In most of my writing I take strong stances, especially against unilateral military action. It is clear to me, for example, that the US should leave Iraq, albeit while launching a diplomatic initiative and taking other precautions to reduce potential bloodshed there. But the situation in South Asia is somehow more difficult for me to make up my mind on. Therefore I pose the question to you: Should the US withdraw from Afghanistan?

As I think through this, I'll lay out what I see as the three main options before us. But first, let me touch briefly on the broad pros and cons of withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The argument for withdrawal is largely predicated on the assumption that current military and development strategies in Afghanistan will not change enough, even under a Democratic administration, to realize the project of nation- and democracy-building that would be essential for any American "victory" in Afghanistan. The argument against withdrawal, on the other hand, assumes that the resurgence of the Taliban which would likely follow withdrawal would wound American prestige and threaten the integrity of NATO at a time when both of these phenomena are perhaps important components of any potential stability in the world. Additionally, the argument against withdrawal also holds the US morally responsible for doing its best to fix the mess in Afghanistan before leaving.

With this in mind, here are what I see as our three major options:

1. Remain in Afghanistan and attempt to "win" through nation-building and other development projects.

I can imagine a scenario in which the United States and NATO, through a dramatic reversal of military strategy and overall approach in Afghanistan, could bring about stability and national unity in the country. This would involve, at the least, a rigorous effort to reduce civilian casualties to an absolute minimum, subsidies to pay farmers not to grow opium poppies, and development projects that employed large numbers of Afghanis at an attractive wage. It would also demand greater accountability from the Karzai government as well as the US military and private US contractors operating in the country. Finally, it would require a sustained effort to bring conditions of justice, stability, and peace to Afghanis at the local level. In short, we would have to supplant the Taliban and undercut every aspect of its local appeal, from its ability to regulate local problems to its role in the drug trade. Underlying these strategies would be a more participatory and inclusive form of development work, such as that seen in microfinance networks, rather than the heavy-handed top-down approach that characterizes much of the US' development efforts. For example, putting Afghanis to work paving roads could represent an important step toward generating income for the people and creating infrastructure to lead the way toward further development. Above all, we would listen to Afghanis and implement their suggestions.

One counterargument to this strategy is that these ideas would meet with strong disapproval on the domestic front as politicians attacked "wasteful" expenditures in Afghanistan and accused the government of being soft on terrorists and drugs. This opposition could sway public opinion against the war completely, or provoke a return to earlier failed strategies.

Another counterargument is that no model for success exists, either in the military realm or the development sphere. When has the US successfully accomplished nation-building outside of Western Europe and Japan? critics ask. Is the situation in Bosnia, for example, comparable to the situation in Afghanistan? Furthermore, how could the ingrained and institutionalized habits of individuals and agencies in the US government, particularly the Departments of Defense and State, be altered so dramatically in a short period of time?

2. Continue with the current approach.

If domestic support and institutional capacity for the development-heavy approach are lacking, but American leadership feels queasy at the thought of outright withdrawal, they could attempt to remain in Afghanistan without a major change in strategy. It is difficult to describe this option without sounding cynical, but the main argument in its favor is that if we are caught between the rock of withdrawal and the hard place of development strategies that lie out of reach, maintaining the status quo is a tempting course. Allowing the situation to limp along, or counting on an infusion of troops and resources when the US leaves Iraq, could minimize the Taliban's ability to maneuver and allow US prestige and NATO integrity to survive in the medium term.

The disadvantages here are almost too many to name. I believe that even with 100,000 more troops, it would be difficult to stabilize Afghanistan by force. Our current approach seems almost calibrated to turn Afghanis against us. Furthermore, without seriously addressing the destabilizing impact of our presence across the region, we risk provoking larger crises simply by remaining. This course's only real advantage is basically that it allows us, in the best case scenario, some time to think and see if a better option comes along.

3. Withdrawal.

Withdrawal from Afghanistan, if conducted properly, would be accompanied by major diplomatic initiatives on the part of US and the EU. After holding bilateral talks with Iran (something we would need to do for a variety of other reasons), we should invite Pakistan, India, Iran, and Afghanistan to a regional summit where we would offer each country specific incentives, inducing them to make contributions to building stability in Afghanistan. Involving other powers, such as Central Asian nations, China, and Russia, would likely also prove to be a good idea. Some manner of discussions with the Taliban would also need to take place, hopefully to find out if there is any way to reconcile their aims with those of the Karzai government and the international community. Finally, in an ideal situation the US would throw its weight behind a UN-led effort to create an institutional framework for stabilizing Afghanistan.

Additionally, the US would disengage from its current misadventures in Pakistan, as well as its allegiance to Musharraf, and lend its support to the democratically elected parliament. Through engagement with both Pakistan and India, the US would do its utmost to press for a solution to the Kashmir issue and establish greater regional cooperation.

The major disadvantages here are that if the frameworks we set up failed - ie, if the Taliban overthrew the Karzai government by force and retook control of the country - both NATO's integrity and America's prestige could be severely damaged. While I have no sentimental attachment to NATO or American prestige as such, one could argue that in a dangerous and unpredictable world both NATO and America could represent important and positive forces. If the new century is to be characterized by a complex balance of powers among various rising giants, the EU, and the US, perhaps the postwar organs of Europe and America still have a role to play.

More importantly to my mind, the failure of "multilateral" operations in Afghanistan could discourage future attempts at multilateral military intervention in crisis situations. As someone who believes strongly that some genocides, such as the Darfur crisis, will eventually require military force to make them stop, I would be concerned at the prospect of a future where major powers become even more reluctant to stage interventions.

Conclusion, Or Lack Thereof

What I have spelled out here are three deeply flawed options. There are others, I imagine, and the ideas presented here are not mutually exclusive - the regional summit I propose in the withdrawal option, for example, could easily fit with the development-based strategy. Thinking through the problem of what to do about Afghanistan leaves me with a deep sense of pessimism. Again, while I believe that after a US withdrawal Iraq would eventually regain stability, I do not share that confidence regarding Afghanistan. Are we doomed to leave Afghanistan a failed state, just as we found it? And is that really a solution, given how other failed states - Somalia, Sudan, etc - are still destabilizing their neighbors and denying their inhabitants any chance of a meaningful or prosperous life?

Some of the best minds in America and the world have been thinking through the problems caused by our invasion of Iraq. I would encourage some of them to turn their sights on Afghanistan as well, which comparatively has received far less attention. Perhaps they'll come up with solutions more compelling than the ones I've offered here.

I look forward to hearing your thoughts.