As I say, that's what I'm getting from Stratfor and from the Nelson report. Not from official statements by Israel. Startfor and co. could be wrong. Statfor in particular appears to think that state and non state actors are all just as rational as a Stratfor analyst.

However, you could well be right, and they could only be grabbing the near area. That would be smarter, though it's still one of those "hang out and bleed" sort of operations.

What has motivated Israel, then, to repond in such disproportionate ways? Why all-out war now? The Israelis seemed intent on ramping up matters in Gaza even before the religio-fascists of the Hezbollah launched their provocative attack. The Hez merely provided the rationale for a second front.

One disturbing theory comes from Brit writer Johann Hari. He argues that Israel opted for total war in Gaza precisely because it feared that Hamas was on the verge of publicly accepting Israel's right to exist. Or at least a faction of Hamas. The extremist organization was coming under intense pressure from the more moderate Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas to do make the historic concession. Doing so would have foiled Israel's great strategy, one based on the notion that there is no "partner for peace."

Far-fetched? Not really. Remember that it was Ariel Sharon and his allies that originally encouraged Hamas in order to undermine the more moderate Yasser Arafat. It would not be totally inconsistent with Israeli history to decide to wipe out the same organization at the precise moment in which outside circumstances might have forced it to come to the table.

From:
Marc Cooper

...I think it's a bit more complicated. Near as I can see, Israeli decision making seems to model Hamas as a unitary, highly integrated body - they view the distinctions between the military and political wings as artificial [for a good summary of this, take a look at Matthew Levitt's book on Hamas]. Further, they've consistently viewed the "real" leadership guidance to be coming out of the "external" leaders. If they're thinking about things that way, then in their view there isn't a faction within Hamas to make peace with, and any such statements towards concilliation coming out of the OT a) don't have any potential to deliver on their ostensible goals, and b) are a liability, in that the international community will seize on the possibility and use diplomatic pressure to curtail Israel's options. All this is a subtly different thing from Israel slapping down an honest broker.

"We declared war on terror, it's not even a noun, so, good luck. After we defeat it, I'm sure we'll take on that bastard ennui." - Jon Stewart.

What Hezbollah may do, in that situation, is concentrate on every opportunity to capture Israeli soldiers. Israel has shown that it is very sensitive to that, and Hezbollah wants its own people back from various Israeli prisons.

You're correct, the consensus appears to be forming in the foreign policy establishment in the US. Corrected, and my apologies for the misleading title, not sure what happened there, probably revised myself once too often during the writing.

If you're correct about what they're thinking, that makes more sense and is less dangerous to everyone, though I still think it's probably counterproductive.

The window to make or force a deal is closing, and every dollar oil goes higher closes it further. Olmert is undoing a lot of Sharon's work. He should have been moving to get out of whatever parts of the West Bank he's willing to give to Palestine, then more or less hand Palestine a deal they can't refuse.

Not sure they would have accepted, but they knew they were weak, and Hamas was making noises of conciliation. But Hamas is broken now, and I don't think they could enforce a peace any more unless they get something from all this. But I'm not sure they'll want to. Bad situation - break the prestige of your enemy with his own people and he can't negotiate with you. Increase his prestige by buckling after such massive escalation, and he probably hates your guts too much to make a deal.

Hard to say. I really wish they hadn't killed Hamas's founder.

...thinking, but I do know that Arik had a lot more latitude for doing things that might have looked "soft". He frequently didn't have the impulse, of course, but there were a lot of things that he did later in life that he would never have done earlier - defence in depth and a n enduring civilian presence on the ground were a mania for the guy through much of what I've read of his views, and he essentially walked a goodly way down the hall from that.

I personally don't put much stock in Hamas' conciliation over the long term - given the dynamic of their support they can't afford to disengage completely (and nor frankly, do I think that the ideological convictions of influential decision makers lend themselves to a peace with Israel - truces yes, peace no). It's not that they're not rational, they just can't reconcile their most closely held convictions with the notion of a peaceful co-existence with Israel - and I'm not seeing anything that would lead them to modify their convictions; as far as they're concerned, they're doing pretty well and God knows that the Israelis haven't done a lot to move them off the notion that their convictions and long-term struggle are enough.

"We declared war on terror, it's not even a noun, so, good luck. After we defeat it, I'm sure we'll take on that bastard ennui." - Jon Stewart.

Well, the fact of the matter is that just before everything went to hell, Hamas had said they were considering acknowledging Israel's right to exist - it was, actually, a significant move.

A lot of people find it interesting that Olmert essentially went batshit immediately after they said that.

Somehow I doubt any Hamas leader is now willing to go even as far as to say Hamas would consider it.

...above. Regardless of whether Hamas (or a faction thereof) was serious about the notion of acknowledging Israel's right to exist, I don't think Israel believed they could be trusted, and/or could deliver on such an acknowledgement.

"We declared war on terror, it's not even a noun, so, good luck. After we defeat it, I'm sure we'll take on that bastard ennui." - Jon Stewart.

If that's what they believe, then they believe no peace is possible. In which case it must be war.

Certainly a self fulfilling prophecy, but whatever, it's not my country they're going to destroy with their foolishness and warmongering.

And there are no Canadian troops in Iraq as effective hostages either.

...hit them fast, furious and imperfect, and get the heck out of town. One of the things that folks frequently don't remember is that the guerilla decision making cycle is frequently a lot slower than a modern army's - it's just that they typically make a lot better decisions and have a hand that gets better when the modern army slows down and attempts occupation. Hizbollah just isn't going to do as well when things get dynamic and they aren't fighting totally on their own initiative on a battleground that they've shaped extensively.

Interestingly, this quick in, quick out is pretty much what John Keegan suggested for Afghanistan - his take on it was that limited reprisals had been effective, but that occupation led to tragedy for the occupier. What I know of southern Lebanon suggests that it's significantly less hospitable than Afghanistan.

"We declared war on terror, it's not even a noun, so, good luck. After we defeat it, I'm sure we'll take on that bastard ennui." - Jon Stewart.

I think you're right. I don't think they are looking to re-occupy Lebanon, despite the hysterical fantasisies of some. My take is they are looking to cause as much damage to Hizbullah as possible, get their soldiers back, and then lend support to the elements of the Lebanese government that want to curtail Hizbullah's influence as much as possible. There are many many Lebanese that would love for the Israelis to wipe Hizbullah out and spare them the responsibility for reigning Hizbullah in. Next time Hizbullah decides to invade Israel and kill some IDF soldiers it will have a better idea of what they can expect in return. Should any non-Hizbulla Lebanese catch wind that Hizbullah is seeking to once again attack Israel and invite this sort of response he/she will likely eliminate Hizbullah themselves.

Interestingly, I've read reports that Abbas is similiary hoping that Israel will wipe out Hamas and has pleaded with the Israelis to not do a prisoner exchange as that would kill chances of a more moderate Palestinian leadership coming to power.

I seriously doubt Israel is going to get involved in urban warfare if they can avoid it. I am sure they are sensitive to the lessons of the previous Lebanon invasion.

While I agree that the best outcome for the Israelis is to turn the Lebanese population against Hezbollah, I think the methods being used are too personal, too over the top for this to happen.

Mad Dog

I would question the usefulness of blitz style tactics against enemies that don't have the organization, or infrastructure of a traditional army. You end up killing many more civilians then enemy combatants. It's doubtful Israel will kill many Hezbollah with air raids on apartment complexes, and blowing up bridges and airports is more for show. They are unlikely to disrupt the operations of an organization that is basically a guerilla outfit. If the VC could move thousands of tons of munitions over the Ho Chi Minh trail, the Lebanese can hump some rockets over a wadi.

Overmatched foes have a remarkably organic level of adaptation.
I wasn't surprised that Hezbollah was already blowing apart tanks, but launching drones at Israeli warships in the Med that were actually effective at disabling those ships indicated a big leap in capabilities. They've been preparing for the day when Israel's madness would bring her back into Lebanon.

What usually happens in these situations is that the stronger conventional power, in this case Israel, gets into a situation with one set of ideas (namely to cause a lot of damage and get out) but is sucked into a quagmire because their original tactics were not suitable to contain their enemy, or they sense an impending loss of face. The IDF will need to remain in control of territory if any buffer zone is to be established, and that's a redux of the previous military disaster in Lebanon. More likely still is that Hezbollah chooses to take the fight into Israel proper. They've actually been rehearsing commando style attacks inside Israel for some time. When is Israel going to learn that the only conclusion to this endless fighting that doesn't end in the literal, economic, or political destruction of Israel is a political solution that is going to be humiliating to them.

..."blitz" tactics that kill civvies? I would suggest that they go in, hit as many logistical stores points as they can, depriving Hezbollah of as many munitions as they can, attrit anybody dumb enough to pop up and fire on them, and snatch as much documentation for intelligence exploitation as they can. If they don't manage to kill even one person, but disrupt the log network and obtain exploitable intel I'd call that good. Hizbollah can regenerate people quickly - regenerating materiel, and particularly materiel that hurts Israel from stand-off, that's far tougher for them.

I've walked the wadis on the Israeli and Jordanian sides of the border quite extensively and they're very similar to those in southern Lebanon. It's very, very different from the Ho Chi Minh Trail, where I've also been. Given modern surveillance platforms, one simply can't compare the two - you try and move any significant amount of materiel on foot over that terrain, you're compromised, pure and simple. The whole reason why they cut the road net in so many places is to make it more difficult to move stuff around using vehicles. The reason that they've cratered all the airstrips is so that important personalities will have a more difficult time getting out. I don't know how effective these tactics will be, particularly the latter, but they're definitely not "more for show".

If Hezbollah tries to take the fight to Israel using direct action, they're very, very foolish. It'll achieve essentially nothing strategy-wise and it plays to Israeli strengths - if the IDF is foolish enough to spend any time hanging about in southern Lebanon, then Hezbollah will be able to use tactics that play to Israeli weakness. I don't think Hezbollah was quite planning on the IDF coming in in force on the ground, if indeed they do - my read is that they were still in a build-up phase.

"We declared war on terror, it's not even a noun, so, good luck. After we defeat it, I'm sure we'll take on that bastard ennui." - Jon Stewart.

Why should we believe Israel's tactics now will differ from their standard m.o.? They utilize brute force attacks that exploit what they do well--mechanized infantry, and airstrikes. They have no concern for collateral damage, as a perusual of their operations in the Occupied Territories, or Lebanon for 22-years will loudly attest. Hitting an airport is most certainly for show, what military goal does it accomplish? How does it increase Israel's security situation vis-a-vis Hezbollah? It doesn't. Since repairs can be made in a very short period of time, and no military advantage is gained, even temporarily, it had to have been done to send a message. There is speculation in and outside of Israel that the entire operation is a political manuever, so I don't think my ruminations are far afield.

My point with the Ho Chi Minh trail was not to draw a direct parallel, because there is none, my point was to drive home that when there is a will to move materials, there is a way. .

I disagree with you about attacking Israel directly. Hezbollah gains a great deal more by pulling raids inside Israel then Israel does cratering an airport. It scares the hell out of the civilians in Israel for one, and it sends a message that Olmert's government can't protect the homefront. It's a form of psyop. What's the downside for Hezbollah? Some dead operatives?

Hezbollah made the first move, so they almost certainly anticipated the typical Israeli response. They cannot be surprised by what has happened. I find it difficult to believe that Hezbollah hasn't made preparations for an Israeli incursion, and as such I doubt Hezbollah has a lot of valuable materials sitting about in ammo dumps waiting to be hit by Israel, so I question the rationale of what Israel is doing. I just don't see an upside for them, what is gained for Israel? More dead soldiers? More debt? More economic disruption? More international isolation? Maybe the danger of a much bigger war. Compare that with what they might gain: A few dead Hezbollah guerillas, some smashed Katayusha rockets, some captured documents. Not a fair tradeoff in my opinion.

"Hitting an airport is most certainly for show, what military goal does it accomplish? How does it increase Israel's security situation vis-a-vis Hezbollah? It doesn't."

"Since repairs can be made in a very short period of time, and no military advantage is gained, even temporarily, it had to have been done to send a message."

Robert - I'm no military expert, but it would seem to me that temporarily disabling Hezbollah's access to air travel WOULD be a sound maneuver in the type of engagement Israel is currently involved in. Can you please explain better why it is not, aside from it being your opinion. If you have a particular background in military strategy and tactics, like JustPlainDave, and care to share that with us, please do.

I don't have a particular background in military strategy and tactics.

"We declared war on terror, it's not even a noun, so, good luck. After we defeat it, I'm sure we'll take on that bastard ennui." - Jon Stewart.

It's a legitimate military target unlike some of the other things they have hit. However, everything I've heard is that that airport is very secure. At least one analyst I know thinks that significant military equiptment was not moving through it. However, while that odds, the Israelis may not want to take the chance.

But it's within the rules of war.

It's the hitting a university, taking out the power plant in Gaza, attacking civilians directly rather than military units, etc... that are more problematic, and of questionable effectiveness. Taking out ground, air and see transport points to isolate Hezbollah is a good idea and legitimate.

I don't think it'll be enough, since Hezbollah knew they would do it, but it's still necessary if you're going to have any sort of incursion or invasion.

...far from secure, at least on the civil passenger side. Unless they've made huge strides it is the least secure airport I've seen in the Middle East and I've been through all of the principals on the Levantine rim. When I went through five years ago I think I could have waltzed through there with a Marine fire team under my jacket (I set off the detection loop but got waved through without follow-up; as well, there was no one actually looking at the screen of the x-ray machine - seemed to interfere with the tea drinking). When we landed in Amman we were run with what I must say was exquisite thoroughness (i.e., "a little far for a first date" thoroughness, if you know what I mean) through their security, under armed guard, before being let into the immigration arrivals area. All that said, I personally agree that there likely wasn't any military equipment moving through the airport - I suspect the point of cratering the runways, to the extent that it was about stopping traffic rather than sanctioning the government was about stopping outbound traffic.

"We declared war on terror, it's not even a noun, so, good luck. After we defeat it, I'm sure we'll take on that bastard ennui." - Jon Stewart.

Eh, fair enough. As I say anyway, airports are legitimate military targets.

I have no background in strategy, or tactics, and it is my opinion that hitting a commercial airport that is not the launching point of any military operations against Israel, is a meaaningless gesture from a tactical point of view. It's clear that Israel's targeting of the airport was a form of punishment aimed at the Lebanese government which will not, or cannot control Hezbollah. Israel said they were going to make the Lebanese government feel some pain, this is what they had in mind I'm sure.

Lebanon is a small country geographically. You can blast every road, bridge, rail line, and airport in the country and Hezbollah will have little difficulty moving about. They can take a car, a bike, a boat, or a donkey if they need too. If flying is really expedient for Hezbollah (and probably not all that smart with Israeli aircraft filling the skies) they can catch a plane elsewhere, or helicopter to their destination. If disrupting Hezbollah's transportation infrastructure is really the purpose behind these attacks on the airport, then I don't know what to say to your average Israeli citizen other then: expect more Hezbollah, because blowing up airports isn't likely to protect Israel from the sort of attacks Hezbollah has the capability of delivering. That's why I said it was for show. An impotent display of firepower that doesn't alter the threat one iota.

...this doesn't apply here:

Since repairs can be made in a very short period of time, and no military advantage is gained, even temporarily, it had to have been done to send a message."

Betcha that if we had access to the overheads we'd see that all those runways and taxiways are still cratered. Additionally, a second-wave attack using helicopter gunships destroyed the tank farm, after MEA used a taxiway to evacuate their aircraft (empty). Certainly the FAA still has a current NOTAM out saying that Beirut is closed. My understanding is that there's similar damage at all other airfields in the country.

I guess my question vis a vis Hezbollah's gain in a theoretical attack inside Israel would be how would that substantively change the situation? Israeli civilians already believe that Hizbollah is an effective and implacable enemy and they already know that the homeland can't be protected - the rockets hitting Haifa tell them that with all possible clarity.

As to Hizbollah having prepared for all this in the aftermath of the kidnapping, I think it's important to remember that they've done this successfully previously in 2000 to strategic success - additionally, they've tried several times unsuccessfully. Never has it led to this level of reprisal. Sorry, but I'm not buying this unreservedly - your interpretation has Hizbullah being a bunch of geniuses and Israel being a bunch of dummies, and I think the truth's less polarized than that. Further, I'm not sure that the political downside for Israel's so heavily negative on the back channel - if they manage to convince foreign governments of the involvement of outside state players, which they appear to be messaging on pretty hard.

"We declared war on terror, it's not even a noun, so, good luck. After we defeat it, I'm sure we'll take on that bastard ennui." - Jon Stewart.

Repairs seem moot at this point. The airport has now been reduced to a flaming pile of debris.

It is not my contention that Hezbollah will launch commando style attacks inside Israel, I was simply repeating what I read six months ago that Hezbollah was rehearsiing commando-style assaults on strategic targets in Israel. I see no downside for Hezbollah, at most you lose some cadres. The mere attempt must then put the Israelis in a position to devote more assets to protecting various targets inside the country. It would certainly raise Hezbollah's prestige.

Rockets are frightening to a population, but in a sense everyone knows there isn't a defense against such a weapon, you are sort of resigned to getting hit with them so long as the enemy has them, but Israelis almost certainly expect a degree of physical security from armed assault via ground forces. To take that expectation of security away from them would be another net victory for Hezbollah, and another black eye for Olmert.

I don't assume Hezbollah is in possession of genius, but I do assume they know how to play the cards they've dealt themselves from a loaded deck. They made the first move. If it was a deliberate provocation, there was certainly the expectation, the hope, that Israel would respond furiously. Why do this if the purpose wasn't to bait? Israel is a one-trick pony, and that trick is overwhelming conventional force, usually delivered from a fighter-bomber. It's clumsy, and ineffective against asymmetrical forces like Hezbollah, or Hamas for that matter.

Israel is already doing much worse than Hezbollah. They will kill many more people of course, so if that's how score is kept, Israel will be the overwhelming victor, but most of the people killed in those clumsy air raids will be like those Canadian tourists killed today. Israel's level of reprisal, at its most extreme, could only hope to equal the devastation rained upon Lebanon in the eighties by the same IDF. That didn't much stop Hezbollah then either. There is danger of a wider war here. There is a danger that the IDF may have to occupy ground in Lebanon which would be perilous. There is danger for Israel that this might end in the status quo, which is a huge victory for Hezbollah, because they just proved that Israel can be successfully attacked. The only way Israel can "win" is if they completely destroy Hezbollah to the point where the group could never reconstitute itself, and we know that is frankly impossible.

The shekel is falling. The Israeli stock market is in collapse. The call ups of reserve units is another hardship on the Israeli economy. Capital isn't going to come into Israel, and a lot of it is going to leave Israel if this "open war" goes on much longer. The difference between Hezbollah's efforts and the IDF's are this: An IED is more accurate than a gravity bomb, and it's a hell of a lot cheaper too. Kayusha rockets are more economically viable then endless sorties that burn expensive jet fuel. Drones (anti-ship missiles included) are a lot cheaper then warships. Israel is already one of the most indebted nations on earth, every confrontation they have just depresses the standard of living, now and in the future, a little more.

I don't know if I'd say Israel was a state governed by dummies, but Uri Milstein, probably the most esteemed military historian in Israel, thinks its officer corps is full of them. (Milstein is unique, he has bizarre right wing views, but is unusually candid about war crimes, he does not deny them, but argues that the only consideration for Israel should be victory, added to which, he has made many enemies in Israel on the left and right, not by admitting war crimes, but by questioning the widely held belief that the IDF is even competent, let alone extraordinary, as a military force.)