By Hannes Artens

The former and future President of Iran? (Photo Source: Wikipedia)
Brian snatched the laurel from me for writing first about this groundbreaking development on our site, so let's give him credit where credit is due. Now it's official what we all have been speculating on for months and what has become almost a certainty over the last weeks: former president and the standard bearer of the reform movement in Iran, Mohammad Khatami announced his candidacy in June's presidential elections. His decision is rather dictated by sense of duty than conviction.
Conviction that he can muster the support to beat Mahmoud Ahmadinejad - for despite Khatami's prominence and reputation the race is far from being called - nor that, if he gets elected, he'll be given the freedom to implement the reforms he thinks pivotal for Iran to advance from international pariah to the status of a respected and pragmatic member of the family of nations.
So how is the coming showdown of titans, the personifications of the deep division running through Iranian society, to asses and where does yesterday's development leave the Obama administration, struggling to formulate a comprehensive approach to the Iranian stalemate?
First, let us have a brief look at the genesis of Khatami's second run. Disillusioned from his failure to use public pressure to force the arch-conservative Council of Guardians and the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khameini, to accept the need for reforms and liberalization, and to end Iran's international isolation Khatami ended his second term amidst boos of his erstwhile staunchest supporters, the students and youth of Iran's major cities. They never forgave him his hesitation to walk the last mile and openly challenge the system during the violent crackdown of student protests in July 1999, misinterpreting Khatami's nature. The "man with the chocolate robe," as he's affectionately called by his supporters, is no revolutionary, no Che who exchanged the beret with a turban, out to topple the system, but a philosopher king in the Platonic tradition who believes in cautious adjustments and gradual improvements to save the system, of which he is part of and fought for to come about, for a better tomorrow.
Khatami's legacy was restored by what came after him, much like Al Gore being forgiven all his occasional missteps in the light of the Bush presidency. If the student and reform movement was shocked by the brutality of the regime in the summer of '99, they had no idea what was in store for them, how thoroughly Iranian civil society was to be restricted, and civil liberties curtailed during the Ahmadinejad years (for those of you interested in this sea change, I recommend Azadeh Moaveni's vivid account, Honeymoon in Tehran, that moves anybody who came to know the spirit of optimism of the early Khatami years to tears).
And yet, despite his almost supernatural status as the rehabilitated standard bearer of the reform movement, Khatami hesitated to challenge Ahmadinejad. Reportedly, he favored his former adviser and like minded spirit, Mir-Hossein Moussavi, to lead the reform camp, and only decided to step in himself after Moussavi declined. I believe what brought about Khatami's change of mind in the end, was the historic election of Barack Obama and the need, crucial for the survival of Iran, to accept the hand reached out to them by the new American president. Khatami acknowledges that back in 2001/03, when Iran declared its solidarity with the US in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack, supported America's invasion of Afghanistan, approached the White House with a once-in-a-lifetime offer to unilaterally abandon its nuclear project, and was rewarded for these conciliatory gestures with being put on the "axis of evil" list, the recipient was wrong, not the message. Now, when his country faces the choice between war and survival, he puts all his political capital at risk to give it a second try. Or as a former minister of the Khatami cabinet puts it, "the one thing he doesn't want to happen is for people to blame him later that he didn't offer himself when he was called upon and needed most."
Mohammad Ali Abtahi, a close aide of Mohammad Khatami reveled, "if the voter participation is high, we can easily win the election." Although he seems aware of the reform camp's biggest challenge - persuading voters to forget Khatami's failure to push through a liberalization of society - any such hopes are premature. The three-tier race between Ahmadinejad, Khatami, and the conservative candidate - at present either Ali Larijani or Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf seem most likely - is widely open. It all will come down to how much the bazaaris will blame Ahmadinejad's politics for the strangling recession and to what extent he can mobilize the rural masses, he has bestowed the horn of plenty on, to support him. But even then, here's one golden rule of thumb: no candidate, the Supreme Leader has not given his tacit approval, wins an election in Iran. The means at Ayatollah Khameini's disposal to thwart the reformist challenge are legion, a lesson they had to learn the hard way as recent as in the elections for the Majlis last year. Only, and I can't emphasize this strongly enough, if the Supreme Leader comes to the conclusion that a second term for Ahmadinejad is not in the system's best interest, Khatami has a chance to win.
And America? Well, the very day Khatami announced his candidacy and the week the Islamic Republic celebrates its 30th anniversary, the paragon of the neocons, the Mussolini-adorer and Iran-Contra veteran, Michael Ledeen, had that much to say in the Wall Street Journal:
Any serious person looking at Iran today, however, would be more likely to conclude that their doom, not their triumph, is right around the corner ... A free Iran must be the objective. There is abundant evidence that the overwhelming majority of Iranians want to be part of the Western world and live in peace with their neighbors. If Iran were free and democratic, we would not lose sleep over uranium enrichment at Natanz. We must be the people's voice. We can offer more hope than Mr. Ahmadinejad's broadcasts from outer space [in reference to the telecommunications satellite Iran launched last week]."
Fortunately, his is a minority opinion. The Obama administration, on the other hand, is struggling for three months on whether to respond to a letter Ahmadinejad sent in November, congratulating Obama for his victory at the polls, and over who will become the president's envoy for Iran (Dennis Ross
looks more likely by the day). Admittedly, the decision on how to reach out to Iran and offer them an all-encompassing dialogue without appearing to intervene in its presidential election, or worse, to strengthen Ahmadinejad as the man who tamed the "Great Satan", is a tricky one. Here subtle signals to the Supreme Leader are what this moment demands. A groundbreaking decision last week by the US Treasury to
brand PJAK, the PKK offspring George Bush used as a proxy to fight Iran, a terrorist organization, is a formidable example of how to do it. Michael Ledeen's "We must be the people's voice"-verbal flatulence, then again, is the best way to ensure a Khatami defeat. But perhaps this is exactly what he is working on.
--
Hannes Artens is the author of The Writing on the Wall, the first anti-Iran-war novel.