Is the fix in?
*.pdf of the amendment as it passed (note, some language has changed from that which I posted below.)
SA 2073. Mr. LIEBERMAN (for himself, Mr. MCCAIN, Mr. KYL, Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. COLEMAN, Ms. COLLINS, Mr. SESSIONS, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. SALAZAR, and Mr. CRAIG) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 2011 proposed by Mr. Nelson of Nebraska (for Mr. Levin) to the bill H.R. 1585, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2008 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; as follows:
At the end of title XV, add the following:
SEC. 1535. REPORT ON SUPPORT FROM IRAN FOR ATTACKS AGAINST COALITION FORCES IN IRAQ.
(a) Findings.–Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Since January 19, 1984, the Secretary of State has designated the Islamic Republic of Iran as a “state sponsor of terrorism,” one of only five countries in the world at present so designated.
(2) The Department of State, in its most recent “Country Reports on Terrorism,” stated that “Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism” in 2006.
(3) The most recent Country Reports on Terrorism report further stated, “Iran continued [in 2006] to play a destabilizing role in Iraq. . . Iran provided guidance and training to select Iraqi Shia political groups, and weapons and training to Shia militant groups to enable anti-Coalition attacks. Iranian government forces have been responsible for at least some of the increasing lethality of anti- Coalition attacks by providing Shia militants with the capability to build IEDs with explosively formed projectiles similar to those developed by Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard was linked to armor-piercing explosives that resulted in the deaths of Coalition Forces.”
(4) In an interview published on June 7, 2006, Zalmay Khalilzad, then-United States ambassador to Iraq, said of Iranian support for extremist activity in Iraq, “We can say with certainty that they support groups that are attacking coalition troops. These groups are using the same ammunition to destroy armored vehicles that the Iranians are supplying to Hezbollah in Lebanon. They pay money to Shiite militias and they train some of the groups. We can’t say whether Teheran is supporting Al Qaeda, but we do know that Al Qaeda people come here from Pakistan through Iran. And Ansar al Sunna, a partner organization of Zarqawi’s network, has a base in northwest Iran.”
(5) On April 26, 2007, General David Petraeus, commander of Multi- National Force-Iraq, said of Iranian support for extremist activity in Iraq, “The level of financing, the level of training on Iranian soil, the level of equipping some sophisticated technologies. . . even advice in some cases, has been very, very substantial and very harmful.”
(6) On April 26, 2007, General Petraeus also said of Iranian support for extremist activity in Iraq, “We know that it goes as high as [Brig. Gen. Qassem] Suleimani, who is the head of the Qods Force. . .. We believe that he works directly for the supreme leader of the country.”
(7) On May 27, 2007, then-Major General William Caldwell, spokesperson for Multi-National Force-Iraq, said, “What we do know is that the Iranian intelligence services, the Qods Force, is in fact both training, equipping, and funding Shia extremist groups. . . both in Iraq and also in Iran. . .. We have in detention now people that we have captured that, in fact, are Sunni extremist-related that have, in fact, received both some funding and training from the Iranian intelligence services, the Qods Force.”
(8) On February 27, 2007, in testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, Lieutenant General Michael Maples, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said of Iranian support for extremist activity in Iraq, “We believe Hezbollah is involved in the training as well.”
(9) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General Kevin Bergner, spokesperson for Multi-National Force-Iraq, stated, “The Iranian Qods Force is using Lebanese Hezbollah essentially as a proxy, as a surrogate in Iraq.”
(10) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General Bergner detailed the capture in southern Iraq by coalition forces of Ali Musa Daqdaq, whom the United States military believes to be a 24-year veteran of Lebanese Hezbollah involved in the training of Iraqi extremists in Iraq and Iran.
(11) The Department of State designates Hezbollah a foreign terrorist organization.
(12) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General Bergner stated that the Iranian Qods Force operates three camps near Teheran where it trains Iraqi extremists in cooperation with Lebanese Hezbollah, stating, “The Qods Force, along with Hezbollah instructors, train approximately 20 to 60 Iraqis at a time, sending them back to Iraq organized into these special groups. They are being taught how to use EPFs [explosively formed penetrators], mortars, rockets, as well as intelligence, sniper, and kidnapping operations.”
(13) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General Bergner stated that Iraqi extremists receive between $750,000 and $3,000,000 every month from Iranian sources.
(14) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General Bergner stated that “[o]ur intelligence reveals that senior leadership in Iran is aware of this activity” and that it would be “hard to imagine” that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, is unaware of it.
(15) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General Bergner stated, “There does not seem to be any follow-through on the commitments that Iran has made to work with Iraq in addressing the destabilizing security issues here in Iraq.”
(16) On February 11, 2007, the United States military held a briefing in Baghdad at which its representatives stated that at least 170 members of the United States Armed Forces have been killed, and at least 620 wounded, by weapons tied to Iran.
(17) On January 20, 2007, a sophisticated attack was launched by insurgents at the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center in Iraq, resulting in the murder of five American soldiers, four of whom were first abducted.
(18) On April 26, 2007, General Petraeus stated that the so-called Qazali network was responsible for the attack on the Karbala
[Page: S9036] GPO’s PDF
Provincial Joint Coordination Center and that “there’s no question that the Qazali network is directly connected to the Iranian Qods force [and has] received money, training, arms, ammunition, and at some points in time even advice and assistance and direction”.
(19) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General Bergner stated that the United States Armed Forces possesses documentary evidence that the Qods Force had developed detailed information on the United States position at the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center “regarding our soldiers’ activities, shift changes, and defenses, and this information was shared with the attackers”.
(20) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General Bergner stated of the January 20 Karbala attackers, “[They] could not have conducted this complex operation without the support and direction of the Qods Force.”
(b) Sense of Congress.–It is the sense of Congress that–
(1) the murder of members of the United States Armed Forces by a foreign government or its agents is an intolerable and unacceptable act of hostility against the United States by the foreign government in question; and
(2) the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran must take immediate action to end all training, arming, equipping, funding, advising, and any other forms of support that it or its agents are providing, and have provided, to Iraqi militias and insurgents, who are contributing to the destabilization of Iraq and are responsible for the murder of members of the United States Armed Forces.
(1) IN GENERAL.–Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 60 days thereafter, the Commander, Multi-National Forces Iraq and the United States Ambassador to Iraq shall jointly submit to Congress a report describing and assessing in detail–
(A) the external support or direction provided to anti-coalition forces by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran or its agents;
(B) the strategy and ambitions in Iraq of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran; and
(C) any counter-strategy or efforts by the United States Government to counter the activities of agents of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Iraq.
(2) FORM.–Each report required under paragraph (1) shall be in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
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