Foreclosures Up 35% from '05 - '06; Subprime to Blame


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From CNN.Money.

Americans continue having difficulties paying their mortgage obligations, with December foreclosure rates above the 100,000 mark for the fifth straight month.

The number of homeowners entering into some stage of the foreclosure process in December was 109,652, down 9 percent from November but up 35 percent from December 2005, according to RealtyTrac.

Any possibility all of those Adjustable Rate Mortgages had something to do with that? Yep:

Adjustable-rate mortgages, especially subprime ARMs, continue to drive the spike in foreclosures: many of those loans are due to reset in 2007, and many of the loans written in 2006 are performing less well than in previous years.

"The combination of slower home sales and rising interest rates on ARMs continues to drive foreclosures at significantly higher numbers than a year ago," said James J. Saccacio, chief executive officer of RealtyTrac.

These loans account for 30% of loans sold in 2005 and the first half of 2006.

So -- how were these products sold? In recent Congressional Testimony (see page 3-4), the General Accounting Office made the following observations about Alternate Mortgage Products (AMPs).

1.) AMP lending tripled over the last three years.

2.) Lenders relaxed lending standards

3.) Borrowers may not understand all the risks of AMPs because the documentation is complicated, poorly written and advertised inappropriately.

Another noted, "Increasingly, these products are marketed as affordability products... which is to say potential borrowers could use these products to afford larger homes."

The FDIC conducted a review of six lenders who underwrote about half of the sub-prime market. Their report concluded:

The review found a loosening of underwriting standards, some instances of borrowers not being qualified on a fully amortized loan basis, and in increase in second mortgages and other practices that uncreased the underlying risk.

A careless industry has led to a deteriorating sub-prime mortgage market:

In a conference call titled "How Bad is Subprime Collateral?" Tom Zimmerman, head of ABS research for UBS, and David Liu, head of mortgage credit, discussed how much higher loan delinquencies and foreclosures are for 2006 subprime loans compared with similar subprime loans from earlier years -- the result of deteriorating underwriting quality from lenders combined with a slower housing market.

Still, despite the adverse conditions, "I guess we are a bit surprised at how fast this has unraveled," said Zimmerman. While it's "not a secret that subprime collateral has performed pretty disastrously so far," he said, "I must say we were a bit surprised by the magnitude with which" the loans "deteriorated this year."

The rate of subprime loan delinquencies of 60 days or more -- meaning borrowers are that far behind in their payments -- has climbed to about 8 percent, up from about 4.5 percent a year ago.

These 60-day plus delinquencies jumped up fairly sharply in the past few months, to 3.63 percent for the 2006 loans in October, up from 2.95 percent in September and 1.62 percent in July, according to UBS research.

Comparing loans of similar age, 2006 loans are performing worse than 2005, which are worse than 2004. In fact, given where delinquencies are now, loans from 2006 are on track to be among the worst-performing ever, along with the 2000 to 2001 years, according to UBS research.

And not only have delinquencies risen faster in 2006 than in earlier years, Liu noted in the presentation, but 2006 loans have entered the foreclosure process faster. In October 2006, the foreclosure rate was about 2 percent, while a year earlier it was 1 percent.

So,

1.) Foreclosures are increasing, in part because

2.) Lenders relaxed standards,

3.) Misrepresented some products, and

4.) Did a poor job of explaining risks to potential buyers.


Bonddad January 18, 2007 - 7:37am

Certainly all the mortgage brokers flocking to a booming business after 2001 helped lower the credit standards for the whole industry.

But the real story here is something regulators call "moral hazard" risk. This occurs when a lender thinks for whatever reason that they have a way out of any problems if the borrower gets into trouble.

The home mortgage industry felt it had multiple "outs" for credit risk:

1) The mortgage could be thrown into a package of other mortgages and sold off to investors in the mortgaged-backed securities market. While the bankers could be given back any non-performing mortgages by the investors, the bankers' models showed historically this wasn't high risk (the models have been proven to be wrong for the sub-prime market where the greatest risk is). The MBS market was the principal outlet for mortgage risk after -

2) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stopped buying home mortgages after 2004. These federally-chartered agencies were the main reason the mortgage business has been so strong for 30 years - it's like having another Federal Reserve in the market buying up trillions of dollars of mortgages, or guaranteeing them against loss. Except both these agencies ran into trouble with their hedging practices and had to stop aggressively supporting the market in 2005.

3) There is always the collateral. After all, housing prices have never gone down in living memory, except until this year.

Bankers gave up all pretense that they were worried about borrower defaults because the credit risks were perceived to be gone - hence the moral hazard risk, and hence the collapse in credit standards so that even the living dead could walk into a bank and get a mortgage.

What we have now is an MBS market deteriorating in the sub-prime sector, and subsceptible to similar problems in the higher-rated sectors if the economy weakens any further. On top of that, property values are falling in most parts of the country, shrinking the collateral (the debt never shrinks unless it is paid off or the Fed tolerates hyperinflation). So MBS investors and banks have less protection. The two federal agencies are holding about $2 trillion in mortgages on their balance sheet (though we are still waiting to see Fannie Mae's correct financial statements), and they have guaranteed multiples of this amount for the financial industry. Oh yes, don't forget the tales of fraud, overstated appraisals, kickbacks to brokers, corrupt lawyers, etc.

The mortgage industry would like to reignite the boom - maybe even the Fed would too. It might happen, but it means the government has to accept more moral hazard risk on top of what has happened already.

Numerian January 18, 2007 - 12:55pm

WBUR, By David Boeri, Feb 27

Boston, MA - In a case of bad news turning worse, foreclosure filings against Massachusetts' homeowners have hit their highest monthly total on record.

According to a new report from Foreclosures Mass Dot Com this morning, lenders started proceedings on 22-hundred and seven properties last month. That's double the number for January last year.

The latest figures follow the Framingham company's records for 2006, which show a 77 percent rise in the rate of foreclosures across the Bay State.

Raja February 27, 2007 - 8:08am

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