

AS MODIFIED

O:\DAVID\DAV07A44.xml
HC-7,8

S.L.C.

10¹⁵/a m312
7/11/01

~~PENDING~~
Y
N

AMENDMENT NO. _____ Calendar No. _____

Purpose: To require a report on support provided by the Government of Iran for attacks against coalition forces in Iraq.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—110th Cong., 1st Sess.

H.R. 1585

AMENDMENT No. 2073

To	By <u>Lieberman</u>	ry
	To: <u>Amdt. No. 2011</u>	ry
	<u>H.R. 1585</u>	t-
	<u>8</u>	el
	Page(s)	s.

GPO: 2006 30-772 (Mac)

ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT intended to be proposed by Mr. LIEBERMAN

Viz: *(for himself, Mr. McCain, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Graham and Mr. Coleman)*

- 1 At the end of title XV, add the following:
- 2 SEC. 1535. REPORT ON SUPPORT FROM IRAN FOR ATTACKS
- 3 AGAINST COALITION FORCES IN IRAQ.
- 4 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
- 5 ings:
- 6 (1) Since January 19, 1984, the Secretary of
- 7 State has designated the Islamic Republic of Iran as

*Collins.
Sessions
Levin
Salazar*

1 a "state sponsor of terrorism," one of only five
2 countries in the world at present so designated.

3 (2) The Department of State, in its most recent
4 "Country Reports on Terrorism," stated that "Iran
5 remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism"
6 in 2006.

7 (3) The most recent Country Reports on Ter-
8 rorism report further stated, "Iran continued [in
9 2006] to play a destabilizing role in Iraq... Iran
10 provided guidance and training to select Iraqi Shia
11 political groups, and weapons and training to Shia
12 militant groups to enable anti-Coalition attacks. Ira-
13 nian government forces have been responsible for at
14 least some of the increasing lethality of anti-Coali-
15 tion attacks by providing Shia militants with the ca-
16 pability to build IEDs with explosively formed pro-
17 jectiles similar to those developed by Iran and Leba-
18 nese Hezbollah. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard
19 was linked to armor-piercing explosives that resulted
20 in the deaths of Coalition Forces."

21 (4) In an interview published on June 7, 2006,
22 Zalmay Khalilzad, then-United States ambassador to
23 Iraq, said of Iranian support for extremist activity
24 in Iraq, "We can say with certainty that they sup-
25 port groups that are attacking coalition troops.

1 These groups are using the same ammunition to de-
2 stroy armored vehicles that the Iranians are sup-
3 plying to Hezbollah in Lebanon. They pay money to
4 Shiite militias and they train some of the groups.
5 We can't say whether Teheran is supporting Al
6 Qaeda, but we do know that Al Qaeda people come
7 here from Pakistan through Iran. And Ansar al
8 Sunna, a partner organization of Zarqawi's network,
9 has a base in northwest Iran."

10 (5) On April 26, 2007, General David Petraeus,
11 commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq, said of
12 Iranian support for extremist activity in Iraq, "The
13 level of financing, the level of training on Iranian
14 soil, the level of equipping some sophisticated tech-
15 nologies... even advice in some cases, has been very,
16 very substantial and very harmful."

17 (6) On April 26, 2007, General Petraeus also
18 said of Iranian support for extremist activity in Iraq,
19 "We know that it goes as high as [Brig. Gen.
20 Qassem] Suleimani, who is the head of the Qods
21 Force... We believe that he works directly for the
22 supreme leader of the country."

23 (7) On May 27, 2007, then-Major General Wil-
24 liam Caldwell, spokesperson for Multi-National
25 Force-Iraq, said, "What we do know is that the Ira-

1 nian intelligence services, the Qods Force, is in fact
2 both training, equipping, and funding Shia extremist
3 groups... both in Iraq and also in Iran... We have
4 in detention now people that we have captured that,
5 in fact, are Sunni extremist-related that have, in
6 fact, received both some funding and training from
7 the Iranian intelligence services, the Qods Force."

8 (8) On February 27, 2007, in testimony before
9 the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate,
10 Lieutenant General Michael Maples, director of the
11 Defense Intelligence Agency, said of Iranian support
12 for extremist activity in Iraq, "We believe Hezbollah
13 is involved in the training as well."

14 (9) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General Kevin
15 Bergner, spokesperson for Multi-National Force-
16 Iraq, stated, "The Iranian Qods Force is using Leb-
17 anese Hezbollah essentially as a proxy, as a surro-
18 gate in Iraq."

19 (10) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General
20 Bergner detailed the capture in southern Iraq by co-
21 alition forces of Ali Musa Daqdaq, whom the United
22 States military believes to be a 24-year veteran of
23 Lebanese Hezbollah involved in the training of Iraqi
24 extremists in Iraq and Iran.

1 (11) The Department of State designates
2 Hezbollah a foreign terrorist organization.

3 (12) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General
4 Bergner stated that the Iranian Qods Force operates
5 three camps near Teheran where it trains Iraqi ex-
6 tremists in cooperation with Lebanese Hezbollah,
7 stating, "The Qods Force, along with Hezbollah in-
8 structors, train approximately 20 to 60 Iraqis at a
9 time, sending them back to Iraq organized into these
10 special groups. They are being taught how to use
11 EPFs [explosively formed penetrators], mortars,
12 rockets, as well as intelligence, sniper, and kidnap-
13 ping operations."

14 (13) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General
15 Bergner stated that Iraqi extremists receive between
16 \$750,000 and \$3,000,000 every month from Iranian
17 sources.

18 (14) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General
19 Bergner stated that "[o]ur intelligence reveals that
20 senior leadership in Iran is aware of this activity"
21 and that it would be "hard to imagine" that Aya-
22 tollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, is
23 unaware of it.

24 (15) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General
25 Bergner stated, "There does not seem to be any fol-

1 low-through on the commitments that Iran has made
2 to work with Iraq in addressing the destabilizing se-
3 curity issues here in Iraq.”


4 (16) On February 11, 2007, the United States
5 military held a briefing in Baghdad at which its rep-
6 resentatives stated that at least 170 members of the
7 United States Armed Forces have been killed, and at
8 least 620 wounded, by weapons tied to Iran.

9 (17) On January 20, 2007, a sophisticated at-
10 tack was launched by insurgents at the Karbala Pro-
11 vincial Joint Coordination Center in Iraq, resulting
12 in the murder of five American soldiers, four of
13 whom were first abducted.

14 (18) On April 26, 2007, General Petraeus stat-
15 ed that the so-called Qazali network was responsible
16 for the attack on the Karbala Provincial Joint Co-
17 ordination Center and that “there’s no question that
18 the Qazali network is directly connected to the Ira-
19 nian Qods force [and has] received money, training,
20 arms, ammunition, and at some points in time even
21 advice and assistance and direction”.

22 (19) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General
23 Bergner stated that the United States Armed Forces
24 possesses documentary evidence that the Qods Force
25 had developed detailed information on the United

1 States position at the Karbala Provincial Joint Co-
2 ordination Center "regarding our soldiers' activities,
3 shift changes, and defenses, and this information
4 was shared with the attackers".

5 (20) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General
6 Bergner stated of the January 20 Karbala attackers,
7 "[They] could not have conducted this complex oper-
8 ation without the support and direction of the Qods
9 Force." 

(21) On May 28, 2007, the United States Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, met in Baghdad with representatives of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to express U.S. concern about Iranian anti-coalition activity in Iraq;

(22) Section 1213(a) of the FY 2007 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-364) required that the intelligence community produce an updated National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran.

10 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
11 gress that—

12 (1) the murder of members of the United
13 States Armed Forces by a foreign government or its
14 agents is an intolerable and unacceptable act ~~_____~~
15 ~~_____~~ against the United States by the foreign gov-
16 ernment in question; and

17 (2) the Government of the Islamic Republic of
18 Iran must take immediate action to end ~~_____~~ ^{any} training,
19 arming, equipping, funding, advising, and any other
20 forms of support that it or its agents are providing,
21 and have provided, to Iraqi militias and insurgents,
22 who are contributing to the destabilization of Iraq
23 and are responsible for the murder of members of
24 the United States Armed Forces

(3) It is imperative for the executive and legislative branches of the federal government to have accurate intelligence on Iran and therefore the intelligence community should produce the NIE on Iran without further delay;

(4) Congress supports U.S. diplomacy with the representatives of the government of Islamic Republic of Iran in order to stop any actions by the Iranian government or its agents against U.S. service members in Iraq;

25 (c) REPORT.—

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after
2 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 60
3 days thereafter, the Commander, Multi-National
4 Forces Iraq and the United States Ambassador to
5 Iraq ^{in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence} shall jointly submit to Congress a report de-
6 scribing and assessing in detail—

7 (A) ^{any} ~~the~~ external support or direction pro-
8 vided to anti-coalition forces by the Government
9 of the Islamic Republic of Iran or its agents;

10 (B) the strategy and ambitions in Iraq of
11 the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran;
12 and

13 (C) any counter-strategy or efforts by the
14 United States Government to counter the activi-
15 ties of agents of the Government of the Islamic
16 Republic of Iran in Iraq.

17 (2) FORM.—Each report required under para-
18 graph (1) shall be in unclassified form ^{to the extent} but may con- ^{practical consistent}
19 tain a classified annex. ^{with the need to}
^{protect national}
^{security}

(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize or otherwise speak to the use of Armed Forces against Iran.