U.S. has held secret talks with Iran for five years


By Hannes Artens

Yesterday the English daily The Independent dropped a potential bombshell:

"Iran and the United States have been engaged in secret "back channel" discussions for the past five years on Iran's nuclear programme and the broader relationship between the two sworn enemies, The Independent can reveal. One of the participants, former senior US diplomat Thomas Pickering, explained that a group of former American diplomats and experts had been meeting with Iranian academics and policy advisers "in a lot of different places, although not in the US or Iran". "Some of the Iranians were connected to official institutions inside Iran," he said in a telephone interview (…)

While the nuclear issue was "prominent", Mr Pickering said, "we discussed what's going on domestically in both countries and wide-ranging issues" affecting the US-Iran relationship. Although none of the group members was from the US or Iranian governments, he said that "each side kept their officials informed". The Bush administration "did not discourage us," he added."

If these talks in fact were tacitly approved back channel talks on a quasi-official level and if they were continued for five years without cease, no matter who is in power in Iran nor how close both countries had come to war in September last year, we would be forced to re-evaluate not only our assessment of the Bush Administration's saber-rattling and its Middle East policy, but also our own investigative analysis of U.S.-Iranian relations since 2003.

Let us pause for a thought and take stock of what we have believed to be the state of affairs till this week. On August 14, 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, closely tied to MEK, revealed to the world details about Iran's nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak that set off the ongoing confrontation between the West and Iran over the latter's nuclear program. Since then the EU-3 have tried with limited success to get Washington on board for direct talks between the conflict's prime antagonists. The first official bilateral talks between Ambassador Ryan Crocker and his Iranian counterpart in Iraq that were launched in May 2007 were explicitly limited to discussing Iraq, and the United States refused to discuss the nuclear stand off. The Bush Administration, so far, has categorically ruled out to extend these talks to a broader reflection on U.S.-Iranian relations or to model the efforts helmed by the EU-3 on the groundbreaking Six-Party-Talks with North Korea.

Is it conceivable that through all these years the Bush Administration has actually pursued a dual track diplomacy of carrying a big stick in public but speaking softly with Iran behind closed doors through the good services of private citizens/former officials; that despite its public refusal the U.S. has actually yielded to the EU-3's pleas for direct talks from day one on? In conflict resolution theory, this is exactly how "Track 3 Diplomacy" is applied, and in reality, such a strategy led to the Oslo Accords and the peace process in Northern Ireland. But who would have thought the Bush Administration capable of such visionary thinking and to ever exercise such wise restraint on Iran?

Two more aspects deserve our closer attention. First, the time factor. If the Pickering-talks have been really going on for five years now they must have been initiated around the time the 2007 NIE claims Iran to have stopped its nuclear weapons program. From Trita Parsi we know that in 2003 the Bush Administration was approached with an official Iranian attempt at reconciliation through the Swiss Ambassador in Tehran, Tim Guldiman, which they refused to consider. What if the Pickering-initiative constituted the Bush Administration's unofficial, easily deniable response to the Iranian opening? Second, the mystery's main protagonist. Thomas Pickering is a former, up-to-all-dodges career diplomat who served in Moscow, New Delhi, Amman, Tel Aviv, and at the UN under administrations from Carter to Clinton and under the latter as Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. Since his retirement he is on the board of the American Iranian Council, the Council on Foreign Relations and is affiliated with the International Crisis Group. In March 2008, he delivered a thorough analysis of the nuclear stalemate with Iran together with recommendations how to resolve them diplomatically through a grand bargain in The New York Review of Books. The Independent sums it up the following:

"The Luers-Pickering-Walsh initiative gives Iran the opportunity to prove that its nuclear intentions are peaceful by yielding to the Iranians' key demand for a uranium enrichment programme on Iranian soil. The enrichment activities would take place under the supervision of a jointly managed international consortium. The plan is the most detailed of its kind since 2005. Conditions to be negotiated with Iran would include:


  • a UN Security Council resolution authorising the arrangement and specifying that if Iran breaks the agreement, member states would be authorised to take punitive action;

  • Iran would be barred from producing highly enriched uranium, which is weapons grade fuel, or reprocessed plutonium, which can be an alternative route to producing a bomb;

  • Iran would implement the stringent inspection measures in the Additional Protocol to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty;

  • Iran would commit itself to building only "safe" light-water reactors."



What if these recommendations not only constitute Pickering's private, scholarly musings but the Bush Administration's unofficial bargaining position?

Needless to say, The Independent revelation could not have come at a more inopportune time for President Bush as he, Ambassador Crocker, and General Petraeus are leaving no stone unturned to convince the public that Iran is the true enemy American soldiers are fighting in Iraq, and as Republican candidate John McCain has built his entire campaign strategy on us-against-the-rest-of-the-world fear-mongering (in which Iran has been assigned the role of Adolf Hitler reincarnate). The fact, though, that while European and Middle Eastern (especially Israeli) media is abuzz with the intentional leak of the Pickering talks, American media at large has completely ignored it, is either embarrassingly shocking, particularly revealing, or both. Besides some negligible (for lacking any analysis) mention on Truthdig and US News and World Report, we find ourselves fobbed off with an as trivial as telling denial by "an unnamed State Department official." Given the fact that U.S. media - whether conservative or progressive, corporate or alternative - usually considers every literal fart from the White House in Iran's direction worth front page coverage, this meaningful silence alone is worth further scrutiny.

It is the nature and virtue of these kind of talks and quasi-official initiatives that they are easily deniable any time, and that a good part of their background as to who, why, and when will always remain in the dark. Let there be no doubt, it is too early to make any substantial statements about the true nature and scope of the Pickering talks, let alone assess their import on future U.S.-Iranian relations. But there is also no doubt that since yesterday the narrative of the Bush Administration's Iran policy is more complex than we thought it to be. Perhaps in years from today (as was the case with the 2003 Iranian offer) we will get a vague understanding of what was at stake, what the major protagonists' intentions were, what Iran's reaction was, and what status these talks were given by the Bush Administration. At worst, they were considered a diverting, meaningless pastime by some do-gooders and State Department old hands, at best, they constituted a true back-channel opening a future U.S. administration, if willing, can build up on. Only time and the election in November can tell.

--
Hannes Artens is the author of The Writing on the Wall, the first anti-Iran-war novel.


Hannes Artens April 15, 2008 - 8:15pm
( categories: Iran | Opinion )

The Bush Administration appears to want a US-Iran war.

Yhis is probably another leak by the professionals, similar to the intelligence leak of the absence of a current nuclear weapons program, designed to sink the Bush adminsitraion's official position.

If so, thanks.

Synoia April 15, 2008 - 11:11pm

Or, the hardliners found out and cut the back channel by exposing it. So war is now more likely.

Jim M April 16, 2008 - 1:47pm

remember a while back someone made similiar statements of back channel talks, and then recanted? Rice?

Tina April 16, 2008 - 4:03pm

a start.

LJ April 16, 2008 - 4:33pm

LJ,I forgot about that. The story I was thinking of was from this year. Eventually I will remember. lol

Tina April 16, 2008 - 5:22pm

these rumors have been leaking out every few months.

LJ April 16, 2008 - 9:59pm

no doubt correct. :)

Tina April 17, 2008 - 9:46am

just saying their contacts between Iranians and the US is a statement of minor importance. In thisof Juan Cole by D. Drezner at Bloggingheads.tv, Cole says that power in Iran is strangely dispersed amongst many factions. So you could say you were conversing with the Iranian govt. and not lie, while that might well be a trivial statement based on whom you were conversing with. Just who can speak for the Iranians is problematic.

LJ April 17, 2008 - 11:42am

LJ, believe me, I can tell a story or two about how dispersed Iranian politics is. I’ve lived for many years just a mile from the IAEA and their staff had many tales of woe to tell on how they misperceived the status or importance of their Iranian interlocutors. I haven’t portrayed these talks as the Iranian equivalent to the Six-Party-Talks, nor do I believe them to be. It lies in the nature of “Track 3 diplomacy” that ninety percent of the efforts come to nought at the end of the day. Yet, three aspects, I reasoned, made them worth writing about them. The bipartisan gravitas of Pickering, who isn’t a retired, obscure professor of Middle Eastern Studies from a second rank US college trying to get some action into his autumn of life; Pickering wouldn’t waste his time and rep if his Iranian counterparts were not remotely his equals. Second, the fact that world media was abuzz with the story on Monday and Tuesday, while US media (deliberately?) hushed it up. Third, the link you’ve provided above, shows that back channel talks like these occasionally come to the surface and are tacitly encouraged if not even conducted by the Bush Administration – contrary to their ongoing media blitz in public. Cole himself, to whom I referred in last week’s diary, brilliantly points out the common interests the US and Iran share in Iraq (for example, the survival of Maliki and keeping al-Sadr in a box); why not discuss them through someone like Pickering?

Again, I’m not about to propose Pickering for this year’s Peace Nobel Prize and use my book as fuel as war with Iran has suddenly become a non-issue, but I see it as part of my task here to inform Agonistas about all dimensions of US-Iranian relations at depth, the more so if certain aspects are willfully ignored by US corporate media.

Hannes Artens April 17, 2008 - 4:53pm

I kept putting out my skeptical side on this hoping to flush out some tidbit that would move me towards more trust in this new bit of hopeful news. You stepped up!

LJ April 17, 2008 - 9:57pm

I share your skepticism; at best these talks will be a tiny mosaic stone a future administration willing to talk to Iran can build up on. Although I can understand many expecting the worst from the nine months Bush still has - an attack on Iran included - I believe, Iran will be handed over to the next president. And then, ideally, these talks may yield fruit.
Over the next nine months, on the other hand, we'll see a continuation of official Washington's idiotic isolation policy and preparing the ground for McCain to consider all options on the table.

Hannes Artens April 18, 2008 - 8:55am

South Korea's conservative president will meet with Bush Friday, as the US appears to soften its stance on North Korea.
By Donald Kirk | Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

from the April 17, 2008 edition

SEOUL, SOUTH KOREA - South Korea's recently inaugurated president, Lee Myung Bak, faces his first major foreign-policy challenge this week, as he prepares to confront President Bush Friday on a controversial secret deal reportedly drafted between American and North Korean negotiators.

Senior South Korean officials say they still don't know the contents of the agreement, which is meant to jump-start North Korean compliance with agreements to abandon its nuclear weapons program. But they bristle at suggestions that North Korea is attempting to bypass their government while negotiating with the United States.

"I do not know what they have agreed," says Prime Minister Han Seung Soo, the top official here while Mr. Lee meets with Mr. Bush at Camp David on Friday and Saturday. "But if North Korea is going to the United States over the shoulder of [South] Korea, it will not succeed."

Analysts say the US is backing away from the key condition of the six-party agreement signed in February 2007, which called for North Korea to reveal the contents of its entire nuclear program. The North has repeatedly denied developing warheads with enriched uranium or aiding Syria on the facility that was bombed by Israeli warplanes last September.

Tough love or compromise?

Now, say analysts, Lee has to decide quickly whether to stick to his repeated pledges to adopt a "pragmatic" and tough policy toward North Korea – and break, as he has promised, from the Sunshine policy initiated by Kim Dae Jung after he became president a decade ago.

"It could be a dilemma for Lee Myung Bak," says Shim Jae Hoon, a longtime analyst of North Korean affairs. Lee "needs to draw a line from the previous government. He got elected on a platform of changing the government policy, and everything hinges on the nuclear issue."

At stake is a memorandum believed to have been drafted by US nuclear envoy Christopher Hill and North Korean envoy Kim Kye Gwan in a recent meeting in Singapore. In the face of North Korea's refusal to acknowledge anything to do with enriched uranium or the Syrian facility, Mr. Hill is believed to have suggested the two agree on a statement listing those accusations. North Korea would acknowledge that it "understands" what's written down – without directly affirming the truth of the document.

"That's too big a concession," says Choi Jin Wook, senior researcher on North Korea at the government-affiliated Korea Institute for National Unification, especially since Mr. Kim said after the meeting that he was happy with the results.

"North Korea cannot help but smile at this agreement," adds Mr. Choi, "but problems apparently focus on a matter of definition."

"As far as I know they just acknowledge the memorandum," he explains. "North Korea may say it 'understands' [the] memorandum," he goes on, "but 'understands' has a meaning that is different from 'I know' or "I confirm.' "

The reward for US acceptance of the North Korean position includes compliance with two longstanding North Korean demands: removal of North Korea from the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism and lifting of economic sanctions imposed under the US "trading-with-the-enemy" act.

At the same time, North Korea would complete disabling its well-publicized facilities at Yongbyon – where it has produced warheads with plutonium at their core – and move on to permanently dismantling its entire nuclear program.

Pressure to accommodate

For all the apprehensions about the outcome of the Singapore meeting, however, the sense is that Lee may go along with it if only to advance South Korea's interests in other areas.

"There's no other way but to accommodate it," says Paik Hak Soon, director of North Korean studies at the Sejong Institute, which worked closely with the governments of Kim Dae Jung and Mr. Kim's successor, Roh Moo Hyun, on North-South reconciliation.

"The previous policy has been to facilitate the process of denuclearization," says Mr. Paik. "The rational way," he says, "is to keep both channels open." These include the six-party talks to persuade North Korea to live up to agreements on abandoning its nuclear program and inter-Korean dialogue building on the North-South summit of last October, in which North Korea's leader Kim Jong Il and South Korea's President Roh vowed to forge ahead on economic issues.

North Korea, however, has canceled all dialogue with the South. In recent days it has called Lee a "traitor," "imposter," and "sycophant" for demanding reciprocity on any deal with the North and verification of compliance with the nuclear agreement.

Lee "has failed to improve inter-Korean relations," Paik continues. "North Korea has its own interests to upgrade deteriorating relations. South Korea is losing some leverage."

North Korea's most pressing interest now may be the threat of a food crisis similar to that in the 1990s, in which up to 2 million people died. The World Food Program's Asia director, Tony Banbury, described North Korea as nearing a food crisis that is "bad and getting worse." The UN agency estimates that North Korea's food deficit this year will be twice that of last year. Foreign help is "urgently required to avert a serious tragedy," he said.

North Korea, however, has not made its annual request for food and fertilizer with South Korea. But it has spurned Lee's program, "Vision 3000," in which he has said he wants to help rebuild the North's economy so the average North Korean will earn the equivalent of $3,000 a year, many times the current level.

To accomplish this, "Lee doesn't have any other option than to accommodate," says Paik. For that reason, "what happened in Singapore is a breakthrough," he adds.

Find this article at:
http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0417/p07s03-woap.html

Tina April 17, 2008 - 11:41am

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