George Kenney's interview with Jonathan Landay regarding conditions in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

http://www.electricpolitics.com/podcast/2009/03/the_great_game_twenty_first_ce.html

A very informative interview. Pakistan is by far the greater danger.

Obama's Afghan plan: Leave Al Qaeda to others
Despite the surge, he wants others to take over and to ease the US out.

By The Monitor's Editorial Board
from the March 28, 2009 edition

As a candidate, Barack Obama called Afghanistan "the war we must win."

On Friday, however, President Obama laid out a new US strategy that sees Afghanistan and Pakistan as one problem and provides more resources for both countries, but also with the goal that they eventually defeat Islamic terrorists largely on their own.

He no longer seeks a US victory over Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Rather, he now defines the US interest as merely preventing the Taliban from returning to power in Afghanistan and will do so by turning over much of that task to others.

He calls such a handover a "new sense of shared responsibility."

His plan appears designed to have a US surge in troops, money, and civilian workers merely contain and deter Taliban and Al Qaeda for about two more years and then slowly reduce America's role. He will set out benchmarks for Afghan and Pakistani leaders to meet by 2011, such as beefing up their capabilities against terrorists.

The implied threat is that the US will withdraw its forces if those benchmarks are not achieved.

"We will not blindly stay the course," Obama says.

His administration is even trying to lower American expectations of ever defeating Al Qaeda, even though that officially remains a goal. His officials now refer to the campaign against Osama bin Laden and his followers as simply an "overseas contingency operation," not a war on violent Islamists.

And he doesn't call for democracy in Afghanistan as way to keep the Taliban at bay, saying only that the US "can't dictate" that country's future.

The president's strategy may reflect his concern about the high cost of the wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq at a time of recession and when Democrats want to spend hundreds of billions more on healthcare, clean energy, and education.

He's taking a big risk by trying to push more responsibility for Afghanistan onto Europe, the UN, China, Russia, and Iran as well as the governments in Afghanistan and Pakistan. His threat assessment of Al Qaeda's capability to conduct another 9/11-style attack must be quite low. Or else he has simply weighed the price of such an attack against his domestic priorities and decided the latter is more important to America's future.

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ET
27 Mar 2009, 2133 hrs IST, Chidanand Rajghatta, TNN

WASHINGTON: US President Barack Obama on Friday affirmed a tripling of US economic aid to Pakistan to $ 1.5 billion annually over the next five years, calling it a ''down payment'' for America’s future security even though he unambiguously accused the country of being a safe haven for al-Qaida and its leadership.

Obama announced what seemed like a buy-out strategy while unveiling his administration’s new Af-Pak policy in which there was a pronounced shift to Pakistan as the central front in the so-called war on terror. In an oblique indictment of Islamabad, Obama implied that Pakistan's military strategy was the root cause of trouble in Afghanistan, and Pakistani actions, or inaction, was hurting its own people and Afghans, besides threatening the whole world.

''Make no mistake: al-Qaida and its extremist allies are a cancer that risks killing Pakistan from within,'' Obama warned, even as he repeatedly expressed support for the Pakistani people and outlined policies to stabilize the troubled country. ''That is why we must focus our military assistance on the tools, training and support that Pakistan needs to root out the terrorists.''

However, in a clear message to Islamabad that it has to shape up and deliver, the US President warned that it would be held accountable for the generous aid he is requesting from Congress.

''After years of mixed results, we will not provide a blank check. Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al-Qaida and the violent extremists within its borders. And we will insist that action be taken – one way or another – when we have intelligence about high-level terrorist targets,'' he said.

Obama also announced that together with the United Nations, Washington will forge a new Contact Group for Afghanistan and Pakistan ''that brings together all countries who should have a stake in the security of the region,'' including India, Iran, Russia, China, Gulf nations, Central Asian states, and NATO allies. ''None of these nations benefit from a base for al-Qaida terrorists, and a region that descends into chaos. All have a stake in the promise of lasting peace and security and development,'' he said.

Obama also acknowledged in passing Pakistan’s insistence that its troublesome security outlook was tied to disputes with India, saying ''to lessen tensions between two nuclear-armed nations that too often teeter on the edge of escalation and confrontation, we (US) must pursue constructive diplomacy with both India and Pakistan.'' He did not elaborate.

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I am really underwhelmed by Obama's plans for Afghanistan/Pakistan, how about you? I love the detail on the benchmarks, about as informative as the Republican new budget plan. ;)

28 Mar 2009 00:47:42 GMT
Source: Reuters
* Many Pakistanis see Afghanistan as "American problem"
* Deep suspicion of government in Pakistan border regions
* Analyst: 'failure is an option'

(Adds comment by U.S. intelligence official, paragraph 5)

By Arshad Mohammed

WASHINGTON, March 27 (Reuters) - U.S. President Barack Obama's goal of defeating al Qaeda in Pakistan faces myriad hurdles including the country's weak civilian government and infighting among its military and intelligence services.

Obama on Friday unveiled a new war strategy for Afghanistan with a central aim: crushing al Qaeda there and in neighboring Pakistan more than seven years after the group orchestrated the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States from Afghanistan.

Obama said the group -- and almost certainly its leader, Osama bin Laden -- had moved across the border to Pakistan and that the two countries were inextricably linked. He outlined plans to boost economic and military aid to Pakistan to help Islamabad go after al Qaeda and its militant allies.

While analysts praised the focus on Pakistan in Obama's approach, they said it will be hard to carry out in a country that has never truly controlled some border regions where there is deep-seated suspicion of the central government.

And a senior U.S. intelligence official predicted that violence in Afghanistan "is probably going to go up in 2009, no matter what." The official, speaking to reporters, added: "It's going to go up, either because we are clearing the Taliban out of these areas and of course they will resist, or because we are ineffective and the Taliban are clearing themselves back into it, or shooting themselves back into these areas."

Pakistan's action will require institutional and popular support despite a view among many Pakistanis that the Afghan war is an American problem and allegations that Pakistani intelligence operatives support the Afghan insurgency.

"The Pakistanis feel as though we treat them as a rent-an-army," said Alex Thier, an analyst at the U.S. Institute of Peace.

"We give them money and in exchange they engage in a domestically unpopular battle in their frontier ... and they do so somewhat halfheartedly while continuing to support the Afghan Taliban that have safe haven in Pakistan," he said.

The job also may be complicated by tensions among the year-old civilian government led by President Asif Zardari; the military, which has ruled the country for more than half its 61-year existence; and the intelligence services.

"Clearly the government leadership class, which includes the military and the intelligence community in Pakistan, are really not aligned at all," said Rick Barton, a senior adviser in the International Security Program at the CSIS think tank.

'FAILURE IS AN OPTION'

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White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on
U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan

INTRODUCTION

The United States has a vital national security interest in addressing the current and potential security threats posed by extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Pakistan, al Qaeda and other groups of jihadist terrorists are planning new terror attacks. Their targets remain the U.S. homeland, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Europe, Australia, our allies in the Middle East, and other targets of opportunity. The growing size of the space in which they are operating is a direct result of the terrorist/insurgent activities of the Taliban and related organizations. At the same time, this group seeks to reestablish their old sanctuaries in Afghanistan.

Therefore, the core goal of the U.S. must be to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.

The ability of extremists in Pakistan to undermine Afghanistan is proven, while insurgency in Afghanistan feeds instability in Pakistan. The threat that al Qaeda poses to the United States and our allies in Pakistan -- including the possibility of extremists obtaining fissile material -- is all too real. Without more effective action against these groups in Pakistan, Afghanistan will face continuing instability.

Objectives

Achieving our core goal is vital to U.S. national security. It requires, first of all, realistic and achievable objectives. These include:

* Disrupting terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terrorist attacks.

* Promoting a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan that serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, especially regarding internal security, with limited international support.

* Developing increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced U.S. assistance.

* Assisting efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy that provides opportunity for the people of Pakistan.

* Involving the international community to actively assist in addressing these objectives for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with an important leadership role for the UN.

A New Way Forward

These are daunting tasks. They require a new way of thinking about the challenges, a wide ranging diplomatic strategy to build support for our efforts, enhanced engagement with the publics in the region and at home, and a realization that all elements of international power -- diplomatic, informational, military and economic -- must be brought to bear. They will also require a significant change in the management, resources, and focus of our foreign assistance.

Our diplomatic effort should be based on building a clear consensus behind the common core goal and supporting objectives. To this end, we will explore creating new diplomatic mechanisms, including establishing a "Contact Group" and a regional security and economic cooperation forum. The trilateral U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan effort of February 24-26, 2009 will be continued and broadened, into the next meeting planned for early May, in Washington.

The United States must overcome the 'trust deficit' it faces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where many believe that we are not a reliable long-term partner. We must engage the Afghan people in ways that demonstrate our commitment to promoting a legitimate and capable Afghan government with economic progress. We must engage the Pakistani people based on our long-term commitment to helping them build a stable economy, a stronger democracy, and a vibrant civil society.

A strategic communications program must be created, made more effective, and resourced. This new strategy will have no chance of success without better civil-military coordination by U.S. agencies, a significant increase of civilian resources, and a new model of how we allocate and use these resources. For too long, U.S. and international assistance efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan have suffered from being ill-organized and significantly under-resourced in some areas. A large portion of development assistance ends up being spent on international consultants and overhead, and virtually no impact assessments have yet been done on our assistance programs.

We must ensure that our assistance to both Afghanistan and Pakistan is aligned with our core goals and objectives. This will involve assistance that is geared to strengthening government capacity and the message that assistance will be limited without the achievement of results.

Additional assistance to Afghanistan must be accompanied by concrete mechanisms to ensure greater government accountability. In a country that is 70 percent rural, and where the Taliban recruiting base is primarily among under-employed youths, a complete overhaul of our civilian assistance strategy is necessary; agricultural sector job creation is an essential first step to undercutting the appeal of al Qaeda and its allies. Increased assistance to Pakistan will be limited without a greater willingness to cooperate with us to eliminate the sanctuary enjoyed by al Qaeda and other extremist groups, as well as a greater commitment to economic reforms that will raise the living standard of ordinary Pakistanis, including in the border regions of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the North West Frontier Province, and Baluchistan.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

The following steps must be done in concert to produce the desired end state: the removal of al-Qaeda's sanctuary, effective democratic government control in Pakistan, and a self-reliant Afghanistan that will enable a withdrawal of combat forces while sustaining our commitment to political and economic development.

*

Executing and resourcing an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

Our military forces in Afghanistan, including those recently approved by the President, should be utilized for two priority missions: 1) securing Afghanistan's south and east against a return of al Qaeda and its allies, to provide a space for the Afghani government to establish effective government control and 2) providing the Afghan security forces with the mentoring needed to expand rapidly, take the lead in effective counterinsurgency operations, and allow us and our partners to wind down our combat operations.

Our counter-insurgency strategy must integrate population security with building effective local governance and economic development. We will establish the security needed to provide space and time for stabilization and reconstruction activities.

To prevent future attacks on the U.S. and its allies -- including the local populace -- the development of a strategic communications strategy to counter the terror information campaign is urgent. This has proved successful in Iraq (where the U.S. military has made a significant effort in this area) and should be developed in Afghanistan as a top priority to improve the image of the United States and its allies. The strategic communications plan -- including electronic media, telecom, and radio -- shall include options on how best to counter the propaganda that is key to the enemy's terror campaign.

*

Resourcing and prioritizing civilian assistance in Afghanistan

By increasing civilian capacity we will strengthen the relationship between the Afghan people and their government. A dramatic increase in Afghan civilian expertise is needed to facilitate the development of systems and institutions particularly at the provincial and local levels, provide basic infrastructure, and create economic alternatives to the insurgency at all levels of Afghan society, particularly in agriculture. The United States should play an important part in providing that expertise, but responding effectively to Afghanistan's needs will require that allies, partners, the UN and other international organizations, and non-governmental organizations significantly increase their involvement in Afghanistan.

*

Expanding the Afghan National Security Forces: Army and Police

To be capable of assuming the security mission from U.S. forces in Afghanistan's south and east, the Afghan National Security Forces must substantially increase its size and capability.Initially this will require a more rapid build-up of the Afghan Army and police up to 134,000 and 82,000 over the next two years, with additional enlargements as circumstances and resources warrant.

The international community must assume responsibility for funding this significantly enhanced Afghan security force for an extended period. We will also have to provide support for other Afghan security forces such as the Afghan Public Protection Force. Salaries paid to Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police must become more competitive with those paid by the insurgents.

Over time, as security conditions change, we should continue to reassess Afghan National Security Forces size, as it will be affected by such factors as: the overall security situation, the capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces, and the rate at which we can grow local security forces and integrate them into the overall ANSF structure.

*

Engaging the Afghan government and bolstering its legitimacy

International support for the election will be necessary for a successful outcome. We should do everything necessary to ensure the security and legitimacy of voter registration, elections, and vote counting. The international military presence should help the Afghan security forces provide security before, during and after the election. International monitoring will also be required to ensure legitimacy and oversee Afghanistan's polling sites.

The overall legitimacy of the Afghan government is also undermined by rampant corruption and a failure to provide basic services to much of the population over the past 7 years. Where Afghan systems and institutions have benefited from high quality technical assistance and mentoring, they have made great progress. Making such support more consistent with qualified mentors to advise and monitor officials, pushing such efforts to the provincial and district levels, and channeling more assistance through Afghan institutions benefiting from this high quality support will help restore and maintain the legitimacy of the Afghan government.

*

Encouraging Afghan government efforts to integrate reconcilable insurgents

While Mullah Omar and the Taliban's hard core that have aligned themselves with al Qaeda are not reconcilable and we cannot make a deal that includes them, the war in Afghanistan cannot be won without convincing non-ideologically committed insurgents to lay down their arms, reject al Qaeda, and accept the Afghan Constitution.

Practical integration must not become a mechanism for instituting medieval social policies that give up the quest for gender equality and human rights. We can help this process along by exploiting differences among the insurgents to divide the Taliban's true believers from less committed fighters.

Integration must be Afghan-led. An office should be created in every province and we should support efforts by the Independent Directorate of Local Governance to develop a reconciliation effort targeting mid-to-low level insurgents to be led by provincial governors. We should also explore ways to rehabilitate captured insurgents drawing on lessons learned from similar programs in Iraq and other countries.

*

Including provincial and local governments in our capacity building efforts

We need to work with the Afghan government to refocus civilian assistance and capacity-building programs on building up competent provincial and local governments where they can more directly serve the people and connect them to their government.

*

Breaking the link between narcotics and the insurgency

Besides the global consequences of the drug trade, the Afghan narcotics problem causes great concern due to its ties to the insurgency, the fact that it is the major driver of corruption in Afghanistan, and distorts the legal economy.The NATO/International Security Assistance Forces and U.S. forces should use their authorities to directly support Afghan counternarcotics units during the interdiction of narco-traffickers.The new authorities permit the destruction of labs, drug storage facilities, drug processing equipment, and drug caches and should contribute to breaking the drug-insurgency funding nexus and the corruption associated with the opium/heroin trade. Crop substitution and alternative livelihood programs that are a key pillar of effectively countering narcotics have been disastrously underdeveloped and under-resourced, however, and the narcotics trade will persist until such programs allow Afghans to reclaim their land for licit agriculture.Targeting those who grow the poppy will continue, but the focus will shift to higher level drug lords.

*

Mobilizing greater international political support of our objectives in Afghanistan

We need to do more to build a shared understanding of what is at stake in Afghanistan, while engaging other actors and offering them the opportunity to advance our mutual interests by cooperating with us.

*

Bolstering Afghanistan-Pakistan cooperation

We need to institutionalize stronger mechanisms for bilateral and trilateral cooperation. During the process of this review, inter-agency teams from Afghanistan and Pakistan came to Washington, DC for trilateral meetings. This new forum should continue and serve as the basis for enhanced bilateral and trilateral cooperation.

* Engaging and focusing Islamabad on the common threat

Successfully shutting down the Pakistani safe haven for extremists will also require consistent and intensive strategic engagement with Pakistani leadership in both the civilian and military spheres.The engagement must be conducted in a way that respects, and indeed enhances, democratic civilian authority.

* Assisting Pakistan's capability to fight extremists

It is vital to strengthen our efforts to both develop and operationally enable Pakistani security forces so they are capable of succeeding in sustained counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. In part this will include increased U.S. military assistance for helicopters to provide air mobility, night vision equipment, and training and equipment specifically for Pakistani Special Operation Forces and their Frontier Corps.

* Increasing and broadening assistance in Pakistan

Increasing economic assistance to Pakistan -- to include direct budget support, development assistance, infrastructure investment, and technical advice on making sound economic policy adjustments -- and strengthening trade relations will maximize support for our policy aims; it should also help to provide longer-term economic stability. Our assistance should focus on long-term capacity building, on agricultural sector job creation, education and training, and on infrastructure requirements. Assistance should also support Pakistani efforts to 'hold and build' in western Pakistan as a part of its counterinsurgency efforts.

*

Exploring other areas of economic cooperation with Pakistan

We need to enhance bilateral and regional trade possibilities, in part through implementing Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (which were recently re-introduced in Congress) and encouraging foreign investment in key sectors, such as energy. In addition, assisting Islamabad with developing a concrete strategy for utilizing donor aid would increase Islamabad's chances for garnering additional support from the international community.

*

Strengthening Pakistani government capacity

Strengthening the civilian, democratic government must be a centerpiece of our overall effort. Key efforts should include fostering the reform of provincial and local governance in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the North West Frontier Province. We need to help Islamabad enhance the services and support in areas cleared of insurgents so that they have a real chance in preventing insurgents from returning to those areas.

With international partners, we should also promote the development of regional organizations that focus on economic and security cooperation, as well as fostering productive political dialogue.

*

Asking for assistance from allies for Afghanistan and Pakistan

Our efforts are a struggle against forces that pose a direct threat to the entire international community. While reaching out to allies and partners for their political support, we should also ask them to provide the necessary resources to accomplish our shared objectives. They have the same interest in denying terrorists and extremists sanctuaries in Pakistan and Afghanistan that we do. In approaching allies we should emphasize that our new approach is integrated between civilian and military elements and in looking at Afghanistan and Pakistan as one theater for diplomacy.

For the mission in Afghanistan, we should continue to seek contributions for combat forces, trainers and mentors, strategic lift, and equipment from our friends and allies. The U.S. will also pursue major international funding and experts for civilian reconstruction and Afghan government capacity building at the national and especially the provincial and local levels.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan should take the lead in exploring ways that donors could systematically share the burden of building Afghan capacity and providing civilian expertise.As part of its coordination role for civilian assistance, the UN should consolidate requests and identify gaps.

In Pakistan, the U.S. will urge allies to work closely with us both bilaterally and through the 'Friends of Democratic Pakistan' to coordinate economic and development assistance, including additional direct budget support, development assistance, infrastructure investment and technical advice on making sound economic policy adjustments. Similarly, we should ask them to provide technical advice and assistance in strengthening government capacity, such as improving Pakistani institutions.

Conclusion

There are no quick fixes to achieve U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan.The danger of failure is real and the implications are grave.In 2009-2010 the Taliban's momentum must be reversed in Afghanistan and the international community must work with Pakistan to disrupt the threats to security along Pakistan's western border.

re immediate action, sustained commitment, and substantial resources. The United States is committed to working with our partners in the region and the international community to address this challenging but essential security goal.

March 28, 2009
White House Debate Led to Plan to Widen Afghan Effort
By HELENE COOPER and ERIC SCHMITT

WASHINGTON — President Obama’s plan to widen United States involvement in Afghanistan came after an internal debate in which Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. warned against getting into a political and military quagmire, while military advisers argued that the Afghanistan war effort could be imperiled without even more troops.

All of the president’s advisers agreed that the primary goal in the region should be narrow — taking aim at Al Qaeda, as opposed to the vast attempt at nation-building the Bush administration had sought in Iraq. The question was how to get there.

The commanders in the field wanted a firmer and long-term commitment of more combat troops beyond the 17,000 that Mr. Obama had already promised to send, and a pledge that billions of dollars would be found to significantly expand the number of Afghan security forces.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pressed for an additional 4,000 troops to be sent to Afghanistan — but only to serve as trainers. They tempered the commanders’ request and agreed to put off any decision to order more combat troops to Afghanistan until the end of this year, when the strategy’s progress could be assessed.

During these discussions, Mr. Biden was the voice of caution, reminding the group members that they would have to sell their plans to a skeptical Congress.

This article is based on interviews with half a dozen officials who were involved in the debate. All requested anonymity because they were discussing meetings that involved classified material and the shaping of policy.

Mr. Obama left a final White House meeting in the Situation Room last Friday signaling to participants that he was close to a decision, but that he wanted to get comfortable with what he was going to do. He mulled the issue while at the Camp David presidential retreat over the weekend. On Wednesday, he told his top aides that he had made up his mind.

In announcing a plan on Friday that could be his signature foreign policy effort, Mr. Obama said that he would send more troops — some 4,000 — but stipulated that they would not carry out combat missions, and would instead be used to train the Afghan Army and the national police. He left himself open to the possibility of sending more as the situation warrants.

The debate over the past few weeks offered a glimpse into how Mr. Obama makes decisions. In this case, he chose a compromise between his political and military advisers that some critics say includes some strategic holes, such as a reliance on the same sort of vague guidelines that proved difficult to carry out in Iraq. It also offers insight into the role of Mr. Biden and other members of a foreign policy team that includes many powerful figures vying for Mr. Obama’s attention.

In the end the plan is a compromise that reflected all of the strains of the discussion among his advisers, one that is markedly different, though perhaps no less difficult, from the goals his predecessor set for the region. In speaking of Afghanistan and Iraq, President Bush spoke of lofty goals that included building nations that could stand as models of democracy in the Muslim world.

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Bueller? Bueller?

zeroing on problems in Balochistan and Bajuar Agency 3/28/2009

Editorial: Addressing Baloch grievances
and
Second Editorial: Plight of the Bajaur displaced

By Jonathon Burch

MUSA QALA, Afghanistan, March 29 (Reuters) - Most Afghan Taliban are willing to lay down their arms, a former insurgent commander said, but are afraid they will be killed for defecting because the government cannot ensure their safety.

The United States on Friday launched a new strategy in Afghanistan in response to the Taliban-led insurgency that is growing in strength and scope. More than 5,000 people, including 2,100 civilians, have been killed in the past year alone.

With violence at its highest level since the Taliban was ousted in 2001, the United States is sending some 21,000 new troops to bolster about 70,000 foreign soldiers already in Afghanistan trying to crush the insurgency. ([ID:nN26525038])

Washington says the fight cannot be won by military means alone and its strategy review refers to the need to bring some of the insurgents in from the cold.

"Ninety-five percent of the Taliban want to reconcile with the government if they can be assured security," Mullah Abdul Salam, a former high-ranking Taliban commander and now governor of Musa Qala in southern Helmand province, told Reuters.

"But the government of Afghanistan cannot ensure their safety. If they defect to the government, the other Taliban will kill them. They are fighting for their lives," said Salam.

The government must promise to keep safe those insurgents who make peace, Salam said, but most of the militants are hedging their bets until it is strong enough to do so.

The Taliban "are just observing the security situation. At the moment the government is not much stronger than them. When it gets stronger they will come to the government side," said Salam, once a friend of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar.

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Pak Daily Times

* Prime minister praises ‘regional approach’ to Afghan problem in new US policy

By Irfan Ghauri

ISLAMABAD: The Pakistani government has expressed concern to the US over reports of possible drone attacks in Balochistan and such attacks will not be allowed, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani said on Saturday.

Addressing a joint meeting of the parliamentary parties of the ruling coalition, the prime minister said the positive point in US President Barack Obama’s new strategy on Pakistan and Afghanistan was the adoption of a regional approach towards the problem.

He said the new US policy also seconded the Pakistani government’s three-pronged strategy based on dialogue, development and deterrence.

He said the Kerry-Lugar bill would provide economic assistance to Pakistan, and that the money would be used on economic development in the region.

The prime minister said “a handful of foreign terrorists”, mostly Chechens and Arabs, were spreading terrorism and extremism in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas.

He said the tribesmen were patriotic people and were not involved in terrorist activities.

uhuh

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I always thought terrorism was best fought with concentrated, attack forces, going in killing, then retreating back to safety? More of a policing action than large numbers of troops being sent to dangerous places where they're dying like flies. England and Russia couldn't defeat guerrilla tactics and highly doubt the United States, combined with NATO will be successful either.

Seems with large numbers of troops, the more terrorists that are found, the more than spring up. Kinda like cutting off Hydra’s head, only for more to grow. IMHO, not military mind, there have to be better ways to defeat terrorism!

http://www.reuters.com/article/featuredCrisis/idUSLT669420

Sun Mar 29, 2009 9:49am EDT

By Waleed Ibrahim

BAGHDAD, March 29 (Reuters) - Iraqi security forces besieged a Baghdad district on Sunday after Sunni neighbourhood patrolmen angry at the arrest of their leader clashed with police and troops in a gunfight that killed three people.

The shootout on Saturday between government forces and the guards, many of them former insurgents who switched sides and joined the U.S. military to fight al Qaeda, took place in the central Baghdad district of al-Fadhil after the arrest of Adil al-Mashhadani and at least one of his men.

Ties are tense between the Shi'ite Muslim-led government and the fighters, who numbered 100,000 nationwide at one point, and many fear being targeted for their insurgent past.

"Our forces are chasing only those who are wanted and who have committed crimes against innocent people," Baghdad security spokesman Qassim al-Moussawi told Iraqiya state TV as police and troops, backed by tanks and U.S. forces, encircled al-Fadhil. "We will deal harshly with anyone who carries weapons in the face of the Iraqi security forces or tries to shake the stability and security of Iraq," he said.

The Awakening Councils -- "Majalis al-Sahwa" in Arabic -- are led mostly by Sunni Arab sheikhs who rose against al Qaeda in 2006 and were recruited by the U.S. military in a bid to contain a raging insurgency unleashed by their 2003 invasion.

Moussawi told Reuters Mashhadani was wanted for heading a military wing of an off-shoot of Saddam Hussein's outlawed former Baath party.

Pakistan's North West Frontier Province's regional government ceded authority to the Taliban under the peace deal, giving them almost a free hand to impose their puritan Islamic rule on the around 600,000 people of Swat and its seven neighbouring districts.
.
The 17-point peace accord signed with a pro-Taliban cleric Maulana Sufi Mohammad includes measures to establish Islamic courts, a ban on music, expulsion of prostitutes and pimps from the area, closure of businesses during prayer times, and a campaign against what they call obscenity.
.
But it does not stop militants, armed with assault rifles and grenade launchers, from patrolling Mingora, the main town in Swat district, military troops being confined to their barracks.
.
Few policemen can be seen maintaining law and order in the city, which is completely under Taliban control.
.
Mohammad is a reformed pro-Taliban cleric who led thousands of fighters to Afghanistan following the 2001 invasion of US-led international forces.
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Most of his comrades died, but he escaped and was imprisoned in Pakistan, only to be released early last year.
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Mohammad convinced his son-in-law, Maulana Fazlullah, to abandon his armed campaign that has turned Swat, often compared to Switzerland for its stunning landscape of mountains and meadows, into a war zone since late 2007.
.
Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani recently defended the agreement, saying it is part of government's 'three D' strategy of dialogue, development and deterrence.
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Some cabinet members have proposed it should be a model for the new US policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan, which stresses the need for 'reconciliation with the reconcilable elements in Taliban.'
.
The militants have stopped executing their opponents in public, bombing girls' schools and targeting security forces - with few exceptions here and there - but Swat remains a no-go area for foreigners and even Pakistani tourists.
.
Hundreds of al-Qaeda-linked militants, mainly from Central Asian states, continue to recruit and train fighters for the war in Afghanistan.
.
'How could it be a model for reconciliation with moderate Taliban if all it produces is a Taliban rule,' asks analyst and retired general Talat Masood.
.
'If that is how you want to resolve problems in Afghanistan, and for that matter, in Pakistan, just hand over the government to Taliban and they will have no reason for the insurgency.'

The New York Times said in an earlier report that the White House was considering to expand pilotless drone attacks beyond Pakistan's tribal areas on the Afghan border to include the south-western Balochistan province, where many Taliban leaders, including Mullah Omar, are believed to be hiding.

A Pakistani official, who participated in last month's trilateral consultations on policy review between Islamabad, Kabul and Washington, told dpa that 'the US would like to talk to them [the Taliban] from a point of strength.'

'Under the proposed reviewed policy, an intensive force will be used against Taliban in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan for at least one year. When the Taliban are weakened to some extent, they would be approached for reconciliation' he added.

Read more: "Swat deal an unlikely model for reconciliation with Taliban (Feature)" - DPA

By Patrick Donahue

March 30 (Bloomberg) -- German Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung rejected attempts to negotiate with elements of the Islamist Taliban movement in Afghanistan, rebuffing NATO allies who have sought to draw out cooperative elements in the group.

President Barack Obama’s plan to send 4,000 more U.S. troops to Afghanistan includes a strategy to exploit fractures within the Taliban, though he rejects talks with the movement’s Afghan leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar. Jung said he draws no distinction between groups that promote terror and it’s up to the Afghan government to lure in those who swear off violence.

“From my perspective there’s no differentiation,” Jung, a Christian Democrat, told a group of foreign journalists today in Berlin. “When I was just in Afghanistan, we spoke with many tribal chiefs who said ‘Taliban is Taliban’.”

Jung said North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies should concentrate on working with tribal elders to promote development work as a way of preventing Afghans from turning to the Taliban, which ruled the country harshly until it was overthrown in the 2001 U.S.-led invasion. The widening Taliban insurgency aims to push out NATO and U.S. forces from the country and oust the western-backed government of President Hamid Karzai.

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Commentary: Afghanistan and Pakistan's wilderness of mirrors

Also from last Dec, more on Pakistan: DE BORCHGRAVE: Unholy war culture

Commentary: Losing Afghanistan? 9/18/2008

informative news video from France 24

NYT describes how Gates is shaping Obama's AfPak poicy.

March 31, 2009

World Agenda: the Taleban boasts of its own AfPak alliance

Four days after President Obama unveiled his new strategy on Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Taleban appears to have revealed its own “AfPak” policy with its Pakistan branch claiming credit for yesterday's attack on Lahore – and boasting of a new regional militant alliance.

Mr Obama’s strategy, announced on Friday, involves sending another 21,000 US troops to Afghanistan, pouring $7.5 billion (£5.2 billion) into Pakistan, treating both countries as a single military theatre and reaching out to “moderates” among the Taleban’s shifting network of allies.

Diplomats, analysts and local officials on both sides of the border have welcomed the plan, mostly agreeing on its basic premise: that the Taleban will never surrender or negotiate as long as it thinks it can win the war against US-led forces in Afghanistan.

The problem is that the Taleban and its militant allies appear to be changing their strategy too, by uniting their own disparate forces, expanding the territory they control in Pakistan, and mounting audacious commando-style attacks on that country’s urban centres.

That is apparently why Baitullah Mehsud, the 35-year-old head of the Pakistani Taleban, felt confident enough to pick up the telephone and call Western news agencies to claim responsibility for the attack on the police academy in Lahore.

Mr Mehsud has been accused of masterminding many attacks in Pakistan, including the one that killed Benazir Bhutto, the former Prime Minister, at an election rally in December 2007, and another on the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad the next month.

However, he has denied involvement in many, and has never before been accused of organising an attack on the eastern province of Punjab, where other militants groups are thought to have more influence than the Pakistani Taleban.

Today, as well as claiming responsibility for the police academy attack, he claimed to have set up a Council of Mujahidin (holy warriors) bringing together different militant groups “to step up attacks on US and Nato forces in Afghanistan”. That tallies with other reports that the Afghan and Pakistani Taleban have joined forces, and are also working with elements of outlawed Pakistani militant groups with links to the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) service.

The Pakistani Taleban is thought to be run by Mr Mehsud and two rival commanders — Hafiz Gul Bahadur and MaulviNazir — who are all based in North and South Waziristan, the northern tribal areas that are now the centre of militant activity in Pakistan.

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Pakistani warlord threatens to launch attack on Washington

By SAEED SHAH
McClatchy Newspapers

LAHORE, Pakistan -- Pakistani warlord Baitullah Mehsud threatened to attack Washington and the White House, as he claimed responsibility on Tuesday for this week's assault on the police training academy in Lahore.

Mehsud leads the biggest faction of the Pakistani Taliban, an Islamic militia, operating in the lawless South Waziristan tribal region that borders Afghanistan. Mehsud's violent faction is the biggest challenge to the very existence of the Pakistani state, which has been under sustained attack by the Taliban and other extremists for months.

Fighters loyal to Mehsud also cross the border to battle U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Earlier this month, the U.S. put a $5 million bounty on his head, describing him as a key commander of al-Qaida.

The Pakistani Taliban have no known capability to stage attacks in Washington or elsewhere in the west, although al-Qaida could facilitate such an operation for them, said Asad Munir, the former head of military intelligence for northwest Pakistan.

That fact isn't dampening Mehsud's bluster.

"We wholeheartedly take responsibility for this attack and will carry out more such attacks in future," said Mehsud, speaking with Reuters news agency by phone from his hideout. "It's revenge for the (U.S.) drone attacks in Pakistan."

The CIA operates pilotless "drone" aircraft that have repeatedly fired missiles at suspected militants in the tribal area including, more recently, the area under the control of Mehsud.

Mehsud warned the U.S. that, "You can't imagine how we could avenge this threat inside Washington, inside the White House." Separately, Mehsud told the Associated Press: "Soon we will launch an attack in Washington that will amaze everyone in the world."

At least 12 people were killed on Monday when a squad of heavily armed militants stormed the police training school on the outskirts of Lahore, spraying it with gunfire and grenades. Nearly 100 were injured.

There was also a rival claim for the attack from a little-known group, Fedayeen al Islam, which previously took responsibility for the September bombing of the Marriott hotel in the capital, Islamabad. Mehsud's proclamation of guilt, which jibes with the initial government investigation, was the one taken seriously, however.

Munir, the retired intelligence officer, said that Mehsud wanted to emulate Mullah Omar, the founder of the Afghan Taliban.

Mehsud "wants power. He's not going to lay down arms even if NATO forces leave Afghanistan," Munir said. "He thinks that, if Mullah Omar can rule Afghanistan, he can rule part of Pakistan."

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also, does this mean striking in other countries to in the region?

Petraeus said that U.S. forces would “aggressively and relentlessly” pursue al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

“We will continue to target, disrupt, and pursue the leadership, bases and support networks of al-Qaeda and other transnational extremist groups operating in the region,” Petraeus said.

Petraeus Says Israel Might Choose to Attack Iran (Update3)
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By Tony Capaccio

April 1 (Bloomberg) -- Israel might choose to attack Iran to prevent it from developing a nuclear bomb, the top U.S. commander in the Middle East said today.

Army General David Petraeus told Congress that “the Israeli government may ultimately see itself so threatened by the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon that it would take preemptive military action to derail or delay it.”

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Iran’s “obstinacy and obfuscation have forced Iran’s neighbors and the international community to conclude the worst about the regime’s intention,” Petraeus said in a statement submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee for a hearing today.

Ali Akbar Javanfekr, media adviser to Iran’s President Mahmound Ahmadinejad, responded to the general’s comments.

“Iran’s position as a powerful country that is a proponent of logic and peace, the Zionist regime’s chaotic situation, and the state of the world’s economy are realities that do not make this possible,” Javanfekr said in a telephone interview.

Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Yigal Palmor declined to comment on Petraeus’s remarks.
..

Petraeus appeared before the Senate as Obama began talks with world leaders in London on the economic crisis and political issues. Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced agreement on a new round of arms control talks aimed at shrinking their nuclear arsenals and curtailing the spread of such weapons to Iran and North Korea.

Call to Netanyahu

Obama discussed Iran during a congratulatory telephone call today to Netanyahu. Obama affirmed the U.S.’s “steadfast commitment to Israel and its security,” according to a statement released by the White House. The Israeli government described the conversation as “friendly and constructive” in an e-mailed statement.

Ken Katzman, a Middle East military analyst for the non- partisan Congressional Research Service in Washington, said Petraeus’s assertion on Israel “was extremely significant, particularly for what he did not say -- that the United States would act to restrain Israel or talk it out of conducting such a strike.”

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Iran Policies

Petraeus told the Armed Services Committee that Iran pursues policies that “frustrate U.S. goals” in the region: providing “material, financial and political support” to the Islamic militant movements Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Iran has undermined efforts to stabilize Afghanistan by “providing opportunistic support to the Taliban” insurgency, Petraeus said.

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The rise and rise of the neo-Taliban
By Syed Saleem Shahzad

KARACHI - With the number of international soldiers in Afghanistan at an all-time high, they are prepared for their toughest season yet of fighting the Taliban-led insurgency that has grown beyond recognition in the past seven-plus years.

This year, though, the 70,000 troops - 38,000 of them American - face a new and ominous challenge in the form of the neo-Taliban, a new generation of Pakistani, Afghan, al-Qaeda and Kashmiri fighters who have adopted al-Qaeda's ideology, and who plan new tactics, according to Asia Times Online investigations.

big snip...

Echoes from the Swat Valley

In February, Islamabad and militants in the Swat Valley agreed on a peace deal to end two years of fighting; one of the stipulations was that sharia law be introduced in the area.

Commenting on the accord, a senior Pakistani militant told Asia Times Online, "The peace deal was a good gesture towards the Taliban. But it was then realized that it was a maneuver on the part of the Pakistan army. They withdrew their troops from Swat and mobilized them in the tribal areas. A sizeable number of troops were posted in Khyber Agency to provide protection to the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] supply convoys, while other troops were beefed up in North Waziristan and in South Waziristan.

"At the same time, [US Predator] drone attacks were carried out on Baitullah's native town of Makeen in South Waziristan. But, before Pakistan could strike the mujahideen into oblivion, we struck first, all around North-West Frontier Province. The war is on," the militant said.

This was confirmed by the inspector-general of North-West Frontier Province, who said this week that over the past week or so the situation in the province had deteriorated rapidly, with kidnappings and other acts of terror on the rise.

The militant continued, "The next thing that is going to happen is the breaking up of the Swat peace deal and the opening up of a war theater. This will shatter the entire American plans in the region and Pakistan will be left with no choice but to surrender to the will of the mujahideen."

Just hours later, on Wednesday morning, it was reported that up to 70 Taliban had stormed the home of a former federal minister and leader of the Pakistan Muslim League-Q - a major breech of the peace agreement

these policy shifts just don't seem to jive with Karzais recent bill signing on women

Negotiations with Afghan President Hamid Karzai reveal new pragmatism ahead of US offensive

By Kim Sengupta and Jerome Starkey in Kabul
Thursday, 2 April 2009

An Afghan man has his beard trimmed at the Fazal Mohammad Barber Shop in Kabul. The trimming of beards was outlawed by the Taliban

The Taliban, whose extreme interpretation of Sharia law and its harsh punishments made Afghanistan one of world's most repressive and reviled regimes, have agreed to soften their position on such things as beards and burqas as part of a trade-off in negotiations with the Afghan government.

Afghanistan is increasingly the focus of international diplomatic attention following a major international conference in The Hague this week. It will surface on the fringes of the G20 summit and dominate this week's Nato meeting in Strasbourg. Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, floated the idea of talking to "moderate" Taliban at the Hague conference, saying that those who gave up "extremism" would be granted an "honourable form of reconciliation".

Publicly, a Taliban spokesman yesterday rejected the American offer, describing it as "a lunatic idea". But preliminary talks between President Hamid Karzai's government and Taliban insurgents are already under way, and appear to have yielded a significant shift away from the Taliban's past obsession with repressive rules and punishments governing personal behaviour. The Taliban are now prepared to commit themselves to refraining from banning girls' education, beating up taxi drivers for listening to Bollywood music, or measuring the length of mens' beards, according to representatives of the Islamist movement. Burqas worn by women in public would be "strongly recommended" but not compulsory. The undertakings have been confirmed by Mullah Abdul Salaam Zaeef, who was the Taliban's ambassador to Pakistan in the late 1990s, and who has been part of a Saudi-sponsored peace initiative.

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this seems to assume all are taliban and that they all have the same aims

By Steve Hynd(cernig)

If Bush had announced a 15-year, $1.3 trillion "new" strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan which was identical in many respects to the old one and which had no benchmarks or metrics in it to boot, Democratic Party lawmakers would have howled, and rightly so. But Obama has done exactly that and there's not a lot of noise at all - yet.

MORE at Newshoggers

BADEN-BADEN, Germany, April 3 (Reuters) - U.S. President Barack Obama said on Friday he did not expect NATO troops to have to enter Pakistan, but said allies should do more to help Islamabad root out safe havens for Islamist militants.

Obama last month unveiled a new strategy for the conflict in Afghanistan, with a new emphasis on neighbouring Pakistan which has been targeted by militants.

But Obama told a news conference following talks with German Chancellor Angela Merkel before a NATO summit: "My focus on Pakistan does not envision NATO troop activities in Pakistan."

"It does mean that the U.S. and NATO partners have to work more effectively with Pakistan to enable them to root out the safe havens for extremists that pose not just a danger to us but now pose an extraordinary danger to Pakistan."

A patchwork of militant factions is based in northwest Pakistan's ethnic Pashtun border lands.

Obama said more international efforts should be made to help Pakistan with training for a "different type of conflict" to the kind it has traditionally faced.

"Those are all areas where I think NATO can work together very effectively and we can't ultimately, I believe, be effective in Afghanistan if we have not addressed the problems across the border," Obama said.