By Hannes Artens
On Wednesday, CIA Director Michael Hayden made yet the boldest accusation by any high ranking U.S. official on Iran being directly involved in the killing of American soldiers in Iraq, more, he accused Iran of this strategy constituting government-approved policy: "It is my opinion, it is the policy of the Iranian government, approved to highest level of that government, to facilitate the killing of Americans in Iraq," Hayden said. "Just make sure there's clarity on that." Together with CJCS' Adm. Michael Mullen weighing "potential military courses of action" in public and SecDef Gates wanting the arrival of a second carrier in the Persian Gulf to be understood as a clear warning sign, the recent avalanche of bellicose rhetoric reaches levels of September last year when aerial strikes on Iran were more immanent than ever before.
Yet this hysterical hyperactivity may have another, less-known-to-the-public reason. Largely underreported by U.S. corporate media, as usual, Iran has made groundbreaking strategic inroads into Central and South East Asia over the last month with the potential to not only stultify Washington's sanctions regime but also to result in a new geopolitical balance of power that would render an attack on Iran virtually impossible. On March 24, Iran officially applied to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Central Asian security group dominated by Russia and China. On April 28, Iran and Pakistan reached final agreement on the $7.6 billion Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline (IPI) connecting the world's second biggest natural gas field, South Pars, with the Indian Subcontinent. Just one day later, China's interest to join the project was announced and President Ahmadinejad could celebrate a major diplomatic victory by New Delhi cold-shouldering Washington's threats and re-entering negotiations that, according to Ahmadinejad, could be finalized within 45 days with a targeted start of construction works next year.
Over the course of the last weeks it became painfully aware to the Bush Administration that not only its competitors but also its allies give a rat's ass about its containment strategy when it comes to their own energy security. History may show that America lost the New Great Game due to its shortsighted policy of (go-it-alone) isolationism and refusal to talk with Iran. Confronted with an axis of Moscow-Beijing-Tehran-Islamabad (and on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis, New Delhi) even ultra-hawk Dick Cheney is left with no option but to pack his suitcase and head for the retirement home.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization with member states in blue and observers
states in green. Source: Wikipedia
The second of these interconnected developments, however, is up in the air in a mid-term perspective. The SCO, founded in 2001 and whose organizational form, principles and purpose were laid down at the St. Petersburg Summit in June 2002, is often wrongly compared to a Central Asian version of NATO. Contrary to the latter or the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) of the Central Asian successor states (plus Armenia) of the former USSR, the SCO is an intergovernmental mutual security organization focusing on internal threats such as terrorism, separatism or drug trafficking but features no mutual defense clause against an external enemy. Although its role and importance is rapidly expanding - China pushes for the establishment of a free trade area and Russia for increased cooperation in energy security - the SCO at present still lacks a coherent agenda and a common ideology beyond Russia's understandable desire to reunite its former empire and China's drive for controlling the resources of the oil rich Central Asian republics. The legal aspects and rights of states with observer status are dubious at best and the procedures of the ascension process are embryonic in comparison to the EU and NATO.
There is no doubt that an SCO membership of Iran would have indubitable advantages for the SCO, especially for China, the more so if Pakistan were to also join. Iran already is its second biggest supplier of crude and the double impact of Iran and Pakistan closing ranks with Beijing in the SCO would open the Persian Gulf for the Chinese Navy thus enabling it to control the tanker routes - the lifeline of China's economic growth - from their origin at Bandar Abbas to the northern entry of the Strait of Malacca. For the U.S., such a development would mean a more devastating strategic defeat than Vietnam and Iraq combined; in fact, it would reverse America's victory in the Cold War. The whole point of occupying Iraq and threatening Iran with attacks is to maintain unconfined strategic supremacy over the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz - if Iran were to become an SCO member, Washington, from one day to the other, would have to share it with its most likely adversary in the second half of the twenty-first century. Worse, a mere look at the above map suggests that America would have lost the New Great Game, the race for the oil riches of Central Asia - remember Unocal's involvement in the ill-fated Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline? - for good, and an attack on Iran would be as off the table as one on North Korea, no matter whether Dick Cheney and the entire Heritage Foundation and RAND Corporation are going postal like Rumpelstiltskin.
Having said that, despite the tantalizing bridal price, Iran will not become an SCO member any time soon, simply for the fact that Beijing isn't prepared yet to confront Washington openly on the world stage by writing a security check for Iran and transforming the SCO into a de facto anti-American alliance. For the time being, as long as they're in a catch-up race, Moscow and Beijing are interested in as multi-polar a world order as possible and have no desire to return to the confrontation of two antagonistic military blocks. But what isn't happening now can still occur sooner than many in Washington may think. Sergey Karanov, Chairman of the Russia-based Foreign and Defense Policy Council, ventilates the idea that an SCO membership and thus a certain security guarantee could act as the carrot for Iran to abandon its nuclear enrichment or to outsource it to an international (Russian dominated) consortium, thus depriving America of its official casus belli. Still, you can bet all your remaining idealism on not even a President Obama to let such a grand bargain happen. Before the U.S. Navy has to ask Chinese destroyers for right of passage in the Persian Gulf any American president will bomb Iran back into the Stone Age.
The second ground-braking development, the pipeline deal between Tehran, Islamabad and New Delhi, is of more immanent significance and may very well be the reason for the Pentagon's recent saber rattling. The true addressee of the threats eructated now on a daily basis by Petraeus, Hayden and Mullen may be India and China, cautioning them to abstain from bidding in the further exploitation of the South Pars Field, put IPI on hold, and not to undermine the West's anyway friable sanctions front through the backdoor. As Stephen Kinzer has pointed out in an interview here on TheAgonist, the NIE may have had the effect that a rigid, global sanctions regime is no longer possible to keep up - the less so with an oil price beyond $120 per barrel. Kaveh Afrasiabi analyzes the situation in the Asia Times:
"But, with the IPI likely to be finalized in the coming weeks, if not days, and with China and other players keen to participate in the international bidding for various aspects of this massive project, the US faces a triple jeopardy. These are:
- Impose reprisals against its important allies and thus alienate them.
- Inaction on this project makes US laws redundant and undermines the US's image and prestige.
- De facto accommodation of the project will play into the hands of Iran in its strategic games in relation to the intrusive superpower."
Washington has managed so far by sweet-talking, coercion, and supporting Baloch uprisings (no matter that these threaten their ally Pakstan as much as the enemy Iran) to delay a decision on IPI for as long as possible. With the deal ready to sign, though, it's left with no other option than to block its funding at the World Bank. If China's involvement isn't only a pipe dream of Ahmadinejad's, these stalling tactics will have little effect but to further alienate America's most important South East Asian allies, Pakistan and India.
There can be no doubt, at present, the successful implementation of Iran's Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki's policy re-orientation towards the East - negahe be shargh ("Look East") - will soon give America greater headaches than the "special groups" in Iraq. This threat to U.S. global supremacy is real, while the other is a chimera. The combination of both, though, may soon lead to war.
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Hannes Artens is the author of The Writing on the Wall, the first anti-Iran-war novel.