In Afghanistan, endemic violence continues to demonstrate how the American mission has faltered in achieving its objectives there. Across the border in Pakistan, violence is also claiming lives. At the same time, though, the Pakistani government is tentatively pursuing new approaches to dealing with militants.

Afghanistan

Today the world was shocked to learn of a Taliban attack on a military parade in Kabul attended by President Hamid Karzai. Karzai was unhurt, but two citizens were killed and eleven others wounded. The Taliban claimed that they were not trying to kill Karzai, but merely "wanted to show how easily they could get access to such events." Whether or not this statement represents their real intentions (I suspect it was a failed assassination attempt), the ease with which they got close enough to kill has revealed the weakness of the government's security forces.

The attack also reveals divides in how Afghanistan's historical legacy is remembered. It's significant that the parade commemorated the liberation of Afghanistan from Soviet occupation - by the mujahideen, no less. And while many of the warlords and mujahideen who emerged out of the war against the Soviets are now serving in the parliament or running other sectors of the government, others clearly feel that the war that began in 1979 has not been completely resolved. Afghanistan remains the site of superpower intervention, and resultant conflict, through the present moment.

Today's incident only adds fuel to a gloomy prediction issued last week by Major General Jeffrey Schloesser, an American officer who recently assumed command of international forces in the eastern part of the country. He told reporters that he expects high levels of violence to continue in Afghanistan, potentially exceeding last year's all time high of bloodshed.

One dismaying aspect of Schloesser's comments was his seeming uncertainty about where violence originates. The American military is quick to blame "foreigners" who cross over the border from Pakistan, but in making such statements they ignore at least two related facts: the idea of borders don't have much relevance in the region, and therefore some of the people who cross back and forth aren't regarded as foreigners either by the people who live in eastern Afghanistan or by their fellow insurgents. Listen to how vague Schloesser's depiction of Pakistani elements is:

"When I look at the map ... my area of interest, the area that I'm concerned about is on the other side of the border as well as on the Regional Command East," Schloesser said.

"A large number of the enemy cross that border to attack the Afghan people."

Asked if most attacks in eastern Afghanistan originated in Pakistan, Schloesser said: "Potentially, yeah. I think, yes. There is a good amount of enemy that come across the border."

I find such statements worrying because their open-endedness seems to crack open the possibility of further American military interventions in Pakistan, something American commanders have been hinting at for months now. The article cites "analysts" who credit a recent downturn in attacks with an increased commitment on the part of the Pakistani army to fighting insurgents in the region, conveniently leaving out the fact that the Pakistani army has sometimes lost such confrontations, in a situation that I have called "open warfare."

These same analysts go on to undermine the idea that negotiations between Pakistan's civilian government and militants could ease tensions - instead, the analysts predict, a settlement would send more militants over the border into Afghanistan. While this may be true (the peace settlement the Pakistanis are negotiating would require militant tribes to expel foreign insurgents), one wonders whether negotiations would not ultimately reduce violence. But the Americans don't seem willing to even consider that possibility.

So let's look at the negotiations.

Pakistan

First of all, the Pakistani army's campaign against militants in the border region is not nearly so cut and dry as our "analysts" would have us believe. The lines between soldiers, militants, and tribespeople aren't necessarily clear, as indicated by increased religiosity among soldiers in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and their reluctance to fight fellow Muslims. American drone attacks on militants have also weakened morale in the Pakistani army. They feel caught in the middle.

In fact, it is the difficulty the Pakistani government has experienced in trying to quell the insurgency that has prompted the recent attempts at talks - not the other way around. Civilian leaders are eager to reach a deal with militants, and appear to have achieved partial success. Last week they drafted a peace accord with militant tribes, and pro-Taliban leader Betullah Mehsud responded by ordering a ceasefire.

Dangers remain, and Mehsud's current receptiveness to talks has not meant that all parties are ceasing violence. A major bomb attack in the border region on Friday killed five and injured thirty, casting some doubts on the negotiations. The government and the Taliban pledged to continue talking, however.

American skepticism regarding the talks has been thorough, and thoroughly undermining. Washington is watching with its arms crossed. State Department spokespeople, along with Dana Perino, have made a number of statements expressing a lack of confidence. They cite the breakdown of talks between Musharraf and militants last year as proof that current negotiations will likely fail. The civilian leaders' approach is noticeably different than Musharraf's, however; Musharraf has a reputation for using the army like a bludgeon, alienating locals, and given how little good faith Musharraf has shown either toward us or toward his country, it's hard to believe that talks were conducted in a serious manner.

Of course, there would be room for a different kind of American approach. We could back up a democratically elected government as it attempts to wrestle peace out of a situation where military force has failed to stem a tide of violence. Rather than continually disparaging the idea of talking, we could ask what we could do to help. Our direct involvement, I suspect, would not help matters, given the deep anti-American sentiments in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region. But we could certainly provide moral and even logistical support for talks.

In fact, we should watch and learn carefully, because we sooner or later we'll find ourselves needing to do some talking. Succeed or fail, the negotiations prove that even the most hard-line militants are interested in talking. Given that these same militants have pledged to continue their attacks on American targets even if peace is concluded with the Pakistani government - and given that they too have expressed a willingness to talk directly with us - we might want to consider opening up a channel of communication.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan spokesman Maulvi Umar also insisted the group would continue to support attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan, even though a senior Pakistani intelligence official said the proposed peace deal would forbid them.

[snip]

Umar claimed militants across the region were ready for peace if the government met their demands to withdraw the army and release 200 militant prisoners in exchange for as many as 100 people, mostly security forces, held captive by the militants.

He insisted that militants will continue to attack U.S. forces in Afghanistan, but suggested "if America wants peace in the area through negotiations and dialogue we are ready for talks with the Americans."

I don't expect a lull in violence on either side of the border any time soon, and in this sense Major General Schloesser is correct in his predictions of a bloody 2008. But that just reinforces the need for alternative approaches. If the US really wants peace, we should think about exploring some of those alternatives.