There is concern that the Obama administration will not carry through on withdrawing from Iraq as expeditiously as promised. Although the Iraqi government has approved an agreement requiring all US troops to depart by the end of 2011, the intervening three years are sufficient for maneuvering. The military, some Iraqi groups, Israel, and Saudi Arabia want the US to stay longer and will maneuver adroitly to shape events over the next three years. However, the US presence has adverse consequences beyond the insurgency and terrorism it has fomented in Iraq. Delaying the US departure will have destabilizing effects in Iraq and the entire region.

Working arrangements between the US and various Sunni groups in Anbar and Diyala provinces have helped to reduce violence there, but they have brought instabilities, only vaguely discernible now, that in time will reveal themselves more clearly. The tribal groups are heterogeneous and often antagonistic. Cooperation with the US has brought responses ranging from welcoming an ally against Shi’a militias and al Qaeda, to acceptance of a necessity, to hostility toward those collaborating with foreigners.

In many cases cooperation has increased the power of figures who are outside traditional tribal arrangements and are little more than gang leaders and former insurgent lieutenants. This has lead to simmering resentments and unpredictable social change, which open the door to new forms of conflict within the Sunnis.

The US-Sunni cooperation has caused alarm among the Shi’a. The US favored the Shi’a in the first few years of the occupation. The US disbanded the Sunni-dominated military and enacted a vigorous de-Ba’athification policy, both of which marginalized the Sunnis and pleased the Shi’a. But when the US and Sunnis began to cooperate, the Shi’a feared renewed Sunni power, which led to mistrust of the US and closer ties with Iran. A protracted US presence, then, will further weaken US-Shi’a ties. The Shi’a compose over sixty percent of the Iraqi people and any democratic government must be built by them. They must not be antagonized or driven closer to Iran.

A continued US presence would have destabilizing effects outside Iraq as well. Lost amid the administration’s constant assertion that “the terrorists hate our way of life” is a more thoughtful analysis that sees foreign occupation as the principal reason for terrorism. Hence, a longer US occupation will bring more recruits and funding to terrorist groups. Neighboring states perceived as condoning or supporting foreign occupation – Saudi Arabia would figure highly – will be likely targets.

The US will retain considerable influence on events in Iraq after withdrawing, probably more than if it remains for several more years. It can best influence Iraqi political development in a cooperative effort with Saudi Arabia, which presently has influence with various Sunni groups in central Iraq, and Iran, which has a great deal of influence with the Shi’a. Those powers can work with the Iraqi government to professionalize various military formations, contain sectarian conflicts, and help Sunni and Shi’a groups become political parties. The US effort to end dictatorship in Iraq began with military force, which achieved its goal easily, but it will have to realize that withdrawal and diplomacy are needed now to achieve its stated goal of a stable democracy in Iraq.

~ ©2008 Brian M. Downing
Brian M. Downing is a regular contributor to The Agonist and the author of several works of political and military history, including The Military Revolution and Political Change and The Paths of Glory: War and Social Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam.  He can be reached at brianmdowning@gmail.com.