"This is important for people on the left to keep in mind for at least two reasons: (1) in the envisioned hegemony, illiberal and anti-englightenment values would prevail;"

Surely you can't be implying the corollary - that any liberals actually want the small handful of nutbags that comprise groups such as al Qaeda to realize some dream of Caliphate?

I simply don't believe they've got a snowball's chance in hell - unless of course we react to them so irresponsibly and so incompetently that we give them broad-based popular support for such lunacy on a silver platter.

I am not sure how interesting or important it is to examine individual desires in this political debate, here. Other than at the ragged ends of cultural relativism and the like, we are pretty much constrained by the "rules" of the discussion to maintain a logical commitment to basics like civil order and human rights, no?

But we can look at each position's relation to those shared upon objectives. You, for example, say "I simply don't believe they've got a snowball's chance in hell." Really? That's really quite startling. I haven't found a single serious analyst who agrees with you. It strikes me as a dangerously unlikely assumption. On what basis do you make that assertion?

You talk about "broad-based popular support" as being the keystone here. I have to guess and my guess is that you imagine things like the insurgency in Iraq to be something like the anti-Viet-Nam-war movement in the US, only, you know, with more bombs. Well, probably not, but, what do you really mean? How do you think this works? And why do you believe that?

-t

Paragraph 1: Where was an individual desire expressed? Sentence 2 is an attempt to shame by implying that others aren't committed to civil order and human rights.

Paragraph 2: undermined by "serious". In this type of context, that always means "someone I believe". Bears no relationship to the paragraph opener. Says "these people are dangerous".

Paragraph 3: pretends not to understand "broad-based popular support", rather sarcastically. No further content.

Q: Where was an individual desire expressed.

A: Surely you can't be implying the corollary - that any liberals actually want the small handful of nutbags that comprise groups such as al Qaeda to realize some dream of Caliphate? [emphasis added]

The "sentence 2" that you refer to says: "Other than at the ragged ends of cultural relativism and the like, we are pretty much constrained by the "rules" of the discussion to maintain a logical commitment to basics like civil order and human rights, no?" Who is being "shamed" there unless those cartoonish relativists who would explicitly reject such notions as civil order and human rights? The sentence is meant to convey that nobody in this conversation is that loony, not to reject any position that I've seen anyone take. It reinforces sentence 1 by pointing out a reason why examination of individuals "wants" is not that important, here.

Q: Paragraph 2: undermined by "serious". In this type of context, that always means "someone I believe".

A: Here, it was intended as an invitation. "Escher Sketch" made an unusual claim, that there is no serious challenge to the system of states at present. If you believe that there is some serious analysis that supports that claim, it is news to me: please do cite such (ideally mentioning why you think it is a good analysis).

Q: Paragraph 3: pretends not to understand "broad-based popular support", rather sarcastically.

A: You just seem to have misparsed it. Point (3) points out that the groups in question pursue broad-based support not as an ends but as a means and that other means towards the actual ends include violenced aimed at hollowing out or preventing the formation of legitimate states.

-t

I believe you mean "moral relativism", not "cultural relativism". The former is a doctrine, the latter a tool.

...that any liberals actually want

In this case, "any" is an adjective. While norbizness I'm sure would be pleased you endorse his humorous contention, your focus on the fact that "any" always takes the singular verb form (a grammatical consistency yielding a logical idiosyncracy) is really a cheap rhetorical trick, enabling you to avoid acknowledging that the relevant Republican talking point is a load of crap. Meanwhile you challenge Escher to show he's not a "loony" by agreeing with you (although you should be warned that this blog is rife with "loonies").

Next, you interpret Escher as claiming "that there is no serious challenge to the system of states at present", which is quite a stretch from his talking about a Caliphate. States are always challenged, frequently seriously. What promoters of Caliphate-o-phobia fail to acknowledge is that those dreadful, brutal Caliphates of old were built by massive superior military force, not just desire. They also ignore that the modern Muslim fondness for Caliphate is really the same nostalgic desire that makes Bing Crosby's White Christmas so popular.

AQ's master plan assumes that 1.5 billion angry Muslims is sufficient, that somehow military and political cohesion will appear out of the rubble. That our foreign policy is creating terrorists in the region is well known. That a unified political structure will arise is either wishful or paranoid thinking, depending on POV. That we continue with policies that create terrorists is either sheer stupidity, or the mirror image of your discussion of means and ends.

If you want a serious analyst, try Noam Chomsky . Not sure I've ever seen him laugh.

(although you should be warned that this blog is rife with "loonies").

Who you calling looney? ;)

...important. Although Minnesotans, like us Main(e)iacs probably know that.

"this is important for people on the left to keep in mind" you didn't really mean people but actually some sort of amorphous undifferentiated "left" not represented by individuals, that's different. Please accept my apologies.

You, for example, say "I simply don't believe they've got a snowball's chance in hell." Really? That's really quite startling. I haven't found a single serious analyst who agrees with you.

Define "Caliphate". There are quite a few definitions held by quite a few groups. If it's the grand "Islam will rule the world - and by the way, we're taking back Spain" type of Caliphate - no. Not a snowball's chance in hell. None. It's farcical scaremongering. Show me a serious analyst who believes Islam has any sort of chance of retaking Spain in our lifetimes, I'll show you a non-serious analyst.

If it's the more modest type - they need more than our complete ineptitude, they'd need an Islamic SuperBismarck or HyperGaribaldi or MegaHoChiMinh to forge a comprehensive identity out of that racially and culturally diverse stew. There's no shared identity between a Malaysian Muslim, a Persian Shiite and a Sunni Moroccan save Islam itself - but plenty of divisions. What they've got as a unifier right now is pretty much Islam, social injustice, and us.

You talk about "broad-based popular support" as being the keystone here. I have to guess and my guess is that you imagine things like the insurgency in Iraq to be something like the anti-Viet-Nam-war movement in the US, only, you know, with more bombs. Well, probably not, but, what do you really mean? How do you think this works? And why do you believe that?

I can't really stop you from "guessing" whatever you like about what I "imagine" - bizarre as those guesses may be. Broad-based public support is indeed the key. Read Richard Clarke's "four concentric circles" model if you want to understand what the role of the presence or absence of Islamic public support in defeating the jihadists is - and how we need to take any actions against one circle in full appreciation of the consequences of that action in driving support inwards or outwards between others. We should be exploiting the particular weaknesses of this structure. Save for the cadre, it's by nature a coalition of disparate interests, and you strike coalitions by splitting them, not unifying them. We need to be focusing on driving support outwards in those concentric circles and cracking the coalitions. We'll never completely do away with terror (see "abortion clinic"), but we can starve it until we reduce it to absorbable crime.

I liked this over here -

Point (3) points out that the groups in question pursue broad-based support not as an ends but as a means and that other means towards the actual ends include violenced aimed at hollowing out or preventing the formation of legitimate states.

- I had a moment there where I was certain you were describing PNAC.

"this is important for people on the left to keep in mind" you didn't really mean people but actually some sort of amorphous undifferentiated "left" not represented by individuals, that's different.

I meant no such thing and can't begin to imagine why you would bother to impugn, at such great length, otherwise.

Did I accidentally run over your cat or something?

-t

by such an imputation.

Did I accidentally run over your cat or something?

Alas, I have no cat. However, here at the Agonist, such an event might actually be considered in a positive light by some.

Mmm... I'm pretty sure I meant "impugn".

As a caretaker of an adopted cat, getting into his (still quite spry, knock-on-wood) senior years and consequently quite demanding -- I enjoy the weekly slaggings.

And, this or that aside but just regarding my larger concern of how it is we chat among ourselves.... or, really, just for fun.... this is a fun essay:

http://foucault.info/foucault/interview.html

-t

that has Foucault to do with the topic, I'd rather hear your response to Richard Clarke's "four concentric circles" model laid out in his book "Defeating the Jihadists - A Blueprint For Action" (see my previous link, downloadable .pdf). Clarke very much believes that broad-based public support (equate to increase or decrease in circle three, and to a lesser extent, four) is a keystone.

You had a problem with this when I stated it; now here it is from one of America's best informed people on the issue. Read it and tell us why you disgree.

Defeating The Jihadists: A Blueprint for Action

The Concentric Circles of Jihadism

When thinking of the growth and evolution of jihadist threat, it may be helpful to think of the relationship among distinct groups as four concentric circles.

- In the inner circle are the terrorists of the al-Qaeda organization, whose population is probably in the hundreds.

- The second circle contains active members of other jihadist groups, many of whom are willing to commit terrorist acts personally and die in the process as suicide bombers; it probably contains several tens of thousands of people.

- The third circle consists of those who identify with the jihadist cause or aspects of its ideology, and who might, if called upon, facilitate logistical or financial activity. This circle, which tends to support more "Islamist" governments, may contain tens of millions or perhaps as many as a few hundred million depending on the criteria.

- The outer circle is that of the Islamic world, the followers of the Prophet Muhammad both in majority Islamic countries and scattered throughout the world. They number over one billion people, most of them non-Arab.

Key to the overall management of the U.S. response to the jihadist threat is an understanding of how each U.S. action impacts each of the four concentric circles.

It may well be, for example, that to defeat a jihadist terrorist group (second circle), the United States might choose to support a government that is widely disliked by its people for its corruption and suppression of civil liberties and democracy (such as Uzbekistan).

Doing so, however, may be counter-productive to gaining support in the third and fourth circles within that country and undermine our longer term goals of diminishing the appeal of the jihadist ideology to those societies. Understanding those trade-offs and making them an explicit part of the policymaking process will be key to the overall long- term success in suppressing the jihadists.

Whether al Qaeda - and by extension other jihadist groups - seek broad-based popular appeal as a "means" or as an "end", the point before us is that such support is in fact a strategic pre-requisite for them to ensure a flow of support and personnel, and as such it is to be denied them. Choked to a trickle of such support there is no jihadist movement, there's merely heinous but ultimately absorbable and punishable crime. This can be compared to "striking at al Qaeda's supply lines".

Asking for a response to Clarke is, imo, a good question but there are two practical problems: (a) it will take me a couple of days; (b) we are getting pushed towards the right margin in the reply threads here. So, I intend to give you uptake on your question but be patient for a short while please, and maybe we can reset with a bottom-post or a diary entry or some such.

-t

- EOM

Guerilla movements hold peace and stability hostage, so that it becomes clear if you want them, you have to make a deal with them. The first thing you do as a guerilla is try and make the state look like fools. It is entirely possible to stop them, either through extreme force and coercion, or by gaining the trust of the population (you need informers.)

Not clear to me that providing healthcare for all Americans is abhorent. What is clear to me is that a majority of Americans are for it - so I guess a majority of Americans are unAmerican. Sort of like a majority of Americans now want the war over, so are disloyal, I guess.

Global Guerillas is all very nice; but it's not clear to me that most Islamic militias (not the same thing at all as AQ) can't be convinced to be peaceful. Certainly the ICU wanted peace; certainly what Hezbollah wants from Israel is within the realm of negotiation, if Israel wasn't so convinced they don't have to negotiate (maps of mines, return of prisoners, a very small amount of land.) Certainly Hamas's founder, before Israel assassinated him, had said he might be willing to sign a 99 year truce with Israel.

I think pushing terrorism down to a reasonable level is entirely doable. But it's not doable just by military force (well, not unless you're willing to kill a hell of a lot of people), and if you look at it through a force lens you'll come to the conclusion that it's unstoppable. But, in fact, if you're willing to dredge the swamp, killing the mosquitos turns out to be possible.

But if you decide that every religious Islamic movement that includes people who are willing to commit some violence to get to their ends is the problem - well yeah, it's insoluble.

Guerilla movements hold peace and stability hostage, so that it becomes clear if you want them, you have to make a deal with them. The first thing you do as a guerilla is try and make the state look like fools. It is entirely possible to stop them, either through extreme force and coercion, or by gaining the trust of the population (you need informers.)

In other words, you endorse some key premises of the army's field manual on counter-insurgency strategies, authored by General Petraeus? What do you think of "oil-stain" tactics, in the current global situation? I guess, following your logic, you must be in favor of the surge?

Not clear to me that providing healthcare for all Americans is abhorent. What is clear to me is that a majority of Americans are for it - so I guess a majority of Americans are unAmerican. Sort of like a majority of Americans now want the war over, so are disloyal, I guess.

So, that is just polemic. It's polemic of the "when did you stop beating your wife" variety. When you argue in such ways, projecting such ridiculous things on me that don't resemble anything I've ever said, I have trouble taking you seriously as an intellectual. Again, I could pay more attention to Huffingtonpost or Daily Kos if I want such. I hope that Agonist is a bit more serious than that.

Global Guerillas is all very nice; but it's not clear to me that most Islamic militias (not the same thing at all as AQ) can't be convinced to be peaceful. Certainly the ICU wanted peace; certainly what Hezbollah wants from Israel is within the realm of negotiation, if Israel wasn't so convinced they don't have to negotiate (maps of mines, return of prisoners, a very small amount of land.) Certainly Hamas's founder, before Israel assassinated him, had said he might be willing to sign a 99 year truce with Israel.

Responding in reverse order:

With Hamas, the first issue of late is less what "leaders" say and much more with the existance of a negotiating "leader" who makes a credible claim of holding the authority to negotiate. The second issue is of truces and compromises that have credibility in fact rather than being, more likely, cease fires in a program aimed ultimately at the elimination of Israel.

As for the "convertability" of insurgents -- I agree. Your dissent shares that belief with current policy. The question, then, regards tactics and strategy that start from that premise.

Finally, yes, Jon Robb's "Global Guerilla's" site and analysis are very good, but it does have some flaws, I think. If you were to give it serious uptake, and be prepared to be wrong the first N time in hope of being right the N+1th time, you might help shed some light there.

I think pushing terrorism down to a reasonable level is entirely doable. But it's not doable just by military force (well, not unless you're willing to kill a hell of a lot of people), and if you look at it through a force lens you'll come to the conclusion that it's unstoppable. But, in fact, if you're willing to dredge the swamp, killing the mosquitos turns out to be possible.

It is not doable by force alone -- we agree about that. So does the right, such as the current administration. You are arguing, vaguely, against a straw-man. More polemic.

-t

In other words, you endorse some key premises of the army's field manual on counter-insurgency strategies, authored by General Petraeus? What do you think of "oil-stain" tactics, in the current global situation? I guess, following your logic, you must be in favor of the surge?

Huh? According to Petraeus's own manual he doesn't have enough men even to stabilize Baghdad, let alone the whole country. According to Petraeus also, the military can't solve the problem alone. If the US is willing to do a draft to get enough men, and flood Iraq with billions of dollars of aid, I'll be all for it. Do it right, or don't do it.

So, that is just polemic. It's polemic of the "when did you stop beating your wife" variety. When you argue in such ways, projecting such ridiculous things on me that don't resemble anything I've ever said, I have trouble taking you seriously as an intellectual. Again, I could pay more attention to Huffingtonpost or Daily Kos if I want such. I hope that Agonist is a bit more serious than that.

The Constitution was also against the idea of the US government issuing money; it was also for slavery. Sorry, I don't buy your bullshit that health care is the bridge too far.

Don't let the door slam shut on your ass as you leave, though of course I'll weep tears of anguish that you don't take me seriously as an intellectual.

According to Petraeus' manual, he's got... what did he say in the report we probably both heard on NPR? .... 80% of the ideal force level. Not bad for government work, especially given that the numbers are getting better rather than worse. Anyway, you're deflecting. You didn't start off talking about troop levels but about a more general theory of how to counter insurgencies. And you came from the perspective of a subset of his axioms.

I'm not sure where to start on your moral acceptance of the current policy if only it were supplemented by a draft and a more overwhelming force. At least now we know your true colors, "I guess."

As for the rest, well, sorry if I dare to peep up now and again but, to be sure, I'll take you as seriously as you demand to be taken (which, in a quest for truth, is apparently, "not at all.").

-t

Honey bunch, I was writing about insurgencies long before Petraeus's manual came out. That doesn't mean I belong to his school. Certain basics are accepted by everyone when dealing with insurgencies. 80% of enough for one city is far from 100% of enough for the country, and we both know he ain't getting it, let alone the hundreds of billions in civilian aid which would also be required and the political flexibility to hammer out the necessary compromises.

I leave it to others to make up their own minds about who was being dishonest in our conversation, fortunately, you aren't the arbiter. You are, of course, free to pop up when you choose, but given your record of contempt for us and for the rest of the the liberal blogosphere, I have no idea why you bother. Find your "truth", this thing that makes there be no underlying crime in Plame; makes the constitution hostile to universal health care, and so on, elsewhere, for you shant find such "truths" here.

My supposed "contempt for the liberal blogosphere" is entirely in your mind. My contempt for polemic (and echo-chamber polemic at that) is real, though. Liberals have serious business to attend to.

-t

One man's polemic is another man's truth, and it's not always true who's right.

In point (1), Dasht could as easily be describing the Dominionist movement, except that they don't find it necessary to gain favor by promising universal healthcare, education or housing. Such subterfuge is only required when dealing with poor people, not stupid people.

In point (2), he observes that states in chaos are not friendly to moderates.

Point (3) observes that if bad guys who kill people are picking up the garbage, they've probably got something bad in mind.

Point (4) says forget about politics; the internet might be dangerous to world peace; endorses the Dick Armey approach to interpretation of the Constitution, and says that the promoting the goal of universal health care is just wishful thinking unless you can provide specifics. It finishes with a challenge to provide universal health care in the form of opening a free clinic.

I'd say "Don't trust bad people doing good things, trust good people doing bad things" would be a fair summation.

"Let's hear it for the good guys!!!!"

-t

Agreed, he wouldn't have been on a list I put together.