Chuck Freilich on what comes after the near-inevitable fall of Assad (shorter: don’t even think about spiking the football):
In the absence of any American and Western intention to intervene militarily, and given Russia’s and China’s diplomatic obstructionism, international involvement in Syria has been inconsequential. The Annan plan, based on the illusory premise that Assad would undertake domestic reform, could not possibly have succeeded, for the reforms envisaged would have guaranteed his demise. He was thus left with no alternative but to pay lip service to international demands, to stave off possible intervention, while pursuing the only route available to him to ensure his survival ”“ brutal repression.
Today, international intervention is probably too late, the regime will likely soon fall in any event, though thousands of lives might have been saved, and the opposition will no longer settle for less than ultimate victory. The policy of “leading from behind” pursued by the Obama administration in Libya, where it allowed Britain and France to lead, and now in Syria, where it is letting Russia and China block action, have characterized its entire approach to the dramatic changes in the region since the “Arab spring” began. Admittedly, it did not have many good options, but passivity is not a policy prescription.
Syria’s deeply divided and dysfunctional opposition remains a primary obstacle to effective international involvement, but as the endgame nears, the need to forge a united, moderate and effective opposition is greater than ever. The tragedy of Syria, as in Egypt and other regional countries now undergoing transformational change, is that the chances of a moderate democratic regime evolving are minimal. Indeed, it increasingly looks like the tyranny of Assad will be replaced by an Islamist regime, possibly with strong jihadi and even al-Qaeda influences, and Syria itself may fragment. We may yet miss the relative stability and predictability of the Assad years.
Some of us [sic] more than others:
In the short term…it increasingly looks like a new regime may be as unsavory as its predecessor and may threaten the four decades of calm that have prevailed on the Golan Heights.  The danger of escalation is great, especially if Syria, or its Iranian and Hezbollah allies, in a desperate attempt to save itself in its final extremis, seek to divert attention from their shared problems by using Syria’s vast chemical arsenal against Israel, Syria’s own citizens, or international players, should they seek to intervene. A long-established rule of dictatorship is that an external crisis is always a good means of deflecting attention from domestic challenges.
The whole thing. Read. Etc.
When I read pieces, like the one referenced above, the task of deconstructing them and revealing them for the monumental crap that they are, seems…well, Herculean. From it’s starting assumptions that the writer pretends are facts that we should all accept, to the further assumptions and insinuated moralizing recommendations built upon those – I don’t even know where to begin. And after a long day of work, and a nice glass of wine, I’m feeling too lazy to start diverting the rivers that it would take to clean up the mess. But I just wanted to say…what utter crap. And, anyway, I’d have to have delusions of David Albright proportions to believe that such stuff could be so easily washed away.
I suppose I can just start an inflammatory conversation by saying: Suppose all of Freilich’s assumed rectitude is correct…So what? Why is it our business to get involved? Does Assad’s Regime really stand out as the worst of all possible regimes in the world that we need to take action and spend our resources stamping him/it out versus stamping out other odious regimes that oppress their citizen’s like Saudi Arabia’s, or Turkey’s or Isreal’s or any of the ‘icky-stans’ in central asia (remember our friend Turkmenbashi who would boil people in oil)?
…it’s head and shoulders above much of the rest of the commentary – particularly from the Internet mediated commentariat – that is essentially taking Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya tossing them in a blender and recycling old copy to fill space. Instead of engaging in the sekret squirrel fantasy of covert NATO intervention as primary drivers, Freilich properly highlights that the dominant issues that we in the west will be dealing with centre around the costs of visible non-intervention, not unintended consequences from covert intervention. That’s a significant improvement. I’m no fan of intervention in Syria – largely because on the basis of having spent a fair bit of time in-country over the years, I think it’s pretty likely to cause far more downside than upside for us unless things have changed more than I think they have – but the guys who pretend that non-intervention is cost-free are just as delusional as the guys who thought that Iraq could be transformed cheaply into a bastion of modern, secular democracy.
There are no good options here, only various flavours of least worst.
“Everything around you that you call life was made up by people that were no smarter than you and you can change it, you can influence it, you can build your own things that other people can use.” ~ Steve Jobs
Of course non-intervention in Syria isn’t going to come cost free. My own thought is that J.S. Mill’s “first, do no more harm” is not just a prescription for good utilitarian ethics.
In a situation like this, we don’t have the “moral luxury” of a course of action that clearly does no further harm. Harm is perhaps the only certain product of conflict. Questions we face centre around which of many courses of action causes the least harm – that’s a lot trickier to establish and something that is much more likely to be heavily coloured by how one comes at the issue.
“Everything around you that you call life was made up by people that were no smarter than you and you can change it, you can influence it, you can build your own things that other people can use.” ~ Steve Jobs
BBC – vid at link.