Study Finds anti-drug policies in Afghanistan are backfiring.

The UK mission in Afghanistan is in danger of failing because of "misguided" support for American military and drug-eradication policies, an international think-tank has claimed.

nstead of taking part in the reconstruction of the country shattered by decades of war, British forces find themselves "at war" with a resurgent Taliban and alienated from an increasingly hostile population...

...The study by the Senlis Council, a drug policy think-tank, predicts that the violence in the south will escalate. The Taliban and their allies have been exploiting the anger felt by farmers at the destruction of opium crops and by civilians who have suffered in US-led operations.

Lt-Gen David Richards, the British officer who is due to take over all Nato operations in Afghanistan with US troops under his command, warned the crop eradication programme was driving farmers into the hands of the Taliban and the Western forces are creating new enemies.

Ok, I know it's tasteless to say such things, but goddamn it, I and others were saying this years ago. This is completely predictable. There's no other way to make a decent living in most of Afghanistan than to grow opium. You destroy those crops and you could cause those farmers families to starve to death.

Nor was the solution all that bloody difficult - there's a significant need for legal opium in the world for legal narcotics. We could have just bought it from Afghani farmers at slightly higher prices than smugglers pay, prices which are still very low by our standards.

In Soros's new book he notes that if he had been in charge of reconstructing Afghanistan after the defeat of the Taliban he would have paid salaries to all the civil servants, teachers and so on in Afghanistan - good salaries so they didn't need bribes. And he would have used troops to guard the money being used to pay them. Add that to real reconstruction, to buying opium legally, and to other policies intended to create an economy and Karzai's government, in time, would have found itself legitimized - and with a tax base. And foreign troops, being seen as the ones who bring the cash, would not be hated.

This isn't rocket science. While we may not know exactly what will work in any given situation, we sure know what doesn't work. And alienating the rural population is the number one mistake you can make when fighting an insurgency.

Ian Welsh June 28, 2006 - 9:36pm

Ian Welsh's diary | printer friendly version |

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I’ve been reading the material at the Senlis Council for quite some time. They have completed intensive feasibility studies advocating Opium licensing

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Media Centre - News releases - Following US policies is turning Canadian military operation in Afghanistan into a suicide mission

SENLIS COUNCIL NEWS RELEASE
7 JUNE 2006

Following US policies is turning Canadian military operation in Afghanistan into a suicide mission

Canada at War in Kandahar – Canadian troops no longer on a mission of peace keeping

Civilian deaths have led to mistrust by local populations – support for international military presence has been lost

Canadian public has been misled as to true nature of Canada’s mission

LONDON - Canadian troops are paying with their lives for Canada’s adherence to the US government’s failing military and counter-narcotics policies in the Kandahar province of Afghanistan said The Senlis Council, an international security and development think tank. Senlis warned in a Report released today that the US-led counter-terrorist operations under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and aggressive large-scale crop eradication have significantly contributed to the current war situation that is flaring-up in Kandahar and the other southern provinces.

“The Canada government and the international community continue to seemingly unquestioningly accept America’s fundamentally flawed approach to southern Afghanistan,” said Emmanuel Reinert, Executive Director of The Senlis Council. “But this is jeopardising both the troops’ lives and the stabilisation, reconstruction and development objectives. The Canadian troops in Kandahar are doing a heroic job in the most difficult of circumstances and are to be commended; but the overall policy context within which they are obliged to work is putting them at risk.”

Deadly months ahead

The Council warned that the months ahead could be deadly for Canadian troops participating in Operation Mountain Thrust – the latest military operation designed to defeat the Taliban who are regaining control of southern Afghanistan, but cast the blame for the recent escalation of violence on the current US–led approach in Afghanistan.

Senlis said that the Canadian troops’ biggest challenge is to shake off the legacy of US-led Operation Enduring Freedom – the seek and destroy counter terrorism campaign in which the Canadian troops have been participating.

“There is no longer any peace to keep in Kandahar,” said Reinert. “If Canadian troops are to be supported in their mission of securing Kandahar, they urgently need the additional tools to regain the support of the local population which has been lost due to the aggressive militaristic approach of the US in the region. When the international forces arrived in Afghanistan in 2001 they were welcomed and perceived as being there to help, but now that has changed.”

Forced Eradication of Poppy Crops Contributed to Increase in Support for Taliban

The Report indicates that the large-scale aggressive forced eradication of poppy crops in Kandahar, led by the US, has contributed in a significant way to the discontent of the local populations and that a wave of New Taliban are cashing-in on the local population’s disillusionment with the foreign military presence.

“Most farmers feel abandoned and cheated by the central government and the international community,” said Reinert. “This has given way to a dramatic switch in alliance to the only people who they believe are showing any understanding of their needs – the Taliban.”

In its report, Senlis notes that there is growing support for the Taliban who now offer protection to farmers against the eradication of their poppy crops.

Conflicting policies

The Report said that the policies being used in Afghanistan are in conflict with each other and that this has led to the recent very rapid disintegration security in the southern provinces.

“Conflicting drug, development and security policies are making Afghanistan spiral into chaos,” said Emmanuel Reinert, Executive Director of The Senlis Council. “The growing violence shows that the current approach in Afghanistan is simply not working. The international community needs to go back to the drawing board and rework its approach in Afghanistan.”

An emergency package is urgently needed for Kandahar focusing on poverty relief
Senlis said that a short term emergency package is urgently needed for Kandahar, which Canada could provide.

“Southern Afghanistan urgently needs an injection of financial aid earmarked for the short-term relief of conditions of extreme poverty in which many people live,” said Reinert. “We also recommend the organisation of a series of Jirga-style meetings and the provision of an amnesty period of grace for farmers to carry on growing opium until they have an alternative means of supporting themselves.”

“This will help address the international community’s critical failure to understand the actual impact of the policies that have been implemented in the region,” said Reinert. “Listening to local concerns with the participation of local communities should be an integral part of all future policy decisions.”

Senlis said that in the coming years, thousands of poppy farmers will continue to lack sufficient legal economic alternatives to provide for their families. They are already living in extreme poverty.

“A period of grace for poppy farmers would provide for the smooth transition from current illegal poppy cultivation to legal alternatives without endangering farmers’ economic situations,” said Reinert. “An amnesty will also constrain rural communities’ support for insurgent groups, as farmers will no longer be targeted by ineffective and destructive poppy eradication campaigns.”

Thailand, after commencing its opium control project in 1978, gave farmers a four-year interlude in which to end their opium cultivation and find alternative crops.

Civilian deaths are contributing to the disintegration of trust in the Canadian military

The Report notes that foreign troops are increasingly being seen as aggressors rather than peace-keepers in the eyes of the local population due to aggressive military interventions which have caused numerous civilian deaths and casualties in the past months.

“The increasing number of cases of civilian deaths or injuries at the hands of the coalition military, has directly contributed to the disintegration of the local population’s confidence in the international community and their troops,” said Reinert.

The field research in Kandahar revealed that the number of civilian deaths in the province has doubled from 2005 to 2006. Of the total number of fatalities for 2005 and the first half of 2006 (until the end of June 2006), civilian deaths represented an astonishing 22 percent of total fatalities. This equals the amount of Afghan Army and police forces killed in Kandahar.

The Report notes that the recent bombing in Kandahar by the US which resulted in the deaths of civilians including women and children has recently caused severe alienation of local people.

“The US has lost yet more of the support of the local people with the blood of innocent civilians on their hands,” said Reinert. “The problem facing the Canadian troops who have been assisting in the US led anti terrorist mission Operation Enduring Freedom, is that the local populations do not differentiate between the various nationalities present in their region – foreign troops are foreign troops. And foreign troops have killed their loved ones or other members of their communities.”

One case study in the Report tells of the passenger of a taxi in Kandahar who shot dead by Canadian troops on his way home from an evening with relatives. The taxi allegedly came too close to the Canadian vehicle.

“Mr Nassrat Ali, a father of six, was killed by accident by Canadian soldiers, but once this accident had occurred, it was not dealt with in a proper way,” said Reinert. “His family have not been taken care of by the Canadian Army and they have not even received an apology. They were just given some money for the funeral.”

The Report goes on to conclude that this type of action is not in keeping with Canada’s traditional role as a peace-keeping force and that the Canadian public has been misled as to Canada’s exact role in Kandahar.

“The troops are more on a mission of war than a mission of peace,” said Reinert.

The south is a warning for the rest of the country

Senlis said that the recent resurgence of the Taliban in southern Afghanistan and the sharp rise in violence which has come with it are an early warning of how the rest of the country could go if the international community, particularly the military, do not change their approach in the coming months.

The Report was based on Field Interviews conducted by The Senlis Council’s international and Afghan staff in Kandahar over the last two months.

June 2006: News Release from Senlis Council

Two reports for June:

Integrated Social Control for Afghanistan Implications for the Licensed Cultivation of Poppy Production of Medicines

Helmand at War: The changing nature of insurgency in Southern Afghanistan and its effects on the future of the country

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A Coin Operation in Afghanistan would license poppy growing. That crop is the lifeblood of the country—it needs to be controlled– eradication has been tried for eons—licensing it is an alternative that just could work.

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The last full report I saw was INSURGENCY ASSESSMENT IN AFGHANISTAN: THE SIGNS OF AN
ESCALATING CRISIS
Mr Emmanuel Reinert, Executive Director, The Senlis Council
Ms Gulalai Momand, Afghanistan Deputy Country Manager, The Senlis Council, March 2006

NATO command takes effect, I believe, at the end of July. But will the Canadian troops stay with US command or will they completely transfer to NATO command? That is the question? ? ? No way would they get to try something as daring as Opium Licensing as long as they remain under US command.

canuck June 28, 2006 - 11:06pm

Actually there's a review specifically...

...on the Canadian involvement in Kandahar that's just out. Link to pdf here. I've briefly skimmed it and I gotta say that after long experience reading similar reports from NPOs specifically dealing with security issues and as someone who writes wonkish reports as a profession, I agree with Col. Hope - this report has not given due care to dispassionately setting out the facts. The voice used isn't at all balanced and there's a lot of doom being forecast on some pretty thin indicators.

For example, because two commands are involved, this results in the Canadian effort being "doomed to failure" - good thing they've never seen some of the command arrangements used elsewhere in the world. Similarly, the major contributor to the increased violence from last year to this is the increase in Taliban direct action attacks - spectacularly unsuccessful attacks that have severely hurt the Taliban.

In sum, they've correctly and valuably highlighted a range of issues to be concerned about, but the thinness of the indicators and the lack of even-handedness in much of the language limits the effectiveness of the report as a predictor. You want to make a case for doom based primarly on opinion, ya better be pretty dispassionate in the lingo. They may well be entirely correct, but when the approach to the report followed is essentially finding all the negative stuff they can and throwing it at the wall to see what sticks, I'm not inclined to give total weight to opinion - particularly when they don't specify how much access or time on the ground they had, or even who the folks were who wrote the report. If you're going to found the conclusions of a report like this on opinion (and that's what they've clearly done), who has the opinions and the evidence used to form them matters a great deal.

"We declared war on terror, it's not even a noun, so, good luck. After we defeat it, I'm sure we'll take on that bastard ennui." - Jon Stewart.

JustPlainDave June 29, 2006 - 6:57am

History tells us............

History tells us that Afghanistan will not be subdued. The British tried and the Russians tried. End of story.

Bucksouth June 29, 2006 - 1:19am

Subdue

The only people trying to subdue Afghanistan are the Taliban. Tell them, please.

Mad Dog

MadDog June 29, 2006 - 6:53pm

Senlis Council

Senlis Council's Reports are written under the directorshipship of its Executive, research staff and possibly other members.

It is a NGO and they do not frame their language in military terms. They’re a think tank dedicated to evaluating the effectiveness of the current global drug policy.

Military needs can be adapted from the information and the research that goes into their reports. If the military believes they can adapt their srategry to a COIN-type operation that would be their decision. I expect Senlis would critically examine the results of such a mission.

If the military needs to know who ‘specially’ wrote the report, I expect Senlis would tell them if they were asked.

Legitimate NGO’s have been driven out of Afghanistan: e.g. Doctors with Borders and when that happens it makes it more difficult to make accurate and factual reports on the human rights situation, for example. Human Rights watch has also recently reported on the new restrictions on the media in Afghanistan. From Human Rights Watch:

:The intelligence service's restrictions are a blatant intrusion on the freedom of Afghanistan’s fledgling media. These directives are an insult to the hard work and personal sacrifice of Afghan journalists who try to get the truth out to the public.

Furthermore, ...

: Afghan journalists told Human Rights Watch that the NSD directive was a form of intimidation and would have a chilling effect on reporting the news.

On June 12, representatives of Afghanistan’s major media outlets were summoned to a meeting at the NSD where they first received the list of press restrictions, signed by Amrullah Saleh, the head of the NSD. On June 19, the same list was delivered to journalists’ homes and offices. This version lacked a personal signature and was accompanied by a demand that it not be copied or distributed.

The two-page directive restricts, among other things, “Those reports that aim to represent that the fighting spirit in Afghanistan’s armed forces is weak,” and “Negative propaganda, interviews and reports which are provocative or slanderous and which are against the presence [in Afghanistan] of the international coalition forces and ISAF [International Security Assistance Force].” The document also told radio and television broadcasters that “News of terrorist activities must not come as the lead story of the news.”

:On June 19, President Hamid Karzai’s office issued a statement denying that the government has issued restrictions, instead characterizing the directive as a “request”

It’s good that there are NGO’s that report and examine what is happening in Afghanistan—they lend perspective that military commanders may not regard as important. Politicians are notorious for evasions and untrustworthy information they release to the public.

Karzai, in particular, I do not consider a reliable source of information.

Why would Senlis write a report that simply praised the military? Prime Minister Harper seems to believe when the press writes negative reports about him they are being unfair. That isn't the function of the press. Nor is the function of NGO's to heep praise on military leaders or their missions--they're there as critical observers.

Website for Human Rights Watch

canuck June 29, 2006 - 6:37pm

It's important to remember what the Senlis Council's...

...organizational objectives are here - for them, Afghanistan is a means to an end. Their primary focus is on drugs legalization generally, not not limited to the specific case of Afghanistan. As it happens I broadly agree with them on the legalization issue (too much Economist reading, I guess), but the fact that they have that broader focus does potentially colour their judgement vis a vis Afghanistan. There are few reasons why the Senlis Council would simply praise the military, just as there are a number of reasons why they might choose to emphasize the negative in service of their larger objectives. Strategically, as one who tends to favour drugs legalization of this type, my contention is that the other alternatives need to be seen to fail spectacularly first, and I think this may be what they are thinking.

"We declared war on terror, it's not even a noun, so, good luck. After we defeat it, I'm sure we'll take on that bastard ennui." - Jon Stewart.

JustPlainDave June 29, 2006 - 9:35pm

I agree with that assessment

The Canadian military would have much to gain should they convince the leaders of NATO to license poppy growing in Afghanistan. It removes the profit from Karzai's drug lords and the Taliban. Improves how the villagers look upon the troops--they would no longer be afraid their fields would be burned and it would encourage them to co-operate with the troops by ratting on the whereabouts of the Taliban. There are lots more advantages to licensing opium in Afghanistan.

I hope the military doesn't completely dismiss the Senlis reports. They in turn, need to acknowledge the objectives the military has to achieve to defeat the Taliban and would tailor their reports to being less critical of them.

canuck June 30, 2006 - 9:34am

I don't have much insight into what the...

...high command is thinking, but judging from the reaction to this report on army.ca I would say that something like between a quarter and a third of the operational folks aren't averse to the notion of legalization. A solid 100% of them realize that one can't simply come in and strip the local peasantry of their livelihood without some viable alternative. This is a really, really complicated issue and it's going to take a number of years to resolve - I would point out that forecasting doom on the basis of these indicators only makes it more difficult for things to gradually be restructured without massive suffering.

As part of this it's necessary to understand that licensing isn't a miracle pill - there's a lot of issues that have to be resolved on the operational side. Most importantly, there's going to have to be a great deal more stability and security in the countryside for licensing to work, given the price discrepancies between legal and illegal opium and given the penetration of smugglers and drugs kingpins into the Afghani political and economic landscape.

More directly relevant to these specific reports, they'd get a lot more mileage out of their reports if they were more specific and more obviously informed by ground truth. I've read over the latest report, and there ain't much in there (if anything) that couldn't be gleaned from a dilegent reading of open source media accounts and stuff coming out of Kabul. The scuttlebutt is that the Council folks may never have been down to the Kandahar Area of Operations - if that proves out to be true it's gonna hurt them big, big time in the eyes of the military (I've sent an e-mail to the guy identified as the report author in the PDF metadata for clarification, so we'll see what they say). If they want to be taken seriously by the military, they're going to have to establish an uncontestable street cred, and that means being seen to be on the ground in the AO over a long period. As the CDS has noted, soldiers are really, really skeptical of folks that fly through quickly and then decide that they know what the best course of action is based on 48 hours inside the wire. Ya gotta have detailed insights from up close over a long timeframe to establish ground truth and viable strategy and that's tough for any NGO to sustain - these things take years and years.

"We declared war on terror, it's not even a noun, so, good luck. After we defeat it, I'm sure we'll take on that bastard ennui." - Jon Stewart.

JustPlainDave June 30, 2006 - 9:58am

That's great that you notified

the author of the report that they'll lose tons of credibility with the military if they weren't on site.

For Afghanistan to be so riddled with Taliban, drug lords, terrorists, the drug business and all of them getting men, arms/funding from Pakistan, it couldn't possibly have just developed overnight. Yes, it will take resolve, planning, international co-operation, troops and time to begin regaining control.

NGO's, like Senlis, can either be in the way or be of value--that would be their choice; limited by their skill, knowledge, training, and their ability to adapt to war-zone military conditions in an impoverished country.

I would think if they have all those qualities, they would be aware these are long-term plans and goals that require patience to be added.

BTW, I would like it if you came back to this thread with either disappointing or encouraging news from the author of the plan. Licensing opium is a new approach to drug control and I would like to know whether the people who wrote these reports were serious about its implementation.

canuck June 30, 2006 - 10:56am

The author was kind enough to take...

...the time to reply. Based on what Mr. Kamminga said, essentially it sounds like they have had a substantive presence on the ground in the south (i.e., in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces) and have made a number of field trips into those regions. Significantly, they've held a number of jirgas (traditional meetings) with farmers. They also have signficant ongoing contacts with folks on the ground there. They've had less contact with the Canadian military, and have been able to meet with them in Kandahar only once. Essentially, they're pursuing what seems to be a pretty solid key informant based process in the face of sometimes daunting conditions, and my compliments to them for that - as a researcher, they're doing what I'd do were I in their shoes.

It is important to note, however, that in any key informant based process that when, who and how you talk to people makes a big difference. I'm a bit concerned in that the contexts in which they've talked to people sound like they might shape what folks are saying - the most extensive contact that they had with folks on the ground was during the eradication campaign; the other specific occasion mentioned was during the American bombing in Azizi. Both of these contexts are unlikely to produce absolutely the most complimentary views of the west - that said, we absolutely need to hear those views and we probably need to hear those views more than the complimentary ones - we don't win hearts and minds without confronting ourselves, warts and all, and as Mr. Kamminga noted, their people can get places and sample views that the military can't. In sum, as I see it this is an honourably intentioned and competently run project - but it absolutely isn't the last word on the matter, anymore than anything coming out of the Canadian staff would be. There's clearly a slant - as there is with anything - and it should be interpreted with that in mind.

Two comments really stood out for me:

1) Their head researcher summed it up as "We drank a lot of tea" - yep, I feel your pain; been there, done that, bought the t-shirt. That one thing tells me that they're really out there on the ground doing what needs be done.

2) Mr. Kamminga summed it up by saying that the main point was that the Canadians were doing a "great job" and that we should all be very proud, but that the larger political context of the mission under OEF and the lack of clarity under ISAF made it all very difficult dangerous.

My personal take on point 2 is that one should be extremely cautious in using this report as a basis for advocating a Canadian withdrawal - that certainly doesn't seem to be their conclusion. They want to see us change how we do business, and that means that we need to be there on the ground shaping the campaign.

"We declared war on terror, it's not even a noun, so, good luck. After we defeat it, I'm sure we'll take on that bastard ennui." - Jon Stewart.

JustPlainDave July 8, 2006 - 8:49am

"withdrawal" ?

Where did that come from? I hadn't heard anyone was advocating withdrawal...definitely not Senlis. Believe most of their reports advocate the licensing of poppy growing in Afghanistan. That could be an advantageous tool for the Canadian military to consider in their arsenal of weapons against the Taliban.

That's good to hear they did have a presence on the ground even if most of the information they gathered was during the eradication of the poppies which would have slanted their reports. It does lend them credibility.

Hopefully when the Afghanistan mission does become under ISAF command, they will consider it as a strategy.

canuck July 8, 2006 - 2:00pm

You're kidding, right?

There's a considerable groundswell amongst the rank and file NDP membership (and among other parties as well, but most strongly expressed in the NDP) towards withdrawal. For example, the Burlington NDP riding association passed a resolution to that effect; at least one NDP MP has specifically called for this measure in the House.

Further, the tenor of the coverage on much of this is slanted at least towards considering or confronting the idea of withdrawal - take a look at all the coverage the polls indicating uncertainty about the Canadian commitment garnered, compared to that apportioned to the recent Angus Reid poll that indicated that 65% of Canadians supported the mission in Afghanistan (what's that you say? you've never heard about the Angus Reid poll? quel surprise - allow me to provide a link).

To don my polling hat for a moment, the salient learning from the polling on this whole issue is that how you ask the question regarding Canadian military involvement matters a very great deal - mention peacekeeping or peace support and you get high positives, mention warfighting, and particularly in the context of ops with the Yanks, and you get negatives. For another insight, see here.

"We declared war on terror, it's not even a noun, so, good luck. After we defeat it, I'm sure we'll take on that bastard ennui." - Jon Stewart.

JustPlainDave July 8, 2006 - 5:06pm

Why would I be kidding?

the NDP never did approve of the Afghanistan mission. If nothing else, they are being consistent.

What a shame the troops who are there don't have the time to answer polls...there would then be close to 100% backing for the mission. They believe what they are doing is making a difference, betcha they revel in seeing schools open, especially with girls and women attending. The camaderie they enjoy by being together in this hell hole of a place is a once in a lifetime experience. It will fade over time, but those men will have established a human connection that is a rarity. There could be friendships that transcend Afghanistan for some of them. I don't suppose if they leave the military they will experience again the intensity of depending on each other for survival. Perhaps for some soldiers, a one-time mission is enough--others may stay in the forces and devote their careers to training or find other fields within the military that is rewarding in other ways. Whatever it is they choose to do--their service in the Afghanistan mission will never be wasted.

They must be gratified to see other NATO countries coming forward to join them. I imagine they would take pride in knowing they helped encourage other countries to participate.

I would prefer the Canadian contingent come under NATO command mostly because American forces due to their aggressive approach, haven't found public acceptance--sharing rejection could rub off on them. It potentially could endanger their lives if the rejection is coming from Afghani's who are in two minds about whether to support the Tabliban or American troops. The average Afghani wouldn't distinguish between American and Canadian soldiers. That could be turned around if NATO leaders and commanders earn the trust of the population.

I have nothing against American troops, but in many cases, their reputation whether fairly earned or not, precedes them.

Good to see the Angus Reid poll was up to 70% approval.

Dave, wording poll questions is very difficult to do. Filtering out bias takes highly specialized training to be successful at it. I wouldn't have a clue where to start.

canuck July 11, 2006 - 6:20pm

Canadian reaction:

to the Senlis Report.

Typically Canadian politicians complained because it wasn't rah, rah, the boys are winning.

The military also denigrated it and was dismissive of the report.

Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Rick Hillier described the report as the work of drive-by experts. Although I did see in an earlier report that he said he didn’t know very much about the group who had written it.

Colonel “Hope said Kandahar's minor poppy eradication doesn't involve Canadians and is having nowhere near the negative impact set out in the report. He called the report a political document steeped in anti-Americanism.”

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Pity Canadian troops aren't more involved with poppy growing--it's a vital component of Taliban funding and a source of income for Afghani farmers. Karzai has drug lords within in his government.

The council hopes the report will stimulate debate among Canadians about the country's role in southern Afghanistan.

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I hope it does stir debate among Canadians about what is happening in southern Afghanistan. The more we are informed about what is happening there, the clearer picture we'll have of what it is they are or are not accomplishing. And I don’t regard the report as just being anti-American. It is highly critical, but who isn't legitimately concerned with the American presence around the world. It does have some excellent suggestions that haven't been tried before. Eradicating the crops won't work--that's been repeatedly tried for decades by drug enforcement agencies sometimes in countries like Afghanistan with CIA funding...something else needs to be tried. Repeating a mistake over and over again, results in more of the same.

canuck June 29, 2006 - 7:18pm

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Study Finds anti-drug policies in Afghanistan are backfiring.

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