. or the little guy gets so squeezed that the "real" i.e., non-financial markets contract for lack of buying power. The latter is one issue, since the US consumers who are driving the world economy are seriously overstretched by increasing debt and inflation of necessities, along with declining real wages. Not only is there no relief in sight, but also the system that is loaded against them.

When this happens, the tipping point may become a turning point, where unexpected consequences of moral hazard (read greed and false expectations about risk assumption leading to extreme imprudence) manifests in real world consequences that the central banks cannot adequately control without even worse consequences. Then the usual market correction becomes a change of direction from bull to bear. Whether we are there yet is to be determined and the markets will likely be testing support levels.

However, these consequences may become catastrophic, as they could be at the end of this cycle, either presently or in the not too distant future. Then, a transformation takes place that involves a rethinking of responsibility (fiscal and monetary policy, and regulation). If it is serious enough, political and social transformation, as in post-Weimar Germany and the US during the Great Depression. It can be argued that the US and the world are approaching just such a tipping point, with the effects of globalization, "tough energy," US imperialism and dollar hegemony, the indebtedness of the US and the US consumer, lack of transparency in private equity and hedge funds, the necessity to tackle global warming, and other factors now converging. This is likely coming before 2012, it matters greatly who gets nominated and wins the next election.

tjfxh August 18, 2007 - 12:28pm

is leverage and a rising market.

JKG.

Actually this isn't sudden risk aversion, it's sudden belief by a number of parties that a nash equilibrium is decaying.

Stirling Newberry August 18, 2007 - 12:59pm

This has everything to do with Japan. Bank of Japan couldnt keep cheapening the yen to fund exports in 2004, because doing so ballooned its national debt to 800 trillion yen, which caused the near zero interest rates in the first place. So it liberalized its postal savings to spur people to invest abroad to cheapen the yen. Overseas investors saw this as Japan declining, so they borrowed in yen at near zero rates, pretending Japan was doomed and unsexy. Well once China began copying Japan by cheapening too, keeping the yen cheap, so Western nations piled on the debt. Japan's main competitor, China, faced the same problems that it couldn't fight the yuan rise forever, so it rose and let the yen rise too, reversing the carry trade. All those trillions of dollars borrowed in yen got burned, as their debts blew up. Japan has a current account surplus of $20 bln monthly, so the yen has strong pressure to rise. Add speculation and buying yen to repay these debts, and the yen has even more pressure to rise. Yuan won't come down soon either, as their current account surplus is even larger than Japan. Japan can't or won't intervene to help the dollar this time, as its debt is crushing at 170% of GDP (which it owes nearly 100% to itself). Yen is at 106, will it go to 95? 90? 75? As the yen goes up, debts increase by that same amount. Subprime is just beginning. All of this originates from the US accumulating $8 trillion in cumulative current account (trade) deficits, and the fact Japan and China are more than happy to loan us more and we keep borrowing.

Mooo January 21, 2008 - 4:08pm

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