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EU-Israel Relations, Israeli Politics, and the Gaza StrikesIn the developing world, the Gaza strikes provoked a clear backlash against Israel. To take just one example, protests against Israel's actions have broken out across Latin America. Not surprisingly, Chavez kicked out Israel's ambassador this week. But Venezuela did not see the largest protests - those were in Buenos Aires, where Arab students led a march of 20,000 people to the Israeli embassy on Tuesday. But it's harder to parse out the strikes' effects in other political spheres, particularly EU-Israel relations and internal Israeli politics. To take Europe first, the Christian Science Monitor says that Israel is finding "more sympathy in Europe." CSM attributes changing European attitudes about Israel to growing concerns about Muslim minority populations in Europe and about Islamism more broadly; the article cites polls showing plurality support for Israel in France and Germany. Other factors are at work too. Jewish communities across Europe have staged pro-Israel rallies, and CSM speculates that the entrance of Eastern European countries into the EU, along with a diminution of France's dominance (and thus a decreased emphasis on France's Arab ties) has also increased sympathy for Israel. I'm not convinced. I find the LA Times' depiction of a fractured Europe more convincing than CSM's portrait of increasing pro-Israeli sentiment throughout the continent. The LA Times notes the contradictory statements of European leaders on the Gaza strikes, the multiple calls for cease-fires, and the confused nature of US-EU relations during the Bush-Obama transition. Pro-Palestinian demonstrations have also swept Europe. The picture is, I repeat, somewhat murky. It's also far from easy to guess what effects the strikes are having, and will have, within Israel. As far as Hamas and its future are concerned, Israel will not destroy Hamas with these attacks. As Stirling argues, if any part of Hamas is destroyed it will be the moderate wing, not the entire organization. And as Gideon Lichfield says, even if the attacks go flawlessly from Israel's perspective they will not achieve the goal of "deterring" Hamas, but rather they will have the unintended consequence of redirecting violence into new channels. Regarding the attacks and internal Israeli politics, Lichfield and others believe that Israel's leadership launched attacks in large measure to shore up their tough guy credentials in anticipation of February's elections. I agree. Polls have shown Livni's Kadima and Netanyahu's Likud running neck and neck for some time now. Since the strikes began, it actually appears that Labor's Ehud Barak has benefited the most politically; his party's poll numbers have risen and his personal popularity has soared. Perhaps that means he'll be a fixture of the next government whether Kadima or Likud wins. And perhaps some of his support is being leeched from Netanyahu - though the New York Times mentions that Barak's caution prior to the war has solidified support for him among some leftists. On the other hand, any Israeli politician's gains in this mess may prove short-lived. The BBC notes the majority support among Israelis for the strikes, but also points out that similar support for the invasion of Lebanon in 2006 quickly turned to bitterness. Some Israelis, even those who believe the strikes to be a good idea, also see the maneuver as a transparent political ploy by Labor and Kadima. This isn't the first time military action has intersected with Israeli politics, but in the past results have been mixed; sometimes the leaders who initiate wars end up paying for it at the polls. Given the instability of Israeli politics and the confused European reaction, it's understandable - but not commendable - that Obama has kept a relatively low profile on the situation. Israel has clearly exploited a moment of uncertainty in US and world politics to launch this offensive, but when Obama takes office Israel itself will be facing its own uncertainties. Obama won't know quite what - and who - he will deal with in Israel until after the elections in February. Nonetheless, that just makes the US' imperative to act decisively to end the conflict even clearer. The dynamics of the situation indicate to me that Hamas, a prisoner of its situation, will keep firing rockets; Israeli politicians, prisoners of their situation, will find themselves unable or unwilling to broker peace through bilateral channels; and Europe, without US support, will be hamstrung diplomatically. That means the initiative rests with America. Unfortunately, I doubt Obama will risk much political capital on the Israel/Palestine conflict, especially during his first term. I wish he would take the regional repercussions into account and recognize how detrimental the conflict is to our interests abroad, but I don't think even those concerns will prompt American leadership to action any time soon. I remain pessimistic. Alex Thurston January 8, 2009 - 11:22am
( categories: Analysis | Israel and Palestine )
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